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ABSTRACT 
New advances in genetic screening now make it possible to determine if a person is more 
susceptible to certain types of cancer.  In some cases, it may be advisable to promote 
consultations with heath care providers for genetic cancer screening among patients at risk for 
cancer.  Using emotional appeals is one way to promote genetic cancer screening.  The primary 
purpose of this study was to examine the role of the emotions of fear and hope in mediating the 
influence of emotion-framed PSAs.  This study explored the relative effectiveness of a fear-
framed video message and a hope-framed video message at influencing people’s attitudes toward 
genetic cancer screening and in persuading individuals at increased risk for cancer to talk to their 
doctors about genetic cancer screening.  This study examined three different models of 
mediation: a model testing the mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by attitude, a 
model testing the mediation of framing effect on attitude by both fear and hope, and a model 
testing the mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by fear and hope. Overall, the fear-
framed and hope-framed PSAs did not differ from a control group in terms of attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening, but both PSAs lead to greater intent to discuss genetic cancer screening 
with a health care provider (compared to the control group). Message frame had no significant 
indirect effect on behavioral intent through attitude toward genetic cancer screening.  Likewise, 
message frame had no significant indirect effect on attitude toward genetic cancer screening 
through hope or fear. The study did find evidence that both discrete emotions mediated the 
effectiveness of message frame on intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care 
provider, which was the health behavior targeted by the messages.  These findings suggest that 
both hope and fear essentially transferred the effect of message frame onto behavioral intent and 
that both hope and fear were effective mediators of the framing effect. 
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1 INTRODUCTION  
1.1 Purpose of the Study  
A recent billboard sign for an Atlanta cancer center read “Where fear meets hope.”   When 
dealing with cancer perhaps no two emotions come to mind more than fear and hope.   It is certainly 
reasonable to expect that a diagnosis of cancer can be a frightening experience fraught with fear and 
uncertainty as well has hope of becoming a cancer survivor. 
  But people can also be afraid of cancer too.   One recent survey in Great Britain indicated that 
cancer was the number one health fear (The Scotsman, 2010).  Perhaps too, people with a greater family 
history of cancer may be more fearful of their chances of getting cancer, especially if they know that 
cancer “runs in the family” so to speak.   For them, the prospect of learning that they may be more at 
risk for cancer than those with no family history through genetic testing can also be frightening.  
Individuals in this situation, however, may also experience hope if their knowledge can lead to actions 
that can help prevent cancer and ultimately lead a healthier life.  
For those with a family history of cancer, there are clinically viable genetic screening options 
available that can detect whether or not an individual possesses a genetic predisposition for certain types 
of cancer such as breast, cervical, colorectal, and thyroid (Robson, Storm, Weitzel, Wollins, & Offit, 
2010).  According to the American Cancer Society there were nearly 420,000 new cases of the 
aforementioned cancers diagnosed in 2013 and nearly 80,000 deaths (American Cancer Society, 2013a).   
Moyer (2014), on behalf of the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, points out that genetic screening 
for these types of cancers in certain individuals can be beneficial and lead to interventions that may 
reduce risk for cancer or cancer-related death.  The American Cancer Society suggests that individuals 
who are concerned about their family history of cancer should talk to their doctors about the possibility 
of genetic screening for cancer (American Cancer Society, 2013b).  Because of the potential benefits of 
genetic screening, it can be argued therefore that individuals with a potential genetic pre-disposition to 
cancer should discuss the possibility of genetic testing with their doctors.  This does not imply that 
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everyone with such concerns should undergo genetic testing, merely that they should consult with a 
physician about it.  
 It could also be argued that appeals for genetic screening consultations should be therefore 
developed and directed at individuals who may be considered at high risk for certain cancers.  Should 
individuals with a family history of cancer be scared into talking to their doctors about the possibility of 
genetic testing or should so-called positive emotions such as hope be used to motivate such 
consultations?  The role of these emotions in mediating the relationship between frame and attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening appeals will be examined in this paper.   
  Political pollster Frank Luntz pointed out that “it’s not what you say but how you say it” 
(Luntz, 2007).  The underlying implication is that the effect of messages is not a function of content 
differences but in the modes of presentation (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).  The same message 
content can be presented or “framed” in different ways which is thought to influence how people hear 
and respond to these messages.  To frame, according to Entman (1993) is to “select some aspect of a 
perceived reality and make it more salient in communicating a text” (p. 52).   
  For example, a message designed to promote colon cancer screening can be presented in a way 
that tries to “scare” people into getting a colonoscopy.   The message could do this by making salient the 
idea that they could be very sick with colon cancer and not know it and may even die sooner because of 
it.  In other words, it makes salient the “bad things” that could happen if a person does not get screened. 
This message makes it clear what those bad things are: They may be dying and not even know it.  This 
would be called a loss frame in that it shows the consequences or “losses” the person could incur if they 
don’t get screened.   
The same message can be presented in such a way that makes more salient the positive aspects, 
or the “good things” that could happen if you get screened: Getting screened can catch cancer earlier so 
that it can be more effectively treated and increase the chance for survival.   This would be an example 
of a “gain” frame such that it demonstrates the good things that could happen as a result of adopting the 
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screening behavior.   The vast difference between the two messages is nicely illustrative of the point 
made by Frank Luntz (2007) that the same appeals can be framed in very different ways.    
Health messages have long used these types of gain or loss framed appeals to try to influence 
people. As the previous example illustrates, how a message is framed can influence emotional 
responses.  A great many health messages have used different frames to elicit different emotions.  Many 
messages do utilize appeals designed to elicit so-called negative emotions, notably fear, to motivate 
action.  Recent and not so recent history is replete with examples of health messages designed to scare 
people so that they would either avoid a certain behavior that was thought to be harmful to them 
(smoking for example) or to adopt a behavior thought to be beneficial to them (wearing a seatbelt).  In 
general, these types of messages are called “fear appeals.”  According to a recent meta-analysis of over 
130 fear appeals studies, fear appeals are effective, especially for promoting one time behaviors and 
detection behaviors (Tannebaum, 2013).   
Clearly there has been much interest in fear appeals in the literature.  It cannot not, however, be 
assumed that fear is always the best way to change someone’s attitude toward a health behavior.   As 
indicated above, the elicitation of fear may be more effective in certain situations (Tannebaum, 2013) 
implying that other emotions may be as or more effective in other situations.  One could easily frame a 
genetic cancer screening appeal as loss-framed message eliciting fear or as a gain-framed message 
eliciting a positive emotion such as hope.  Which message would be more effective, however, remains 
unclear at this point as does the role of the discrete emotion in the relationship between message frame 
and attitude toward a health behavior.  This information would be of value to individuals designing 
health appeals.   
In this study, I will first examine the relative effectiveness of fear and hope in genetic cancer 
screening appeals and the extent to which these discrete emotions mediate the influence of message 
frame on attitudes toward genetic cancer screening and intent to seek counsel about screening from a 
health care provider.     
17 
 
2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Framing theory 
According to some of the seminal literature on framing, a single overarching explanation of what 
constitutes “framing theory” would appear to be somewhat elusive.  On framing theory for example, 
Entman (1993) wrote that “nowhere is there a general statement of framing theory that shows exactly 
how frames become embedded within and manifest themselves in a text or how framing influences 
thinking” (p. 51).  Scheufele (1999) later pointed out that “research on framing is characterized by 
theoretical and empirical vagueness in part because it lacks a commonly shared theoretical model” (p. 
103).    
Some framing scholars have looked at how an issue is characterized in news reports influences 
the way people understand the issue (Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007).   In this sense, “framing” can be 
thought of as something media do to a story. Consciously or unconsciously, news media selectively 
choose which elements of a story to emphasize and which elements to de-emphasize as a matter of 
course.       
Central to this type of framing research is the concept of a media frame.  A media frame 
therefore is a “central organizing idea or story line that provides meaning to an unfolding strip of 
events” (Gamson & Modigliani, 1987, p. 2).  Scheufele (1999) argued that “media frames are necessary 
to turn meaningless on non-recognizable happenings into a discernible event” (p. 106).  Gitlin (1980) 
wrote, “media frames are working routines for journalists to quickly package and relay information to 
their audiences” (p.7).  
For example, the media could frame a story about a proposed tax cut in various ways.  On one 
hand, the media could choose to emphasize how the proposed tax cuts would result in significant 
reductions to government programs that serve the poor.  This type of framing would emphasize the 
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consequences of the proposed tax cuts.  On the other hand, the media could also choose to emphasize 
how the tax cuts will put more money in the pockets of consumers enabling them to purchase or save 
more.  This type of framing would emphasize the benefits of the tax cuts.   
Not all framing research, however, can be characterized as news or media framing and the use of 
frames is not exclusive to journalists and journalism scholars.    When developing messages and appeals 
promoting health behaviors for example, health communicators and other message developers are faced 
with a choice of how they are going to characterize the health behaviors to the message recipients.  
Health promoting messages often stress the value of engaging in a healthy behavior or of not engaging 
in an unhealthy behavior (Van ‘T Riet, Ruiter, Werjj, Math, & DeVries, 2009).  Accentuating certain 
aspects of health behaviors at the expense of others is also referred to as “framing” (Hoffner & Ye, 
2009).   For example, one could frame benefits that would accompany the adoption of an exercise 
program (weight loss, better health, more energy) or the consequences of not exercising (weight gain, 
loss of conditioning, risk of adverse health consequences). 
Thus, while the field of health communication and field of journalism are distinct (although there 
are certainly areas where they overlap), the concept of framing is highly relevant to both.  Regardless of 
the field in which frames are utilized, framing can generally be said to involve selection and salience 
(Entman, 1993). To frame therefore, according to Entman (1993), is to “select some aspects of a 
perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a 
particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and or treatment recommendation 
for the item described” (p. 52).   Frames, Entman (1993) argued “define problems such that they 
determine what a causal agent is doing and with what costs and benefits” (p. 52). 
2.1.1 Message framing 
Many types of information or messages can be framed in different ways.  Perusing online used 
car ads for example, one can certainly see some of the most creative uses of framing ever imagined.   
For example, if I want to persuade people to buy my beat-up 1984 Chevy Citation, I am certainly going 
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to want to emphasize in the ad the great gas mileage over the non-existent curb appeal, blown head 
gasket, and faulty power steering.  Though it might seem frivolous, a used car ad is a great example of 
how frames can be used to try to persuade someone to do something that the message sender wants them 
to do.  In this case, the car seller wants to unload his junk car on someone else by making salient all of 
the benefits (such as they are) of purchasing it.  Of course, frames can be also applied to messages and 
appeals designed to persuade people to act in other ways as well.  Broadly, this concept is referred to as 
message framing.   
Yan, Dillard, and Shen (2012) defined message framing as the idea that “persuasive appeals can 
be designed to focus on either the advantages of pursuing some course of action (i.e. gain framed) or the 
disadvantages of failing to do so (i.e. loss framed)” (p. 682).   Message frames are often utilized in 
appeals to persuade people to have favorable attitudes toward and ultimately adopt many health 
behaviors.   One common way to frame health messages is to use a gain (advantage) frame or a loss 
(disadvantage) frame. To engage in health message framing, developers of health messages decide 
which aspect of the health behavior to emphasize and which aspect to de-emphasize.   For example, 
smoking cessation, a health behavior often targeted by public health officials can be framed in terms of 
the gains it may achieve (e.g., “Quitting smoking now can immediately lower your chance of heart 
disease”) or in terms of the losses that could be incurred if such behavior is not adopted (e.g., 
“Continuing to smoke increases the likelihood that you will die of heart disease”).    
It should be pointed out that the adoption of a health behavior doesn’t necessarily guarantee any 
specific outcome.  Wearing a seatbelt, for example, can greatly increase one’s chance for survival in an 
accident, yet tragically many people are still killed each year in auto accidents while they were wearing 
seatbelts while others walk away unscathed without wearing a seatbelt.   Likewise, one may reap the 
benefits of quitting smoking but still die of smoking related illnesses.  A person also may escape an 
unpleasant cancer-related death and continue to smoke until they are 100.   This is illustrative of the fact 
that no matter how a health behavior is framed, engaging in any type of health behavior, whether good 
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or bad, does not always ensure certain health outcomes.  In other words, choosing to behave in a certain 
way may involve certain expectations that something will happen but also carries with it risks that that 
“something” may or may not actually happen.   These potential outcomes, for which the probability can 
rarely be ascertained, can be referred to as “prospects” and provide the basis for Kahneman and 
Tversky’s (1984) prospect theory.  In most cases people making decisions about what course of action to 
take do not know for certain what the outcome will be, so their decisions can be said to be made under 
conditions of uncertainty.  That is, their decision to do something carries with it the risk that something 
else may happen. As Tversky and Kahneman (1981) pointed out, how various courses of action are 
framed can influence what course of action people ultimately take. 
2.2 Decision making under conditions of uncertainty 
The notion that people make decisions under conditions of uncertainty is not a novel concept.  
Milton Friedman and L.J. Savage wrote that people are often faced with situations where they can chose 
courses of action with different subjective risks (Friedman & Savage, 1948).  Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) pointed out that decision-making under conditions of risk can be viewed as a choice between 
prospects or gambles.  According to Tversky and Kahneman (1981), the major theory of decision 
making under risk is the expected utility theory (EUT).  According to expected utility theory, “a 
prospect is acceptable if the utility resulting from integrating the prospect with one’s assets exceeds the 
value of those assets alone” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979, p. 264).  EUT broadly states that when people 
are faced with a choice between risky propositions or prospects they will choose the prospect that 
provides maximum expected value or “utility” of some quantity (Friedman & Savage, 1952).  Yet 
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) demonstrated that people do not always act this way by finding that 
people often act in ways that violate the tenets of the expectancy utility theory.  For example, using 
various decision problems involving monetary gambles, they found that people would often prefer 
taking a smaller amount of money as a “sure thing” rather than a modest gamble for a higher sum.   
When people prefer a “sure thing” over a gamble with a higher value, it is known as risk aversion 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  Conversely, rejection of a sure thing in favor of a gamble of lower and 
equal expectations is called risk seeking (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).    
2.2.1 Framing and Prospect Theory 
The model by which these violations of expected utility theory are taken into account is called 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).  To illustrate prospect theory, Kahneman and Tversky 
(1984) used a fictional scenario of a deadly disease outbreak expected to kill 600 people to ask about 
people’s preferences among two different treatment options   The first experimental group was asked to 
choose between one treatment that would save 1/3 of the people and a second treatment that had only 
1/3 probability of saving all 600 people but a 2/3 probability that no one would be saved (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984).   In this case, a very large percentage of respondents (72%) chose the “sure thing” of 
saving 200 people (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  The second group was given the same scenario and 
asked to choose between an option where 400 people would definitely die and an option where there 
was a 1/3 probability that nobody would die but a 2/3 probability that all 600 would die (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1984).  In this case, an even larger majority (78%) chose the second option with a high 
probability that many would die (Kahneman & Tversky, 1984).  What is notable is that the two sets of 
treatment choices in these problems are identical in their outcomes yet they were framed differently, in 
terms of people being saved or dying.  The fact that people had markedly different treatment preferences 
in the two problems illustrates the power of frames to influence people’s decision making.  As this 
problem illustrates, it is not only possible to frame a given decision problem in more than one way, but 
how one frames the problem can affect what choice people make (Kahneman & Tversky,1984).    
2.3 Framing health decisions 
One major line of research seeks to answer how differently framed messages affect people’s 
attitudes toward a health behavior and their willingness to adopt the health behavior. O’Keefe (2002) 
defined persuasion as “a successful intentional effort at influencing another’s mental state through 
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communication in a circumstance in which the persuadee has some measure of freedom” (p.5).  The 
implication is that when people are persuaded, they have moved beyond simply processing the message 
to potentially acting upon it, assuming that they have the free will to do so.  Thus, the extent to which 
frames can influence persuasion has also been of interest to scholars. 
O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) suggested that there are two broad framing research questions 
worthy of study.  The first relates to the overall difference in persuasion between gain and loss framed 
messages while the second relates to what factors moderate (or mediate) the relative effectiveness of 
these appeals (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).   Research in that regard has been somewhat disappointing.  
Recent meta-analyses (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2007, 2009), which notably reviewed a large number of 
framing studies related to health messages, suggest that it doesn’t really matter which frame one uses in 
a health message because neither the loss or gain frame alone holds a persuasive advantage (O’Keefe & 
Jensen, 2007, 2009).     
At the surface, these findings could imply that further research on the effectiveness of framing in 
health messages would seem somewhat superfluous.  The question of whether or not frames alone have 
any demonstrable impact on health behavior would appear to have been answered.  But it is reasonable 
to consider the possibility that human health behavior is unlikely to occur as the result of a single 
message factor such a framing.  Every health decision is likely to be impacted by more than what frame 
was utilized in a particular health message.  Therefore, to further message framing research, researchers 
must go beyond simply asking the question of what effect the frame by itself has on the behavior.  
Framing research must ask questions to determine under what specific conditions each type of frame is 
more effective.   
 For example, in the wake of O’Keefe and Jensen’s meta-analyses (2007, 2009), it was suggested 
that framing effects do in fact exist and that an understanding of them can only be achieved by 
identifying other variables upon which those effects are contingent (Yan, Dillard, & Shen, 2010).   
Latimer, Salovey, and Rothman (2007) made a similar argument by proposing that there are many 
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opportunities to advance framing research particularly as researchers begin to look at other factors that 
could impact the effectiveness of gain/ loss frames.  Rothman, Bartels, Wlaschin and Salovey (2006) 
suggested examining under what conditions frames could be optimally used.   Likewise, Shen and 
Dillard (2007) argued that research must develop conceptual frameworks that link empirical features of 
messages (e.g., frames) and persons with subsequent portions of the persuasion process.  Looking only 
at features of messages would be short sighted as there are certainly other factors apart from the 
messages themselves that could interact with message frames to influence behavior.  The following 
section reviews recent framing literature that has explored factors influencing message frames in health 
contexts. 
2.4 Factors that can influence message frame persuasiveness: Health behavior 
Type of health behavior has been considered a factor that can influence the effectiveness of 
frames.  For the purposes of this study, I will focus on two types of health behaviors:  health prevention 
behaviors and disease detection behaviors.  Health prevention behaviors (like smoking cessation) are 
behaviors that are performed to help prevent the onset of disease, injury, or other adverse health 
outcomes whereas health detection behaviors (like mammography) are those that detect the presence of 
disease (Van ‘T Riet, Ruiter, Werjj, & DeVries, 2010).    
People tend to view these behaviors differently.  According to Rothman and Salovey (1997), 
people perceive disease prevention behaviors as relatively safe, because they minimize the chance of 
getting sick.   In contrast, people perceive disease-detection behaviors as inherently risky because they 
entail the possibility of finding out that one is ill (Van ‘T Riet et al., 2010).   Early detection of disease 
conditions can potentially have substantial benefits such as reduced risk of death and availability of a 
larger number of treatment options (Smith, Cokkinides, & Eyre, 2007).  But as previously stated, these 
types of behaviors carry with them the inherent risk that the decision maker, that is, the person who 
decides to engage in a disease detection behavior, is faced with risk of possibly finding out that they 
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have a disease.  Depending on the disease, this can lead to a great deal of anxiety or fear in the decision 
maker, as anyone who has awaited the results of a mammogram or an HIV test can probably attest.    
Type of health behavior has been studied frequently within the context of gain/loss framing 
appeals.  In fact, O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) stated that type of health behavior (health prevention vs. 
health detection) is one of the most well-known and perhaps well studied moderating factors for the 
relative effectiveness of framed appeals.   For example, based on their own analysis of framing studies, 
Rothman and Salovey (1997) and Salovey, Schneider, and Apanovitch (2002) suggested that loss-
framed messages would be more persuasive than gain-framed messages for disease detection behaviors 
while gain-framed messages would be more persuasive for prevention behaviors.   Citing Tversky and 
Kahneman’s prospect theory (1981), O’Keefe and Jensen (2006) suggested that “the results of framing 
research indicate that persons are more likely to undertake risky (uncertain) behaviors when potential 
losses are salient but prefer risk-averse choices when gains are prominent” (pp. 5-6).  They also 
suggested that this explains why loss frames would be more effective for disease detection behaviors 
and gain frames would be more effective for disease prevention behaviors (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).  In 
other words, because disease detection behaviors carry with them the risk that someone will “find 
something wrong,” it has been posited that loss framed messages would be more effective at getting 
people to adopt health detection behaviors.  
   It is not insignificant then that O’Keefe and Jensen’s (2006) meta-analytic review concluded 
that gain and loss framed appeals did not significantly differ in persuasiveness concerning disease 
detection behaviors.  A later review by O’Keefe and Jensen (2009) seemed to corroborate these earlier 
findings by concluding again that loss-framed appeals did not appear to have a substantial advantage for 
encouraging disease detection behaviors, a finding that they readily acknowledge was a “rather 
disappointing conclusion” (p. 304).   In fact, they went so far as to posit that “those who have the 
responsibility of designing messages aimed at encouraging disease detection behaviors should not 
believe that choosing loss-framed messages will substantially improve persuasiveness” (O’Keefe & 
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Jensen, 2009, p. 304).  They did acknowledge, however, that there was a very small nonzero overall 
population effect, with some similarly small population effect for each specific detection behavior 
(O’Keefe & Jensen, 2009).  These findings were used by O’Keefe and Jensen (2009) to explain why in 
some cases a small advantage was observed for loss framed messages in breast cancer detection 
behaviors.   
One of the few framing studies that have appeared since the 2009 meta-analytic review that 
addresses a disease detection behavior is a study by Van ‘T Riet et al., (2010) that looked at skin cancer 
detection.  This study came to the conclusion that loss-framed messages were more persuasive than gain 
framed messages, but only for participants with high self-efficacy to engage in monthly skin self-
examination (Van ‘T Riet et al., 2010).   
2.4.1 Genetic screening for cancer: What type of health behavior is it? 
Since genetic screening for cancer is the health behavior of interest in this study, it is fair to ask 
what type of health behavior it is.   In general, I would argue that genetic screening cannot necessarily 
be thought of as a “true” disease detection behavior.  In most cases, genetic cancer screening does not 
detect cancer but rather detects potentially harmful genetic mutations that may increase the risk for 
cancer.   The presence of such mutations does not necessarily mean that a person will get cancer, only 
that they may be more susceptible to a certain type of cancer.  However, knowing that one is more 
susceptible to cancer due to the presence of a mutation can lead to a person adopting interventions that 
can possibly reduce the risk of cancer.  For example, interventions that may reduce the risk of cancer in 
women who are BRCA mutation carriers include earlier and more frequent or intensive cancer 
screening, use of certain risk-reducing medications, and even risk-reducing surgery such as mastectomy 
(Moyer, 2014).  Nevertheless, I would make the argument that because its primary purpose is to detect 
the presence of genetic mutations indicative of susceptibility to cancer, that genetic screening for cancer, 
and by extension, discussing genetic screening for cancer, would be considered more similar to a disease 
detection behavior as opposed to a disease prevention behavior.   Therefore, for the purposes of this 
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study it will be characterized somewhat cautiously as a disease detection behavior that can lead to 
disease prevention measures. 
2.5 Individual characteristics and their impact on frame   
2.5.1 Demographic and social factors 
Some recent studies have sought to answer the question of whether demographic factors such as 
ethnicity and age as well as social factors can interact with message frames to produce different effects 
on the adoption of health behaviors. For example, the relatively recent development of the human 
papilloma virus (HPV) vaccine has led to a proliferation of health promotion activities devoted to 
getting young women vaccinated, especially in light of the fact that among sexually active women 
between the ages of 14-19, HPV has a prevalence rate as high as 39.6% (Dunne, Unger, Sternberg, 
McQuillan, Swan, Patel, & Markowitz, 2007).  There have been recent studies that have addressed the 
use of gain / loss framing within the context of HPV vaccination messaging where demographic and 
factors have come into play in determining the effectiveness of a given message frame.    
A recent study by Lechuga, Swain, and Weinhardt, (2011) found that gain / loss frames exerted 
different effects across ethnic groups such that African-American and Hispanic mothers of daughters in 
the targeted age range were more responsive to loss frames but that non-Hispanic white mothers 
responded equally to gain and loss frames in their intentions to get their daughters vaccinated, 
suggesting for the latter group at least, framing did not matter.   It was suggested that this was because 
people from collectivist cultures (e.g. African American, Hispanic) attempt to “fit in” by fulfilling roles 
and obligations and hence may be more oriented towards avoiding losses (Elliot, Chirkov, Kim, & 
Sheldon, 2001; Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000).  In another study, Cronan, Conway, Davis, and 
Vasserman-Stokes (2011) studied the effectiveness of gain and loss framed messages to increase colon-
rectal cancer screening among low income Caucasians, African-Americans, and Mexican -Americans 
and found that only Caucasians were more responsive to gain framed message.  No preference for frame 
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was found in the other groups.  In terms of the responsiveness of Caucasians at least, this was the 
opposite of what the researchers predicted (Cronan et al., 2011) 
The question of whether age can impact the relative impact of different frames was examined in 
a meta-analysis by Mata, Josef, Samanez-Larkin, and Hertwig (2011) which concluded that there were 
no clear age-related differences as a function of gain / loss framing. 
2.5.2 Individual Perceptions and beliefs 
A considerable amount of the recent research on factors that interact with frames has studied 
how various individual perceptions can interact with message frames to produce different effects.  
Perceptions in this context could include self-efficacy related to the individual’s belief in their ability to 
perform the recommended behavior, the belief that the health behavior will actually be effective 
(response efficacy), and the perceived susceptibility of the individual to the health condition.  Notably, 
all of these factors are constructs from the health behavior model (HBM).  
The HBM states that preventive health behavior results when readiness to act (presence of 
perceived susceptibility and perceived seriousness of the health issue /illness) and efficacy of the 
recommended response (perceived benefits outweigh perceived barriers) work cumulatively (Chew, 
Palmer, Slonska, & Subbiah, 2002).  In other words, according to the HBM, for a person to adopt a 
preventive health behavior, they have to believe not only that they are at risk for a condition and that it 
poses a threat to them, but also that the action being recommended will work to protect them and that 
they have the ability to adopt the behavior (response efficacy).  The extent to which these factors have 
interacted with message frames to impact (or not impact) health behavior has been the subject of some 
recent framing research. 
2.5.3 Self-efficacy 
Self-efficacy is the belief that one can perform an action intended to reduce the impact of a 
condition (Strecher & Rosenstock, 1997).  Self-efficacy is distinct from response efficacy, which is the 
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belief that the health behavior will attain the desired result (e.g. prevent or detect the disease).  The 
extent to which frames can influence self-efficacy in health messages has been studied.   Van ‘T Riet, 
Ruiter, Werrij, and Vries (2008) discovered that individuals with high self-efficacy beliefs about quitting 
smoking had higher levels of motivation to quit smoking after viewing a loss-framed message, but that 
individuals with low self-efficacy didn’t seem to be more motivated by either a gain or a loss framed 
message.  At least among high self-efficacy participants, this could be attributed to loss aversion.  
Among those with low-efficacy, it could simply be that their lack of belief in their ability to quit 
smoking overrode any influence a framed message might have.  In the case of low-efficacy smokers at 
least, it would appear that efforts should be directed at increasing their self-efficacy beliefs about 
smoking cessation.  
In another study addressing framed messages and skin cancer detection measures, Van ‘T Riet, 
Ruiter, Werjj, and De Vries (2008) found that loss-framed messages were more effective for those with 
high self-efficacy, and once again there were no differences among those with low self-efficacy.    In a 
third framing study that looked at self-efficacy related to salt consumption, Van ‘T Riet, Ruiter, 
Smerecnik, and de Vries (2010) found that participants who received information designed to increase 
self-efficacy were more responsive (i.e., more likely to reduce their salt consumption) to the loss framed 
message than the gain framed message whereas those who did not receive the self-efficacy enhancing 
messages were not differentially influenced by either frame.  These studies clearly show that individuals 
with low self-efficacy do not appear to be more responsive to either type of frame suggesting that efforts 
to increase self-efficacy will need to look at factors other than message framing. 
2.5.4 Response efficacy / Response risk 
Response efficacy is the extent people believe a recommended response deters or alleviates a 
health threat (Rogers, 1975, 1983; Witte, 1992a, 1994). Framing and response efficacy was studied by 
Nan, Xie, and Madden (2012). These researchers analyzed framing of H1N1 flu vaccination messages 
and found that loss-framed messages were more effective than gain-framed messages at increasing 
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intent to get vaccinated among older adults with low response efficacy beliefs, but that the loss / gain 
frames made no difference for those with high response efficacy.   They suggested that messages about 
H1N1 targeting older adults should seek to match individuals with low perceived efficacy with loss 
framed messages while at the same time arguing that either a loss or a gain frame would be beneficial to 
those with a high response efficacy (Nan et al., 2012).   What this would seem to suggest then is that in 
the case of H1N1, a loss framed message would be the most effective since among those with high 
response efficacy frame doesn’t matter but among those with low response efficacy, loss frames to 
appear to be more effective.    
To some extent, there is some element of risk inherent all health behaviors.  Few health 
prevention or health detection behaviors come with a 100% guarantee.  For example, one may adopt a 
heath prevention behavior (e.g. flu vaccine) believing it will be effective and then get the flu anyway.   
In this case, the person tacitly accepted that risk when they adopted the behavior.  By the same token, 
one can adopt a health detection behavior (e.g. mammogram) thinking that they probably won’t find out 
that they have breast cancer and instead learn that they do.    The extent to which risk is associated with 
a given health behavior has also been studied within the context of message framing.    
Bartels, Kelly, and Rothman (2010) determined that when the risk associated with a health 
behavior (either prevention or detection) was low, gain-frames were more effective but that when risk 
associated with the health behavior was high, loss-frames were more effective.  Unlike the previous 
experiment, this does seem like a manifestation of loss aversion, such that higher risks engender more 
extreme responses, hence the higher effectiveness of the loss frame in this case. 
Considering the many health risks posed by smoking, it may be hard to imagine that some people 
may view quitting smoking as a risky activity.  But to some, particularly women, it poses the risk of 
weight gain, increases in negative affect, loss of enjoyment, and the unpleasantness of nicotine 
withdrawal (Toll, Salovey, O’Malley, Mazure, Latimer, & McKee, 2008).  Thus, to some considering 
smoking cessation, they must weigh those risks against those of continuing to smoke.  In their study, 
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Toll et al. (2008) found that women with low perceptions of risk related to smoking cessation are more 
responsive to gain frames whereas women with high risk perceptions of smoking cessation had no 
preference for frame.    
2.5.5 Perceived susceptibility / ease of imagination 
If one does not feel they are at risk for a given health condition, they do not perceive themselves 
to be susceptible to that health condition.  Does perceived susceptibility have an impact on what frame is 
more effective? A recent study found that average to higher levels of perceived susceptibility for breast 
cancer were more likely to be screened after viewing a loss framed messages than a gain-framed 
messages (Gallagher, Updegraff, Rothman, & Sims, 2011).  In this case, it would appear that the more 
susceptible one feels to a given condition, the more responsive they will be to a loss frame.  This finding 
seems to be consistent with the concept of loss aversion. 
 Ease of imagination on the other hand, is the degree to which bodily changes or states are 
subjectively easy to visualize (Broemer, 2004).   This can be seen as somewhat similar to the simulation 
heuristic which is the ease that people can imagine or construct events or scenarios (Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1982).  Sherman, Cialdini, Schwartzman, and Reynolds (1985) showed that individuals judged 
the likelihood of contracting a disease to be higher when the symptoms were relatively easy to imagine, 
but as less likely when symptoms were difficult to imagine. In other words, perceived susceptibility can 
be related to the ability of people to imagine themselves in a disease state.   The concept of ease of 
imagination can also apparently be applied to outcomes as Broemer (2004) showed that negatively 
framed health promotion messages about physical activity resulted in more positive attitudes when 
decision makers could easily imagine the outcomes of not exercising (heart disease for example).  
Interestingly, Berry and Carson (2010) were not able to replicate Broemer’s 2004 findings in their own 
study which found that there was no main effect of message framing on attitudes towards physical 
activity, and no interaction between message framing and ease of imagination.   
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So far, this review has looked at many factors that have been found to influence framed health 
appeals.  There are undoubtedly other factors that should also be examined One such factor may be 
emotions.  Emotions might be important to consider because it is thought that emotions can influence 
attitudes, which then affect behavioral intention (Shen & Dillard, 2007).  So, I would argue that 
emotions, including emotions elicited by gain/loss framed messages could influence the effectiveness of 
health appeals.   
Since at any given time, most people experience some type of emotional state, it is important to 
consider the possibility that they could also influence receptivity to gain or loss framed health appeal 
and possibly influence behavior.  In general, emotions are considered “states” as opposed to “traits.”  
States are transient experiences that can change sometimes as quickly as moment to moment (Grawitch, 
2013).    Someone making a decision about whether or not to adopt a health behavior may choose 
differently depending upon how they feel or what emotion they are experiencing at the time.   Emotions 
are individual characteristics that have recently been studied for their potential to interact with message 
frames in influencing persuasion (Shen & Dillard, 2007; Yan et al., 2012).   
The study of emotion is of immense interest in framing research because it is thought that 
emotions can influence attitudes, which then affect behavioral intention (Shen & Dillard, 2007).  If 
emotions can influence attitudes and thus influence behavior, the extent to which this can impact the 
adoption of health behaviors is of great importance.  Thus, it is important to gain a fuller understanding 
of how health messages may stimulate emotion, and which emotions are most effective at changing 
attitude.  
2.6  Overview of emotions 
Can a health message make someone fearful, disgusted, or angry?  Certainly.  Recent ads by the 
Centers for Disease Control (CDC) seem to try to “scare” smokers into quitting by graphically showing 
the consequences of smoking (e.g. showing a tracheotomy ring in the throat of a smoker). Another 
relatively recent ad on smoking cessation featured a graphic portrayal of a young man coughing up a 
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diseased lung, ostensibly from smoking, at the dinner table.  It is easy to see how someone might find 
that disgusting.   The more important questions regarding these ads are whether or not they were 
persuasive to the extent that they resulted in any demonstrable attitude or behavioral change among 
those targeted by the health messages, 
The aforementioned health campaigns clearly elicited what are commonly thought of as 
“negative emotions” (anger, fear, disgust), that is they tend to evoke reactions that are unpleasant.    
Health messages have arguably also tried to elicit positive emotions such as hope.  For example, another 
recent anti-smoking ad carried the message that it is ok to fail at quitting and to just keep trying because 
sooner or later you will succeed.  Someone trying to quit smoking may find this message reassuring and 
slightly hopeful – in contrast to the fear that may be evoked by shocking images of disfigured smokers.  
Perhaps as a result of the positive emotional response, the person may even call the quit line featured in 
the ad.    
2.6.1 Emotion defined 
What exactly is emotion?  Unfortunately, there does not seem to be a single all-encompassing 
definition that can be definitively referred to as the one “true” definition of emotion.  Plutchik (2001) 
says “that the study of emotion is one of the most confused (and still open) chapters in the history of 
psychology,” with over 90 definitions proposed for emotion in the 20th century alone” (p. 344).  So 
while there appear to be many competing definitions for emotion, an emerging consensus seems to agree 
that “emotions are best conceptualized as multi-component response tendencies incorporating muscle 
tension, hormone release, cardiovascular changes, facial expressions, attention, and cognition that unfold 
over a relatively short time span in response to an event” (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008, p. 778). An 
emotion is the process of recruiting resources from various physiological, motivational, and cognitive 
subsystems that shift an organism (a person) into a state of being that will address the person-
environment relationship (Lazarus, 1991; Oatley, 1992).    
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Similarly, Lang (1984) defines emotion as a broad response disposition that may include 
measurable language behavior, organized overt acts, and a physiological support system (somatic and 
visceral) for these events.  Emotions are, by definition, associated with urges to act in particular ways, 
urges that have been called specific action tendencies (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, Kuipers, & Schure, 1989; 
Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1994; Tooby & Cosmides, 1990).  But often, emotions by themselves are not 
sufficient to evoke behavioral responses.  Fredrickson (1998, p. 3) posited that “no emotional theorist 
would argue that people invariably act out urges when feeling particular emotions.”  Plutchik (2001) 
agrees by saying that “impulses to action are not always followed by action” (p. 348). Clearly there are 
other factors that interact with emotions to influence whether urges elicited by emotions lead to actions. 
Plutchik (2001) for example, says that fear of retaliation or embarrassment can influence whether or not 
a person acts on an emotional impulse.  Likewise, whether urges become actions depends on the 
interaction of many different factors including but certainly not limited to ability to control impulses, 
individual coping skills, cultural norms, and the context in which a stimulus is encountered 
(Fredrickson, 1998).    
Emotions therefore are exceedingly complex, multifaceted, and defy a simple explanation.  A 
broader discussion of the vicissitudes and vagaries of human emotion is well beyond the scope of this 
paper.  Nevertheless, because of their potential role in influencing attitude and motivating action, the 
study of emotion is of particular interest in health message framing research.  Such research may help 
illuminate the answer to questions posed above about whether gain or loss framed health messages can 
“scare” or “encourage” someone into action or mediate the effectiveness of message frames in some 
way. 
2.7 Models of emotion: Dimensional vs. discrete emotions 
In the previous section, I indicated that the emotions of fear, disgust and anger were thought of 
as “negative emotions” while referring to hope as a “positive emotion.”   To refer to an emotion as either 
“negative” or “positive” is to characterize the emotions using dimensions that can be applied to multiple 
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individual emotions.  On the other hand, when one refers to an individual emotion and its inherent 
properties, one is referring to a discrete emotion.  What follows is a discussion on the two most 
prominent models of emotion dimensional model and the discrete model.   
2.7.1 Dimensional Emotions 
Nabi (2010) noted that there are two basic models of emotion prevalent today: dimensional and 
discreet.  Although a definitive typology of emotional dimensions has proven elusive, the dimensional 
model views emotions as generalized motivational states characterized by two broad affective 
dimensions: arousal and valence (Nabi, 2010). Smith and Ellsworth (1985) wrote that level of activation 
(arousal) and pleasantness (valence) “are the only dimensions that have been found consistently across 
studies” (p. 814).   Nabi (2010) suggested that the dimension of arousal generally characterizes emotions 
as either resulting in a high or low motivational state.   In terms of the dimension of valence, Smith and 
Ellsworth (1985) argued that there is general agreement that a primary characteristic of every emotion is 
valence on a bipolar continuum from highly unpleasant to highly pleasant which is a highly 
oversimplified way of saying that some emotions are pleasant and some are not, although the degrees to 
which they are either would seem to be able to vary.      
2.7.2 Discrete Emotions 
The discrete emotional model focuses on categorical emotional states each with their own unique 
cognitive appraisals or thought patterns (Frijda, 1986; Izard, 1977; Lazarus, 1991).  According to Nabi 
(2010), “such appraisal perspectives hold that particular patterns of thought about the environment 
relative to one’s goals lead to certain states of action and readiness” (p. 154).   Nabi (2010) also 
suggested that discrete emotions have particular action tendencies (e.g. fear may lead to fight or flight, 
anger to retaliation).   Thus, Nabi (2010) argued that a state is considered a discrete emotion if it has 
unique appraisal patterns, subjective experiences, and action tendencies.  
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In general, therefore, the dimensional approach to understanding emotions characterizes 
emotional responses rather broadly while discrete approach characterizes emotions having specific 
responses and action tendencies.  This study will focus specifically on two discrete emotions: fear and 
hope. 
2.7.3 Why study discrete emotions? 
Before discussing fear and hope individually, it is important to make an argument for why I am 
taking the discrete emotional approach rather than the dimensional approach to the study of framed 
health messages related to messages of genetic cancer screening behaviors.  
I will support this position by citing Nabi’s (2010) basic argument that the inherent complexities 
associated with human thought and behavior render the broad dimensional approach to emotions 
insufficient to understand the processes underlying the persuasive effects of health communication 
efforts, and more specifically, receptiveness to gain/loss health appeals.    By this reasoning, it would 
seem that the broader response tendencies associated with the dimensional emotional approach (e.g. 
negatively-valenced emotions) would provide limited understanding of how someone might respond to a 
gain/loss framed message.  Nabi (2010) pointed out that “the dimensional perspective does not allow for 
the same degree of predictive precision as the discrete emotion paradigm” (p. 155).   To say someone 
reacted negatively to a message promoting some type of health behavior could mean that they responded 
with anger or fear or disgust, each of which has its own specific response tendencies which in the case of 
health behaviors may or may not lead to adoption of a health behavior.  However, if it is known that a 
gain/loss framed message elicited fear or hope—both discrete emotions—it would lead to better 
understanding of how the person might be likely to respond, since fear and hope tend to have their own 
specific response tendencies.   Thus, knowing the various response tendencies associated with discrete 
emotions makes the discrete paradigm a better predictor of behavior than the dimensional approach.    
Izard (2007) also made a strong case for studying discrete emotions by pointing out that they 
have different predictors as well as different behavioral outcomes.  Izard (2007) actually seemed to be 
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making a case against the dimensional approach by arguing that the dimensional approach of grouping 
emotions by valence, direction of motivated action, or describing them as “positive” or “negative” is an 
arbitrary way of classifying emotions.   
Although I have chosen as the focus of this study discrete emotions (fear and hope), it is still 
important to consider emotions dimensionally.  Nabi (2010) argued that the dimensional approach 
provides the essential foundation for emotion-based research even though it may lack for predictive 
precision of the discrete emotional approach.   This is not to say that the dimensional vs. discrete 
dichotomy is mutually exclusive.  In fact, Nabi (2010) wrote that “the beauty of the discrete emotion 
view is that it incorporates the dimensional perspective in that valence and intensity are assessed” (p. 
154). 
So at the most basic level, one can argue that fear is dimensionally different from hope because 
the former is negative while the latter is positive.  Because emotions are often dimensionally classified 
by valence, (i.e. as either a positive emotion or a negative emotion), it is useful to review the 
fundamental differences between negative and positive emotions and provide a summary of some of the 
more common negative and positive emotions.    
In this dissertation, two discrete emotions will be studied: fear, which is widely considered to be 
a “negative” emotion as well as hope which is considered to be a “positive emotion.”  It should be noted, 
however, that while fear is classified as a basic discrete emotion in some typologies, notably Izard 
(1977) and Tomkins (1984), hope is not contained in either typology.  To that point, hope may not 
always be thought of as an emotion.  In describing hope for example, Penz (2008) never once 
characterizes hope as an emotion but rather as a “multidimensional and complex construct” (p. 408).  
Leading hope theorist C.R. Snyder (2002) preferred to view hope as more than solely an emotion but as 
something that influences emotions related to goal pursuits.  So while Snyder indicated that hope can 
influence emotions, he doesn’t explicitly characterize hope as a discrete emotion in this case.  Which 
begs the question:  So is hope a discrete emotion or isn’t it?  It is, after all, critical to a study of discrete 
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emotions to know whether or not one of the main areas of interest—hope—can be classified as such.   
Unfortunately, as with many concepts described in this paper, there is no one single overriding 
definition or conceptualization of hope that definitively characterizes it as a discrete emotion.    
There are those of course who do consider hope to be a discrete emotion (Stotland, 1969; 
Lazarus, 1999, Bar-Tal, 2001).  The variety of views as to what hope actually “is,” however, puts this 
writer in the unenviable position of having to, for the sake of argument, make the distinction as to 
whether or not “hope” is officially a discrete emotion or not.  This is due of course to the centrality of 
discrete emotions to my study. Therefore, I will demonstrate later in this paper that hope does engender 
specific response tendencies that are often associated with discrete emotions, thus for the purposes of 
this paper, I will argue that hope is a discrete emotion. 
2.8 Negative emotions 
Negative emotions function as signals of maladaptation and danger and motivate the individual 
to respond in a way that reduces maladaptation and danger (Chen & Bargh, 1999; Roelofs, Putman, 
Schouten, Lange, Volman & Rinck, 2010).  For example, when one is threatened, fear may be elicited 
which may then lead to a response (fight or flight) to mitigate the threat and return the individual to a 
homeostatic condition.    Anger serves to mobilize a person’s energy and making them capable of 
defending themselves (Izard, 1977).   Distress can signal to others that someone is in need of help (Izard, 
1977).  According to Izard (2007) the basic negative emotions are largely “negative” and include 
distress / sadness, anger, disgust and fear.  Because of its centrality to this dissertation, fear will be 
discussed in greater detail later in this chapter.   
Historically, emotion research has focused on negative emotions (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008).   
This is primarily because psychology as a whole tends to focus on understanding and ameliorating 
psychological problems (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000).   Some gain / loss framing research has 
also focused on negative emotions, notably fear and anger (Shen & Dillard, 2007; Gerend & Maner, 
2011).   Gerend and Maner (2011) pointed out that one of the reasons that negative emotions might be 
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the focus of so much attention within health communication studies is that negative emotional states like 
fear and anger are frequently experienced within the context of health decision-making (e.g., receiving a 
diagnosis; making treatment decisions, etc.). They also suggest that people’s “responses to framed health 
communications vary as a function of people’s current emotional state” (Gerend & Maner, 2011, p. 
422).   One negative emotion that is perhaps most often studied within the context of health 
communication messages is fear.  One does not have to search very long to find health messages 
intended to elicit fear! 
2.8.1 Fear 
In his book Human Emotions, Carroll Izard (1977) wrote that “fear is the most toxic of all 
emotions” (p. 355).  It is certainly one of the most studied.  Izard (1977) claims that “fear has probably 
been the subject of scientific investigation more than any other fundamental emotion” (p. 355).  Fear has 
been characterized as a negatively-valenced emotion (Easterling & Leventhal, 1989; Lang, 1984; Ortony 
& Turner, 1990)   In general, fear mobilizes energy and motivates individuals to escape from danger 
(Izard, 1977).  As previously mentioned, fear is an emotion of great potency and has a very profound 
effect on an individual’s perception, thought, and action (Izard, 1977). Typically, fear is accompanied by 
apprehension, uncertainty, the feeling of a lack of safety, and impending doom (Izard, 1977).  
Additionally, fear can also be characterized by appraisals of low certainty and lack of personal control 
(Slovic, 1987).  Fear can derive from internal or external events, conditions, or situations that signal 
danger the threat of which can be physical or psychological (Izard, 1977).  In other words, fear is 
generally associated with some type of threat to an individual.  Health messages have often attempted to 
make the threat of an undesirable health outcome more salient to people in an effort create fear.  Such 
health messages are called fear appeals. 
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2.8.2 Fear appeals 
Sometimes a health message can attempt to portray something as a threat to a person’s health or 
well-being and do so in a way that can cause fear. Health messages that attempt to stimulate fear in those 
receiving the messages are referred to as fear appeals.  Specifically, fear appeals are persuasive 
messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will happen to them if they do 
not do what the message recommends (Witte, 1992a).  For over half a century, fear and fear appeals 
have been studied extensively within the context of health communication as a persuasive tactic to 
encourage audiences to engage in healthy behaviors (for reviews, see Boster & Mongeau, 1984; Witte & 
Allen, 2000).  In general, fear appeal messages will incite action to the degree that they successfully 
convince message recipients that they are susceptible to severe consequences associated with the threat 
(Maloney, Lapinski, & Witte, 2011).  Research also suggests that fear-arousing messages can motivate 
protective behaviors when people believe they are able to adopt responses (self-efficacy) that effectively 
avert the threat (response efficacy) (Witte, 1992a, 1992b, 1994, 1998). 
2.8.3 The Extended Parallel Process Model 
Fear’s impact on behavior can be described using the extended parallel process model. The 
extended parallel process model (EPPM) attempts to describe what happens when a person encounters a 
fear appeal and to explain when and why these persuasive messages may work or fail (Witte, 1992a, 
1994, 1998).   A fear appeal initiates two appraisals in the individual receiving the message (Witte, 
1992a).  First, a person will appraise the perceived threat of the hazard and if the threat results in 
moderate to high perceived threat, fear will be elicited (Easterling & Leventhal, 1989; Lang, 1984). 
When fear is elicited people are then motivated to begin a second appraisal which is an evaluation of the 
efficacy of the recommended response (Witte, 1992a).  When perceived threat and perceived efficacy 
are high, danger control processes are initiated such that the individual is motivated to control the danger 
by thinking of strategies to avert the threat (Witte, 1992a).  In other words, they seek to act in a way that 
mitigates the threat. They are responding to the danger and not their fear (Witte, 1992a) 
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On the other hand, when perceived threat is high but perceived efficacy is low people act to 
control their fear rather than the danger (Witte, 1992a).  In other words, rather than acting in ways that 
mitigate the threat, people act to control their fear, for example by engaging in maladaptive responses 
like denying or dismissing the threat altogether (Witte, 1992a). 
2.8.4 The effectiveness of fear appeals 
As previously stated, fear appeals are a common technique used by health message designers and 
thus are seen quite frequently.  A cursory review of the literature reveals a plethora of studies on the 
effectiveness of fear appeals in health messages.  Though a complete review of these studies is beyond 
the scope of this paper, and for that matter has already been done (see Tannebaum, 2013), it is 
instructive to review some recent studies to gain a better understanding of the many different health 
behaviors for which fear appeal effectiveness studies have been conducted.   
In short, according to a recent meta-analysis by Tannebaum (2013), fear appeals do work, but 
like frames, there can be a variety of moderators and situations that can impact the effectiveness of fear 
appeals.   Likewise, fear appeals may be effective in raising awareness or arousal but not necessarily 
always effective at changing attitude behavior. For example, Halkjelsvik, Lund, Kraft, and Rise (2013) 
found that tobacco control fear appeals led to an increase in motivation to quit smoking but did not 
appreciably change smoking status.  A meta-analysis of the influence of fear appeals on safe driving 
behavior by Carey, McDermott, and Sarma (2013) found that fear appeals led to greater arousal but did 
not actually lead to changes in driving behavior.  A study in Tanzania showed that young people 
preferred HIV related fear appeals in that they were more effective instilling or reinforcing high 
perceived susceptibility but not necessarily effective at reinforcing response and self-efficacy (Bastien, 
2011).  Respondents in this study expressed a desire for more information about how to protect 
themselves from HIV, suggesting that for fear appeals to be more effective they should contain 
information that will lead to better response efficacy, that is provide people with information they can 
use to reduce the threat (Bastien, 2011).  This is somewhat consistent with recent findings by 
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Tannebaum (2013) and with the extended parallel process model, which suggests that higher response 
efficacy can lead to adaptive responses to threats (Witte, 1992a).   In short, it would appear that in many 
cases fear appeals should be accompanied by information on how to reduce threats rather than simply 
containing graphic portraits of undesirable outcomes.   
But in some cases, the effectiveness of shocking imagery has enhanced the effectiveness of fear 
appeals.   For example, in a study that looked at ads to prevent meth use, Morales, Wu, and Fitzsimons 
(2012) found that adding an element of disgust (e.g., extremely graphic and disgusting photos) added to 
the effectiveness of fear appeal messages resulting in lower reported intentions to use illegal drugs.  This 
study is notable for its elicitation of two negative emotions (fear and disgust) and pointed out that adding 
the element of disgust resulted in a more persuasive message than merely using fear alone (Morales et 
al., 2012).    
Although there is considerable evidence that in some circumstances fear appeals can be effective, 
that is by no means always the case.  In a study of low- to moderate- fear appeals relating to distracted 
driving, Lennon, Rentfro, and O’Leary (2010) found that fear appeals were actually counterproductive 
leading to a “boomerang” effect where the intention to perform maladaptive behaviors (e.g., talk or text 
while driving) actually increased.  Obviously this is not a desirable outcome and is an example of the 
inconsistency sometimes encountered in fear appeals research.    
In the previous sections I have discussed both the emotion of fear and the concept of fear 
appeals.  It is important for the purposes of this study, however, to make a distinction between “fear” 
and “fear appeals.”  As has been discussed, fear itself is an emotion while fear appeal is a persuasive 
attempt to elicit the emotion of fear.  What perhaps needs to be disentangled in studies involving fear 
and fear appeals is a better explanation for what actually leads to positive attitudes toward a health 
behavior—the emotion of fear or the content of the fear appeal itself.  It is entirely possible that both 
emotion and message play some role, a possibility which will be explored later in this study when 
emotions are hypothesized as mediating the relationship between message and outcome. 
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2.9 Positive emotions 
Clearly there has been much research on health appeals eliciting negative emotions, most notably 
fear.   However, there appears to be somewhat less research on the use of positive emotions in health 
appeals.    Fredrickson (1998) argues that even though research on emotions has flourished in recent 
years, investigations that expressly target positive emotions remain few and far between.  Perhaps one of 
the reasons that this is the case is that in general, there appear to be a smaller number of discrete positive 
emotions.  For example, Izard’s (1977) list of basic emotions includes seven negative emotions (fear, 
anger, distress, disgust, contempt, shame, and guilt) and only two positive emotions (joy and interest).  
For the record, Izard (1977) classifies surprise as either a positive or negative emotion.  Minus the 
emotion of guilt, Tomkins (1984) proposed the same typology for emotion.  More recent typologies, 
however, such as that developed by DeSmet (2012) seem to have as more positive emotions listed, 
including hope, courage, sympathy, and many others.   Like emotion itself, defining what exactly 
positive emotions are seems to be somewhat difficult.  Included in their chapter on positive emotions, 
Fredrickson and Cohn (2008) have a section titled “Defining Positive Emotions” (p. 778) which 
interestingly enough doesn’t actually provide a definition of positive emotions. This would appear to 
speak volumes about the apparent difficulty of providing a definition.   Instead they cite how the 
“distinctions between positive emotions and other closely related affective states such as positive mood 
are blurry” (Fredrickson & Cohn, 2008, p.778).   They also wrote that “positive emotions resemble 
positive moods but differ from them in that positive emotions are about some personally meaningful 
circumstance” (p. 778).  This is useful but still does not really tell us what positive emotions are.   
Though Frijda et al. (1989) don’t necessarily define positive emotions either, they at least illustrate how 
they are fundamentally different, at least in terms of behavioral impact, by pointing out that negative 
emotions stimulate people to reject or withdraw from a stimulus while positive emotions cause people to 
gravitate toward a stimulus.   
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In terms of heath appeals, an obvious question becomes, can positive emotions motivate any type 
of action?  Certainly it has been shown that negative emotions such as fear and anger under the certain 
circumstances can motivate people to act.   For example, fear can cause a person to avoid something that 
threatens them.  Anger can also motivate someone to defend themselves.  But again, this is illustrative of 
two different things: that dimensionally, negative emotions can motivate behavior but that the discrete 
emotion results in distinct responses. 
It is somewhat less clear if positive emotions can have the same effect.   It is clear that positive 
emotions do have some motivational effect.  But again, they appear to be tied more to discrete emotions 
than to the “positive” dimension.  For example, Izard (1977) wrote that interest, one of only two positive 
emotions he discussed, provides much of the motivation for learning and creative endeavor.  To joy, the 
only other positive emotion discussed in any detail in his book Human Emotions, Izard (1977) ascribes 
little motivational power, stating rather that it is a highly desirable emotion characterized by a sense of 
confidence, meaningfulness and a feeling of being loved.   Little about the power of positive emotions to 
motivate action can therefore be gleaned from Human Emotions.   Which is perhaps another reason why 
taking the discrete approach will be far more useful in discerning the power of individual positive 
emotions to elicit behavior.   
As I have illustrated, some typologies of emotion (Izard, 1977; Tomkins, 1984) contained more 
of what are considered negative emotions. Later typologies (DeSmet, 2012) certainly contain more 
positive emotions, but in general it would appear that the body of literature on the motivational aspects 
of positive emotions is not as extensive as that of negative emotions.  This is part may be accounted for 
by what is referred to as a negativity bias. 
2.10 The negativity bias in psychological research 
Sheldon and King (2001) pointed out that in general, traditional psychology trains its 
practitioners to view positivity with suspicion thus resulting in the proliferation of a negativity bias in 
psychological research. Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) suggested that this is largely because 
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psychology as a whole tends to focus on understanding and ameliorating psychological problems.  To 
some extent then the “negativity bias” of psychology can be attributed to its nature to understand and 
perhaps correct problems.  Though not necessarily analogous to the negativity bias encountered in 
psychological research, health appeals research does appear to have its own “negativity bias.”    
Tannebaum’s (2013) meta-analysis alone included 132 studies on fear appeals.  A cursory search of the 
term “positive emotional appeals” reveals little in the way of research.  Although that should not be 
taken as confirmation that there has been little or no research on positive emotional appeals, the fact that 
page after page of fear appeals studies was retrieved by a simple search is certainly telling.  
Together, this evidence supports the conclusion that both the field of psychology and the field of 
health appeals research have somewhat of a negativity bias.  Should the relative dearth of research on 
positive emotions, and more specifically on the use of positive emotions in health appeals, be taken as a 
sign that they are not important?  I would make the argument that the answer to this question is no.  As 
previously indicated, positive emotions can motivate.  The broader question, however, becomes which 
discrete positive emotions motivate and under which circumstances are they most effective relative to 
negative emotions.  What can studying discrete positive emotions within the context of framed 
emotional health appeals contribute to the communication literature?   Understanding more about 
positive psychology as a whole will hopefully lay the foundation underpinning such questions. 
2.11 Positive psychology 
The origin of the field of positive psychology can be attributed to Martin Seligman in his 1999 
address to the American Psychological Association (Seligman, 1999).  In this address, Seligman pointed 
out that “psychology had largely neglected the latter two of its three pre-World War II missions: curing 
mental illness, helping all people to lead more productive and fulfilling lives, and identifying and 
nurturing high talent” (Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006, p. 4).   According to Seligman and 
Csikszentmihalyi (2000), the aim of positive psychology is to “begin to catalyze a change in the focus of 
psychology from preoccupation only with repairing the worst things in life to also building positive 
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qualities” (p. 5).   Interestingly, Seligman’s assertions about positive psychology were not necessarily 
novel.  As early as the 1950s Maslow lamented that “the science of psychology has been far more 
successful on the negative than on the positive side” (Maslow, 1954, p. 354).   In short, it appears that in 
one sense, the role of positive psychology is to address the imbalance of focus in the larger field of 
psychology that favors study of the negative.  But it is not merely a movement to balance the 
psychological research playing field.  
According to Seligman, Steen, Park and Peterson (2005), positive psychology is an “umbrella 
term for the study of positive emotions, positive character traits, and enabling institutions” (p. 410).  To 
that end, Linley et al. (2006) argued that “positive psychology should seek to understand the factors that 
facilitate optimal functioning as much as those that prevent it” (p. 7).   Of course, the term “optimal 
functioning” can be open to multiple interpretations.  Could one argue, for example, that adopting 
healthy behaviors over unhealthy behaviors is “optimal functioning”?   Linley et al. (2006) wrote “the 
outcomes of interest to positive psychology may be defined as those subjective, social, and cultural 
states that characterize a good life including happiness, well-being, fulfilment, and health (at the 
subjective level)” (p. 8).  So to that extent, one could make the argument that “optimal functioning” does 
entail outcomes that result in health and well-being.   According to Linley et al., (2006), positive 
psychology is about understanding the processes lead to desirable outcomes.  Thus, understanding those 
processes is paramount to gaining more insight into understanding how desirable outcomes occur. One 
process of interest in this dissertation is the role that health appeals and positive emotions play in 
eliciting attitudes and behaviors that result in desirable health outcomes. 
2.11.1 Why study positive emotions? 
As previously indicated, the rather broad characterization of positive psychology does include 
the study of positive emotion (Seligman et al., 2005).  It is important to study positive emotions in the 
context of health appeals and health decision making because positive emotions and experiences have 
been found to predict or contribute to many different life outcomes (Lyubomirsky, King, & Diener, 
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2005). Clearly, positive emotions have an impact on overall health and well-being.  For example, people 
who experience high levels of positive emotions tend to experience less pain and disability related to 
chronic health conditions (Gil, Carson, Porter, Scipio, Bedaiko, & Orringer, 2004).  Fredrickson and 
Cohn (2008) pointed out that the experience of positive emotions prompt individuals to engage with 
their environments and take part in many activities that are evolutionarily adaptive for individuals.  
Perhaps most importantly, as Ong, Mroczek, and Griffin (2011) pointed out, experimental and 
prospective epidemiological studies are accumulating that indicate numerous aspects of adult health, 
such as self-reported health, physical functioning, disease severity, and mortality, are influenced by 
positive emotions.  So clearly, positive emotions are linked to desirable health outcomes.  Thus, how to 
leverage the benefits of positive emotions within the context of a health appeal is worth examining.  In 
other words, much the same way that fear-framed messages can sometimes scare people into acting in 
their own best interests, can hope-framed messages encourage people to do the same thing?  
As has been documented in this chapter, a considerable amount of research has accumulated on 
the effects of gain or loss framed health appeals.  Some studies have even looked at how pre-message 
emotions interacted with message frames to influence the persuasiveness of messages.  For example, in 
a study of effects of pre-message emotions on behavioral system activation, Yan et al. (2012) found that 
loss frame was more persuasive among fearful individuals and a gain frame produced more persuasion 
for happy and angry participants.  Apart from Yan et al. (2012) very little framing research appears to 
have studied the effect of positive emotions in framed health appeals. This would seem somewhat 
surprising considering that positive emotions facilitate approach behavior (Cacioppo, Priester, & 
Berntson, 1993; Davidson, 1993; Frijda, 1994).  Just as a fear appeal can motivate someone to get a flu 
shot, it is reasonable to hypothesize that some positive emotions could motivate someone to adopt a 
health behavior.   It is critical here to note that fear appeals act by eliciting fear.  In other words, the 
emotions are elicited by the message and are not “pre-message” emotions like those studied in Yan et 
al., (2012). Notably, this study will analyze the effect of “post-message” positive emotions, that is, 
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emotions elicited by the message itself.   In other words, this study will analyze the effectiveness of one 
specific positive emotion—hope—which has the potential to motivate behavioral adoption and will be 
explored later in this paper.    But, the argument is made here that positive emotions should be studied 
for their potential to affect attitudes toward health behaviors and behavioral intentions      
Fredrickson (2008) argued that in general, positive emotions differ from negative emotions in 
that they lead to broadened and more flexible response tendencies while negative emotions lead to 
specific action tendencies.  Fredrickson and Cohn (2008) pointed out that negative emotions (like fear 
and anger) are adapted for specific and often survival critical situations.  Negative emotions they argue 
appear strongly in the moment because they were evolved to mobilize immediate action (Fredrickson & 
Cohn, 2008). For example, when faced with a threat, fear can lead to a “fight or flight” response.      
The results of positive emotions are more diffuse and generally less urgent (Fredrickson & Cohn, 
2008).  According to Fredrickson and Cohn (2008), there are high arousal positive emotions such as joy 
and low arousal positive emotions such as contentment.  One could hypothesize that high arousal 
positive emotions would be more likely to precipitate behavior, although Frijda (1986) found that joy 
has been linked with “aimless activation” which does not seem to indicate that this particular positive 
emotion would elicit strong action.  This does not necessarily mean that all positive emotions lack the 
same action tendency.   It should be recalled that Frijda (1986) said that positive emotions cause people 
to gravitate toward a stimulus, which does imply action.   At present, however, there does not seem to be 
much empirical evidence suggesting which positive emotions, that when paired with a framed message, 
would elicit a desired attitude toward or intent to adopt a health behavior.   Nor does there appear to be 
much evidence to suggest which health behaviors would be best suited to positive emotional appeals. 
 Yet, positive emotions, in particular hope, are associated with and positively linked to health 
(Nekolaichuk, Jevne, & Maguire, 1999).  Hope has also been studied within the context of cancer.  
Radwin, Evans, and Rabow (2013) found that hope was negatively correlated with pain intensity though 
not significantly.  Nevertheless, this is suggestive that hope can at least affect the perception of physical 
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pain.   Hope has also been found to help cancer patients better accept with the repercussions from an 
advanced cancer diagnosis (Reb, 2007).  So while there does not appear to be much research that 
addresses hope specifically within the context of framed health appeals, there has been some research 
linking hope to positive outcomes particularly in the realm of cancer and cancer treatment.  Thus, the 
extent to which hope can mediate the persuasiveness of message frames is worthy of consideration. 
2.12 Hope:  An introduction 
One of the leading theorists on hope, C.R. Snyder and his colleagues defined hope as a “positive 
motivational state that is based on an interactively derived sense of successful (a) agency (goal directed 
energy) and (b) pathways (planning to meet goals)” (Snyder, Irving, & Anderson, 1991, p. 570).  Later 
Snyder (2002) restated this definition of hope as “the perceived capability to derive pathways to desired 
goals and motivate oneself via agency to use those pathways” (p. 249).  Snyder, Lopez, Shorey, Rand, 
and Feldman (2003) argued that pathways and agency are both necessary to sustain a successful goal 
pursuit and that neither by themselves is sufficient.  Indeed, as Lazarus (1999) pointed out, that 
“although desire or motivation is an essential feature, hope is much more because it because it requires a 
belief in the possibility of a favorable outcome, which gives hope a cognitive aspect distinct from that of 
motivation” (p. 665).  Based upon this characterization, hope would appear to be associated with 
motivating individuals to take action toward accomplishing a goal.  
Though not explicitly stated in those definitions, however, hope as I have argued previously in 
this paper, is also a discrete emotion.  To hope is to believe that something that doesn’t presently apply 
to one’s life could still possibly happen (Lazarus, 1999).   A good example of a scenario of hope is the 
occurrence of a life-threatening or illness in oneself or a loved one where a favorable outcome is hoped 
for (Lazarus, 1999).  In the case of cancer diagnosis, one can hope for remission and long-term survival.  
But what if the illness is incurable, if in other words, there is no hope for a favorable outcome?  In such 
instances hope is still relevant. Lazarus (1999) pointed out that when prospects for a favorable outcome 
are low, people may have to change to the scope of what can be hoped for.  For example, someone 
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stricken with stage IV pancreatic cancer, a death sentence for all intents and purposes, cannot 
realistically hope to survive the disease nor that there will be a cure in time to save them.  Their hopes 
may be restricted to having more pain-free days for example (Lazarus, 1999).   Notably for the purposes 
of this study, Bar-Tal (2001) pointed out that hope is also a discrete emotion and a fundamental 
psychological reaction for every person and thus plays an important role in determining human 
behavior.   
Hope is often goal-oriented.  Stotland (1969) wrote that emotion of hope arises when a concrete 
positive goal is expected.  Hope consists of a cognitive element of expecting and an affective element of 
feeling good about the expected pleasant events or outcomes (Staats & Stassen, 1985).  Owen (1989) 
indicated that hope is simulative and prepares people to attain a goal.  Yet it must be acknowledged that 
the desired goal does not always materialize.  Hoping for something, the realization of a goal for 
example, does not mean it will happen.  Certainly many are familiar with the term “dashed hopes,” 
suggesting that even our greatest hopes can fail to be achieved.  Does the possibility of our hopes being 
dashed lessen the value of hope?  Not according to Epstein (1989) who suggests that “if the hope serves 
to improve one's quality of life and does not cause one to avoid taking adaptive action when it’s 
possible, nor be resentful when the hoped-for outcome does not materialize, then it is obviously 
desirable” (p. xxv).  Even when the prospect of goals not being achieved exists, hope is of value to 
human well-being.  “When all hope fails, there is nothing but despair” wrote Lazarus (1999, p. 654)   
2.12.1 Elements of hope 
As previously indicated, one of the key elements of hope according to Snyder, Harris, et al., 
(1991) and Snyder (2002) is that hope is often directed toward the attainment of goals (Snyder, Harris et 
al., 1991; Snyder, 2002). A goal can be anything that an individual desires to experience, create, get, do, 
or become (Snyder et al., 2003, p. 123).  Further, a goal may be a major lifelong pursuit (like earning at 
PhD!) or it may be mundane and brief (like getting oneself vaccinated for the flu) (Snyder et al., 2003).   
One of Snyder’s guiding assumptions in his theory of hope is that human actions are goal directed 
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(Snyder, 2002). Thus, people act in ways that will help them attain their goals. Snyder (2002) identified 
two major types of goals: positive goal outcome and negative goal outcome.   Positive goal outcomes are 
goals that may be envisioned for the first time, sustained from a present goal, or represent a desire to 
further a positive goal toward which one has already made progress.  Negative goals on the other hand 
involve the forestalling or prevention of negative outcomes.      
Lazarus (1999) wrote that “a fundamental condition of hope is that one’s current life 
circumstance is in some way unsatisfactory, involving some type of deprivation or is in some way 
damaging or threatening” (p. 654).  Snyder (2002) suggested that hope can “repair” such deprivations by 
orienting goals toward filling voids in people’s lives.   
Another key element of Snyder’s (2002) hope theory is that of agency thought.  Specifically, he 
pointed out, that agency thought—the perceived capacity to use one’s pathways to reach desired goals—
is the motivational component in hope theory.  Hope arises in part from a strong desire to be in a 
different situation than one is currently in and from the impression that this is possible as a result of 
one’s efforts (Lazarus, 1999).   This certainly implies that one has some degree of agency in attaining 
those goals. As Lazarus (1999) acknowledged, however, there also may be uncontrollable external 
forces that may have an impact on the attainment of goals.  Nevertheless, the idea that one can act in a 
way that can help attain a goal is central to the emotion of hope.   
2.12.2 Hope and health 
Since hope is clearly related to the attainment of desired outcomes, the extent to which it can 
influence people’s health-related choices should be of interest.   To begin, hope is positively linked to 
health (Nekolaichuk et al., 1999).  Likewise, hope is an important aspect of mental health recovery (van 
Gestel-Timmermans, van den Bogaard, Brouwers, Herth, & van Nieuwenhuizen, 2009).  Snyder, 
Feldman, Taylor, Schroeder, and Adams (2000) suggested that individuals with high levels of hope may 
use information about physical illness as a pathway for prevention arguments. In one study, high-hope 
women reported having stronger intentions to engage in cancer prevention behaviors (Snyder, 2002).  
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This raises questions germane to this research: Since hope appears to be related to positive health 
behaviors and may be desirable from a health communication perspective, can hope motivate?  If so, can 
hope motivate to a greater degree than fear? 
2.12.3 Trait hope vs. State Hope 
In general, traits are enduring personality characteristics (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 
2006), whereas states are transient experiences that can change sometimes as quickly as moment to 
moment (Grawitch, 2013).    Hope can be considered both a trait and a state (Schrank, Mag, Sibitz, & 
Lauber, 2010). Snyder, Harris et al. (1991) suggest that “hope is similar to optimism in that it is 
conceptualized as a stable cognitive set reflecting general rather than specific outcome expectancies” (p. 
571).  To measure trait hope, Snyder, Harris et al. (1991) developed the adult trait hope scale.  The trait 
hope scale measures dispositional hope and consists of four agency items, four pathways items, and four 
distracter items. The scale has demonstrated internal reliability for both agency and pathway, and 
temporal reliability ranging from .85 for three weeks to .82 for ten weeks (Snyder et al., 2003).   
 On the other hand, Snyder, Sympson, Ybasco, Borders, Babyak, and Higgins (1996) indicated 
that state indices of hope, specifically agency and pathway components, may also be useful.  They stated 
that people probably have dispositional hope that applies across situations and times, but that they also 
have state hope that reflects particular times and more proximal events (Snyder et al., 1996).    To 
measure state hope, Snyder et al. (1996) developed a 6-item state hope scale.  The state hope scale is a 
brief and well-validated measure of ongoing goal-directed thinking.   Snyder et al. (1996) suggested that 
measuring the level of state hope in individuals at a given time can provide an indication of a person’s 
goal directed thinking at that moment which certainly has implications for health behaviors if a given 
health behavior can help a person achieve a goal.    
In order to establish the utility of measuring state hope, Snyder et al. (1996) conducted an 
experiment and found that that presenting subjects with differing goal pursuits in which they either 
succeeded or failed at a given task did result in changes in post-test state hope scores such that success 
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on the task increased post-test state hope whereas failure reduced post-test state hope. This study 
established that state hope can be manipulated though the use of external stimuli.   
Snyder et al. (1996) conducted another experiment to assess the predictive utility of state hope. 
The experiment found that state hope scores were positively correlated with the number of correct 
responses on a complex learning task.   What this suggests is that higher state hope is related to better 
performance of a task. Although in this particular case the task was an academic exercise, it should be 
clear that higher levels of state hope could potentially lead to higher performance of other behaviors as 
well, such as health behaviors or even consideration of such behaviors, by increasing agentic thinking.  
Indeed, Snyder et al. (1996) agreed by suggesting that the state hope scale may be used in pre-post 
designs in which the focus is on changes in goal-directed thinking. 
2.12.4 Why study hope in health decision-making? 
It appears that there is evidence that inducing the emotion of hope in individuals has potential for 
increasing health related behaviors.  But the literature has already established that other emotions, 
notably fear, can do the same thing.   What is it about hope that makes it worth pursuing within the 
context of health decision making?  It should be noted that proposing this question is not intended to 
suggest that levels of state hope should be optimized at every opportunity.  Indeed, the literature has 
documented many cases where eliciting fear is appropriate and effective (Tannebaum, 2013).   So the 
question becomes: Under what circumstances would increasing state hope become desirable and 
appropriate, and under what conditions would state hope be most effective at increasing the adoption of 
health behaviors?   Unfortunately, there appears to be little in the literature that addresses this question. 
One of the aims of this dissertation is to add knowledge in that area. 
The previous discussion has focused on the positive emotion of hope and the seemingly 
unexplored potential that this emotion may have in changing attitudes towards health behaviors and 
motivating individuals to adopt those behaviors.  That is not to say that the presence of hope would 
increase the likelihood that any or even most health behaviors would be adopted.   Thus, this dissertation 
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has chosen to focus on one particular type of behavior that may be influenced by the presence of these 
emotions in the individual: the decision to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider.   
The willingness of individuals to overcome fears through the induction of hope in framed genetic 
screening appeals is likely to become an even more relevant issue in the near future as the field of 
genetics expands.  
 The rapidly expanding field of genetics and the human genome project bring with them the 
possibility that people will know more about their health risks and susceptibilities to diseases such as 
cancer.  Knowing one’s susceptibility to a catastrophic illness—knowing for example that one has a 
greater potential for getting cancer—could greatly impact that person’s life.   Fear of learning through 
genetic screening of personal susceptibility to a highly undesirable illness could lead an individual to 
simply choose not to undergo genetic testing.  Some would argue that people are simply better off not 
knowing.  If knowing about one’s susceptibility could lead to early interventions that might greatly 
mitigate the impact of such illnesses, however, it might be beneficial to know.   
 Lazarus (1999) discussed how hope is often discussed within the context of the occurrence of a 
life threatening illness. He pointed out that in such situations: “we know we are in serious trouble, yet 
hope for a favorable outcome—for example, that the illness was misdiagnosed, can be successfully 
treated, or death and disability significantly delayed” (p. 654).  In this case, it would appear that Lazarus 
was referring to people who had already been diagnosed with a catastrophic illness. Yet, I would argue 
that it would also be applicable to an individual who has just learned through genetic screening that they 
are susceptible to a catastrophic illness.  In this case, however, the person has the time to act upon it.   
This is to some extent why genetic screening, in cases where it is warranted, can be of benefit to 
individuals.  Further, because hope in general leads to the expectation of favorable outcomes, it is 
valuable to understand the role that state hope may play in the decision to seek out genetic testing.   That 
is one of the questions this study intends to examine. But before moving on to the study itself, a 
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necessarily short overview of genetic testing for cancer is provided, as a full discussion of this topic 
would be well beyond the scope of this dissertation. 
2.13 Genetic testing: An overview 
According to the U.S. Library of Medicine: 
Genetic testing is a type of medical test that identifies changes in chromosomes, genes, or 
proteins. The results of a genetic test can confirm or rule out a suspected genetic condition or 
help determine a person’s chance of developing or passing on a genetic disorder. More than 
1,000 genetic tests are currently in use, and more are being developed.  (U.S. National Library 
of Medicine, 2014)  
 
Genetic screening can be characterized in one of two general ways:   first, genetic screening done 
in consultation with or as recommended by health care providers.  And second, DTC, or “direct to 
consumer” genetic tests, that is genetic tests marketed specifically to consumers through mass media. 
Although there are many genetic tests available, it appears that relatively few of them are actually 
“recommended” by health care professionals.  For example, the U.S. Preventive Services Task Force 
(USPSTF) recommends that primary care providers genetically screen women who have family 
members with breast, ovarian, tubal, or peritoneal cancer to determine if they are at increased risk for 
potentially harmful mutations (Moyer, 2014). Note, however, that the USPSTF does not recommend that 
people get these tests “on their own.”   They recommend that genetic testing be conducted by 
physicians.    Despite calls for genetic testing to be done under the supervision of health care 
professionals, many genetic tests are nevertheless directly marketed to individuals.   
2.13.1 Direct to Consumer (DTC) Genetic Testing 
Over the past decade there has been a dramatic rise in the availability of direct-to-consumer 
genetic tests (Gray, Hornik, Schwartz, & Armstrong, 2012).  Considerable concerns exist within the 
medical community about various aspects of DTC genetic testing (Robson et al., 2010).   First, questions 
can be raised about the utility of such tests.  For example, a review by Ducournau, Gourraud, Rial-
Sebbag, Cambon-Thomsen, and Bulle (2013) found that there were thirteen websites offering DTC 
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genetic tests for Alzheimer’s disease.  This is important since the predictive value of such tests, 
specifically for the more common late onset Alzheimer’s disease, is questionable and not generally 
recommended (Atkins & Panegyres, 2011).   On the other hand, it should be noted that those with a 
family history of the extremely rare early-onset Alzheimer’s may benefit from genetic screening (Atkins 
& Panegyres, 2011).  But again, early-onset Alzheimer’s is very rare and is accompanied by a very 
specific genetic mutation that is highly associated with the onset of early Alzheimer’s disease.  Thus, 
such tests would be applicable to only a very small subset of the population who carry that gene.  The 
genetic link to late-onset Alzheimer’s is much less clear and thus genetic testing would not be 
recommended (Atkins & Panegyres, 2011).   This calls into question the value of DTC genetic tests for 
late onset Alzheimer’s disease.  
Another concern about DTC tests is what people are able to ascertain from the results.   The U.S. 
Government Accounting Office (GAO) for example reported that the results of some DTC genetic tests 
can be misleading at best and meaningless as worst (Nutrigenetic Testing: Tests Purchased, 2006).   
Even if the results of the tests are credible, the absence of professional medical opinion in interpreting 
genetic test results could potentially lead to misinterpretation of the results and perhaps to unwarranted 
fear.  It is that fear that unscrupulous and profit-driven genetic testing companies can exploit to boost 
sales of their tests.   For example, Myriad Genetics, provider of BRCA1 and BRCA 2 genetic screenings 
for breast cancer susceptibility, was criticized for exploiting public anxiety about breast cancer and 
misleading consumers into believing that all women need and should demand expensive genetic tests 
(Caplan, 2007; Williams-Jones, 2006).  Tomes could certainly be written (and likely already have been) 
that discuss and debate the merits and pitfalls of DTC genetic testing; thus an extended discussion of 
such issues is well beyond the scope of this review.  Suffice to say that DTC marketing of genetic 
screening is not without its concerns.   This study, however, will focus on genetic screenings that are 
intended to take place under the guidance of a health care professional. 
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2.13.2 Genetic Screenings Recommended by Health Professionals 
The list of genetic screenings recommended by health professionals appears to be relatively short 
when compared to the list of screenings available to consumers and in general appears to be limited to 
certain circumstances such as family history.  The U.S. Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) 
recommended in 2005 and again in 2014 that women who have family members with breast, ovarian, 
tubal, or peritoneal cancer should be screened for an increased risk for potentially cancer causing 
mutations in breast cancer susceptibility genes (Moyer 2014; U.S. Preventive Services Task Force, 
2005).   The USPSTF also recommends that women with positive screening results should receive 
genetic counseling (Moyer, 2014).  This again suggests that genetic screening for at-risk women should 
not occur in the absence of guidance by medical professionals. The American Society of Clinical 
Oncology (ACSO) agrees.  They suggest that it is the role of oncologists and other health care providers 
to offer genetic tests in a clinical setting (Robson et al. 2010).  Further, ASCO recommends that genetic 
testing only be offered when three criteria are met: the individual being tested has a personal or family 
history -that would suggest genetic cancer susceptibility, the genetic test can be adequately interpreted, 
and the test results have accepted clinical utility (American Society of Clinical Oncology, 2003).   
Regarding clinical utility, it would appear that a small number of genetic screenings fit this criterion. 
Tests for mutations with high penetrance, which means that a high percentage of carriers 
ultimately get the disease, in appropriate populations have clinical utility (Robson & Offit, 2007).  High 
clinical utility means that they inform clinical decision making and facilitate the prevention of or 
amelioration of adverse health outcomes (Robson & Offit, 2007).  High penetrance gene mutations 
usually result in a significant alteration in the function of a corresponding gene and are associated with 
increases in cancer risk (Robson et al., 2010).  Examples of genes with high penetrance mutations 
include BRCA 1 (breast cancer), MSH2 (colorectal cancer), APC (colorectal adenocarcinoma), and RET 
(medullary thyroid cancer), (Robson et al., 2010).  Based on the above information, it appears that at this 
time, these are the only cancers for which genetic screening would be clinically useful.  Considering the 
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annual toll these cancers take in human lives, advanced screening for susceptibility to these cancers 
would appear to have clinical value.   
2.13.3 Promoting genetic testing 
Is there a responsible way to promote genetic testing such that people who legitimately need it, 
actually obtain it?   As previously indicated, there are potential ethical issues related to the promotion of 
DTC genetic screening tests.  Likewise, health organizations such as USPSTF and ASCO make it very 
clear that genetic testing should not be a “do-it-yourself” proposition.  Thus, from a health 
communication and health promotion standpoint, campaigns to encourage concerned people to obtain 
genetic screenings on their own would not be advisable.  Yet there are clearly cases where genetic 
screenings for cancer are necessary and beneficial.    If such tests should only be administered by health 
care professionals, then it would seem that the gateway for individuals to engage in this behavior would 
be to initially discuss the possibility of genetic testing with their health care providers.  In other words, 
rather than promoting genetic testing per se, it would seem that a way to effectively and ethically 
communicate and promote genetic cancer screenings would be to promote the act of initiating 
conversations about genetic testing with health care providers.    Thus, people with family history of 
cancer who have concerns about their susceptibility for cancer should inform their doctors of their 
family history and then initiate dialog regarding genetic screening.  Communication campaigns about 
genetic screening could therefore focus on promoting conversations with health care providers about 
genetic testing for at risk individuals rather than promoting the act of genetic screening itself.  For the 
purposes of this study, willingness on the part of study participants, all of whom will have a self-
reported history of breast, ovarian, colon, thyroid, or peritoneal cancer, to initiate conversations with 
their health care providers about genetic screening will be one of the outcome measures and will be used 
as the target behavior in experimental promotion materials.  
As the science of genetics continues to advance, it is possible that other clinically viable genetic 
tests will be developed.  Even if more clinically viable tests are developed, however, it is difficult to 
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imagine that health care professionals would advise their use in the absence of consultation.   Therefore, 
there is considerable utility in understanding how to best promote the act of initiating dialogue with 
health care providers about genetic screening particularly when screening may result in undesirable 
findings.   This study will examine how fear and hope can influence the persuasiveness of those type of 
appeals.  Before moving on to the overview of the hypotheses and research questions, however, is it 
important to establish what this research will contribute to the literature. 
2.14 What will this study contribute to the literature?   
This study will examine how discrete emotions, specifically fear and hope, mediate the 
relationship between message frame and attitude toward genetic cancer screening and identify which 
emotion is more effective at persuading people to discuss genetic screening with their doctors.  
 From the existing literature, it is evident that the persuasiveness of gain and loss framed appeals 
varies according to many different factors.  This literature review has examined the various factors that 
have been shown to influence the persuasiveness of message frames.  Factors have included those that 
relate to the health behavior itself such as the frequency or type of health behavior (disease prevention 
vs. disease detection).  Other factors relate to the individual characteristics of the person performing the 
behavior such as demographic factors, individual perceptions, and beliefs.   What appears to be 
somewhat lacking in framing literature are studies examining how emotions may mediate the 
relationship between message frame and outcome  
It has been pointed out previously in this literature review that under certain circumstances, fear 
and fear appeals are effective at changing behaviors and persuading people to adopt health behaviors.  
What is unclear to some extent is the role that fear and other discrete emotions, especially positive 
emotions such as hope, may play in the relationship between message frame and attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening. What this study will contribute to the literature is an initial inquiry into the potential 
for discrete emotions to mediate the effectiveness of framed health appeals and the extent to which fear 
and hope each do so.  Understanding more about the conditions under which certain type so appeals are 
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more effective can help message creators design appeals that can result in positive attitudes toward 
health behaviors and to ultimately influence health behavior.     
2.14.1 Practical implications 
This study will also have important practical applications. To begin, there may well come a day 
when routine genetic screening for cancer is as widespread and recommended as the annual flu shot.  
That day is not yet here, but the day is here when those at elevated risk for cancer due to genetic 
predisposition can discuss with their doctor the options available to help them better manage their risk 
via genetic screening.  This is precisely why it is important to study which emotions can enhance health 
appeals for genetic screening.  In the future, there are likely to be other clinically viable genetic tests for 
many other terrible conditions and diseases where knowing the genetic predisposition can lead to 
interventions designed to mitigate the risks.  Understanding how to promote them now may be of great 
value when that day arrives.  It may also teach us how to better promote the potentially beneficial 
genetic screenings to at-risk individuals today. 
2.15 The current study   
In this study, I will examine the extent to which discrete emotions, specifically fear and hope, 
mediate the influence of public service announcements advocating talking to a health care provider 
about genetic cancer screening.  Although much of the relevant framing literature has focused broadly 
on gain- versus loss-framed messages, it has been argued that in a health context it would be useful to 
explicitly examine the use of fear-based versus hope-based appeals as frames. I will first examine the 
overall effectiveness of a fear-framed message vs. a hope-framed message, compared to a control group.  
The focus of this study will be on how fear-framed and hope-framed PSAs differentially influence 
attitudes toward genetic cancer screening and intent to seek counsel about screening from a health care 
provider, and the extent to which emotion mediates the effect of frame on attitudes.   Participation will 
be limited to those with prior family history of cancer. Participants will be randomly assigned to one of 
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three experimental groups.  One group will view a fear-framed message that advocates talking with a 
health care provider about genetic cancer screening and the other group will view a hope-framed 
message about the same topic. Both messages will be presented in the form of a video public service 
announcement.  A control group will watch an unrelated message.  Analysis will examine whether fear 
and/or hope mediate the influence of the appeals for genetic screening on attitudes toward the behavior.  
It will also reveal which emotion in general is more persuasive.    
It has been shown that discrete emotions can interact with messages to affect behavior.  Gerend 
and Maner (2011) for example explored the question of whether the success of a framed message 
depended upon the emotional state of a message recipient.  They found that responses to framed 
messages do vary as a function of people’s current emotional state and specifically that fearful people 
were more responsive to a loss-framed message (Gerend & Maner, 2011).  In their study, however, they 
induced the emotional state before exposing them to a message so they were already in an emotional 
state when they encountered the messages.   While theirs is an interesting and useful finding, its 
applicability outside of a laboratory controlled experiment may be limited.  In practice, it would be 
difficult to ascertain what emotions a person is feeling prior to reading a health message.  In addition, 
those findings do not take into account emotions that may be aroused by the message itself.  Knowing 
what emotions a framed message aroused and whether those emotions mediated the persuasiveness of 
the message would extend the research of Gerend and Maner (2011) and advance framing theory. In 
addition, recent work by Nabi and Prestin (2016) found that both hope and fear can interact with 
response efficacy to increase behavioral intent to adopt health protection behaviors (HPV prevention).  
However, this study will examine how these emotions work within a framing model to influence intent 
toward a health detection behavior (discussing genetic screening with a health care provider).  
As previously indicated, this study will examine which type of emotional appeal results in a 
more positive attitude toward genetic cancer screening.   It will examine the extent to which each appeal 
stimulates two discrete emotions, fear and hope.  The study will then turn its focus to whether these 
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discrete emotions mediate the effectiveness of the appeal and how it affects attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening and intent to discuss screening with a health care provider.  Notably, this study will 
examine two discrete emotions that are dimensionally opposite.  That is, fear is widely regarded as a 
“negative” emotion dimensionally, while hope is regarded as a “positive” emotion.   This study is also 
unique in that it will examine appeals for a disease detection behavior that has received little attention in 
terms of framing studies—genetic cancer screening—a type of behavior surely to become more and 
more frequent as the capacity to conduct genetic screening continues to expand. 
2.16 Hypotheses 
This study first examines overall effectiveness of a fear-framed message vs. a hope-framed 
message, compared to a control group.   Since the framed messages were specifically designed to elicit 
certain emotions, it is reasonable to expect that the fear-framed message would result in a higher level of 
fear than would the hope-framed message or the control message.  Therefore, I predict: 
H1 = The fear-framed PSA will result in higher levels of fear than (a) the control message and (b) 
the hope-framed PSA. 
Likewise, it would be expected that the hope-framed PSA would result in higher levels of hope 
than either the fear-framed PSA or the control group PSA.  Therefore, I predict:  
H2 = The hope-framed PSA will result in higher levels of hope than (a) the control message and 
(b) the fear-framed PSA. 
 Similarly, it would be expected that those who actually watch one of the framed messages 
discussing genetic cancer screening and the importance of talking to a health care provider about genetic 
cancer screening would be more likely to have a better attitude toward genetic cancer screening and 
would be more likely to discuss it with a health care provider than those who did not watch one of the 
framed messages. Overall, I predict: 
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H3= Compared to the unrelated control group message, the fear-framed message and the hope-
framed message will (a) result in more positive attitudes toward genetic cancer screening, and (b) result 
in greater intention to get screened.  
2.17 Model of the influence of frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening and intent to 
discuss with a health care provider 
 
This study focuses on how fear-framed versus hope-framed PSAs differentially influence 
attitudes toward genetic cancer screening and intent to seek counsel about screening from a health care 
provider, and the extent to which emotion mediates the effect of frame on attitudes. First, a basic model 
of the influence of frame on attitude and behavioral intent, and the mediating influence of attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening, will be examined. This model is presented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1.  Model of the influence of frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening and intent to 
discuss with a health care provider. H6 predicts that attitude will mediate the influence of frame on intent 
to discuss. 
 
Previous findings from the framing literature support the notion that loss-framed messages are 
more effective than gain-framed messages at motivating people to adopt health-detection behaviors.  
Citing the work of Kahneman and Tversky (1981), O’Keefe and Jensen argued that when the outcome 
of a health behavior is not known or uncertain, people are more responsive to a loss-framed message that 
highlights the consequences of not adopting the behavior (O’Keefe & Jensen, 2006).  As argued above, 
genetic cancer screening is a type of health detection behavior for which the outcome is uncertain. An 
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analysis of framing studies by Rothman and Salovey (1997), Salovey, Schneider, and Apanovitch 
(2002), and Van ‘T Riet, Ruiter, Werjj and DeFries (2010), suggest that loss-framed messages would be 
more persuasive than gain-framed messages for disease detection behaviors.  It can be argued that in 
general, a fear-framed message is somewhat analogous to a loss-framed message in that it accentuates 
the consequences of not engaging in a behavior.   Much the same way, a hope-framed message might be 
considered analogous to a gain-framed message in that it accentuates the desirable outcomes of engaging 
in a behavior. 
In this study, the primary research question is concerned with what type of appeal message (hope 
or fear) is more persuasive at increasing intent to talk to a health care provider about genetic cancer 
screening. Consistent with evidence suggesting loss-framed messages, and therefore “negative” appeals, 
are generally more persuasive for disease detection behaviors, I predict:  
H4: Compared to the hope-framed message, the fear-framed message will result in (a) a more 
positive attitude toward genetic cancer screening and (b) greater intent to discuss genetic cancer 
screening with a health care provider. 
As previously indicated, message frames are often utilized in appeals to persuade people to have 
favorable attitudes toward a health behavior.  Likewise, attitudes can affect behavioral intention (Shen & 
Dillard, 2007) and ultimately behavioral adoption.  Therefore, it is reasonable to propose that in general, 
if people have a positive attitude toward a health behavior, they may be inclined to adopt the behavior. 
Therefore, I propose a direct influence of attitude toward genetic cancer screening on intent to discuss 
genetic cancer screening:   
H5: Respondents’ attitude toward genetic cancer screening will be positively associated with 
intent to discuss genetic screening with their health care provider. 
In addition to having a direct effect on intent, attitude could also mediate the relationship 
between message frame and behavioral intent.  In such a relationship, message frame would have an 
indirect influence on behavioral intent through attitude.   
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In general, mediation is a “chain of relations where an antecedent variable affects a mediating 
variable which then affects the outcome variable” (MacKinnon, Fairchild, & Fritz, 2007, p. 1).  In other 
words, they argued, the mediating variable transmits the effect from independent variable to dependent 
variable (MacKinnon et al., 2007). A variable is a mediator when it accounts for the relationship 
between an independent variable and an outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).   According to Baron 
and Kenny (1986) variations in the independent variable account for variations in the mediating variable 
and variations in the mediator variable then account for variations in the outcome variable Therefore, 
mediation happens when a third variable (a mediator) is added to an XY relationship such that the 
mediator M lies between X and Y and influences that relationship (MacKinnon et al., 2007).   
Therefore, I propose that the influence of message frame on intent to discuss genetic cancer 
screening is mediated by attitude toward genetic screening: 
H6: Attitude toward genetic cancer screening will mediate the influence of frame on intent to 
discuss genetic cancer screening with their health care provider 
2.18 Message Mediation by Emotion 
This study proposes that discrete emotions mediate the relationship between emotional health 
appeals and attitude. I propose a model in which fear and hope partially mediate the relationship 
between the health appeal message and attitude toward genetic cancer screening. This model proposes 
that fear and hope act as mediating variables but to different extents suggesting that the use of one type 
of message, in this case fear-framed message, is more persuasive.  
In this model, a framed message elicits the emotions fear and hope, each of which then act as a 
mediator resulting in differentially positive attitudes toward genetic cancer screening, with attitude 
ultimately influencing behavioral intent to discuss screening with a health care provider (HCP). Figure 2 
contains the model for the mediation of emotional appeal by fear and hope. 
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Figure 2.  Model of mediation of emotional appeal by fear and hope.  H8 predicts that fear will 
partially mediate the relationship between message frame and attitude toward genetic cancer screening. 
H10 predicts that hope will partially mediate the relationship between message frame and attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening. 
 
2.18.1 Message mediation by fear   
In the model in Figure 2, fear acts as a mediator between message frame and attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening.  This model proposes that the mediating variable of fear partially transmits the 
effect of message frame on attitude.     
As previously stated, mediation requires that a variable, known as a mediator, (partially) account 
for the relation between an independent variable and an outcome variable (Baron & Kenny, 1986).   
Consistent with this understanding of mediation, the mediation model presented in Figure 2 predicts that 
the framed emotional appeal (the independent variable) will influence fear, which will partially account 
for the positive effect of the framed appeal on attitude toward genetic cancer screening (outcome 
variable).  Thus, this model requires the elicitation of fear. A fear-framed message about genetic cancer 
screening may elicit multiple emotions, however, including both hope and fear, but to differing degrees. 
As mentioned earlier, it was predicted (H1b) that the fear-framed message would elicit more fear than 
would the hope-framed message. This is because fear derives from events, conditions or situations that 
signal danger or threat (Izard, 1977).  Certainly, it can be argued that a fear-framed message does just 
that.   
Once fear has been elicited by a message, I propose that it serves at the catalyst for a positive 
attitude toward genetic screening (Shen & Dillard, 2007). In other words, how someone feels about a 
given behavior—their attitude—is influenced by emotion, which suggests that emotions may play a 
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mediating role.  Previously, I predicted that the fear-framed message would lead to a more positive 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening than would the hope-framed message (H4b). In addition, it was 
expected that the emotion of fear would mediate the expected influence of the framed message on 
attitude. Therefore, I predict:  
H7: Fear will be positively associated with attitude toward genetic cancer screening. 
H8: Fear will partially mediate the influence of the framed message on attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening. 
2.18.2 Message mediation by hope 
As previously stated, it is reasonable to expect that viewing either a fear-framed message or a 
hope-framed message may elicit more than one single emotion and I have suggested the possibility that 
both appeals, fear and hope, can lead to the elicitation of both emotions (among others, to be sure).  
Figure 2 above shows the expected partial mediation of emotional appeal by hope.  In this model, the 
effect of message frame is partially transmitted by the mediating variable of hope to attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening.   
It was previously predicted (H2b) that the elicitation of hope would be expected to be associated 
more with the hope-framed message.  Lazarus (1999) explained that hope “requires a belief in the 
possibility of a favorable outcome” (p. 665).  Likewise, Staats and Stassen (1985) suggested that hope 
consists of a cognitive element leading to the expectation of a positive outcome.   In the case of this 
study, the hope-framed message will emphasize the outcome of talking about genetic cancer screening 
as a “positive outcome” (e.g. the opportunity to help prevent the onset of cancer in oneself).    Hence, it 
follows that the hope-framed message will lead to a greater level of hope relative to the fear-framed 
message and will be positively related to attitude toward genetic screening.   
Just as fear has been shown to lead to a positive attitude toward health behaviors, I suggest that 
hope can as well. In other words, although overall, the fear-framed message was expected to lead to a 
more positive attitude toward genetic cancer screening than the hope-framed message, it was 
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nonetheless expected that the emotions of fear and hope would both be associated with more positive 
attitudes. We certainly know that hope underscores the inclination to act.  Stotland (1969) for example 
wrote that “hope is a necessary condition for action” (p. 7).  That said, Nabi and Keblusek (2014) 
pointed out that because hope is “associated with an uncertain degree of uncertainty about the future” (p. 
215), there may actually be doubt about whether or not the desired outcome will occur.   In other words, 
one may hope that genetic screening will result in a finding of no increased susceptibility to cancer but 
that is not guaranteed.   
That said, it should not be assumed that the strength of the positive attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening would be the same for both fear and hope.   Nabi and Keblusek (2014) for example 
found one negative emotion (envy) more strongly associated with behavioral motivation than hope 
suggesting in this case that the negative emotion was more motivational than the positive emotion. 
These findings are consistent with others who have asserted that positive emotions may not be as strong 
a motivator as negative emotions (van de Ven, Zeelenberg, & Pieters, 2011).  So while I have 
acknowledged that hope may also mediate the relationship between frame and attitude just as I have 
proposed fear does, it is more likely that hope does so to a lesser extent than fear.  Therefore, I predict 
that:  
H9: Hope will be positively associated attitude toward genetic cancer screening. 
H10: Hope will partially mediate the relationship between frame and attitude, but will be a 
weaker mediator than fear. 
3 PILOT TESTS 
 
3.1 Study overview 
Overall, the objective of this research is to examine how discrete emotions, specifically fear and 
hope, mediate the relationship between framed health messages and attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening and behavioral intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider, and to 
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explore the differential effectiveness of fear and hope-framed messages.   Participants in this study 
viewed one of two public service announcements (PSAs)—either a fear-framed or a hope-framed 
PSA—promoting the importance of discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider.  
The PSAs were created specifically for this study.  A control group viewed an unrelated PSA.   
The study consisted of three phases.  Phase I consisted of development, pilot testing, and revision 
of the initial PSA scripts. Phase II consisted of production and pilot testing of the PSAs.  Phase III 
consisted of the main study where participants viewed the PSAs and answered a series of questions.  
This chapter will report the results of the Phase I and Phase II pilot tests. 
3.2 Phase I: Development and pilot testing of PSA scripts 
In order to examine how emotions mediate the response between a framed health message and 
attitude toward genetic screening, it was necessary to create framed messages that would elicit the 
emotions of hope and fear.  The initial study proposal specified that the framed messages would be 
written messages such as brochures or pamphlets containing information about the importance of talking 
to a health care provider about genetic cancer screening.  There was some concern, however, that written 
messages would not elicit sufficient emotional responses from research participants.   It was therefore 
decided to use a video format, specifically a video public service announcement (PSA) to convey the 
framed health appeals.   
Public service announcements (PSAs) attempt to persuade by evoking emotional responses in the 
audience (Dillard & Peck, 2000).  Quite often, the emotion evoked in PSAs is fear.  A content analysis 
of AIDS PSAs for example revealed that 39% of the messages were structured as fear appeals.  
(Freimuth, Hammond, Edgar, & Monahan, 1990).   PSAs can incorporate dramatic production 
techniques such as music, dramatic camera angles and lighting, and spoken dialog to convey the 
importance and or consequences of not adopting the behaviors.     
Before producing the public service announcements, two draft scripts (See Appendix A) were 
written.  One contained a fear-framed message and one contained a hope-framed message promoting 
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talking to a health care provider about the importance of genetic screening for those at higher risk of 
cancer.  
In general, the fear-framed PSA was designed as a classic fear appeal.  As previously discussed, 
fear appeals are persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that will 
happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends (Witte, 1992a).  In this case, the fear 
appeal PSA would clearly imply that not discussing genetic screening with a doctor would lead to 
unfavorable outcomes.  Thus, it was deliberate attempt to “show the terrible consequences” of not 
adopting the behavior in the message.  But merely inciting fear may not be sufficient to induce people to 
consider adopting the promoted behavior.   It has been pointed out for example, that for fear appeals to 
be more effective they should contain information that will lead to better response efficacy, that is, 
provide people with information they can use to reduce the threat (Bastien, 2011).   Therefore, the PSA 
would also contain very specific guidance for viewers who have a family history of cancer—that they 
should talk to their doctors about genetic cancer screening. 
The intent behind the hope video was to create a “hope appeal,” that is a message that shows the 
positive outcome of adopting the behavior.  The hope video would contain precisely the same 
information about the health behavior, but would frame it entirely differently using both a combination 
of different narration and film editing techniques to elicit hope rather than fear.  As discussed in the 
literature review section of this paper, much less is known about the effectiveness of positive emotional 
appeals in health messaging.   
Each of the draft scripts—the fear framed PSA script and the hope-framed PSA script—were 
pilot-tested in a series of focus groups prior to PSA production. The pre-production focus group 
questions and survey questions can be found in Appendix B.    
Participants for the pilot test focus groups were recruited from undergraduate communication 
courses at Georgia State University and from a local church senior group.  See Appendix C and 
Appendix D for the recruitment message and Consent Form.  A total of three focus groups were 
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conducted.  Two focus groups were held for the fear framed message (n = 16) and one for the hope 
message (n = 13). 
3.2.1 Participants 
A total of 29 people participated in the three pilot test focus groups.   The age of the participants 
ranged from 19 to 81 years of age (M = 56, SD = 24.3).  Twenty four respondents (82.7%) were female, 
5 (17.2%) were male.  The ethnicities of these participants were as follows:  14 (48.3%) were white, 6 
(20.6%) were Black / African-American, 4 (13.7%) were Hispanic / Latino(a), 3(10.3%) were East 
Asian / Pacific Islander, 2 (6.9%) were Native American Two individuals identified as both Black / 
African American and Native American.  
It should be noted that there was a considerable difference in the average age of the different 
focus groups. The sole focus group conducted at Georgia State (fear message) consisted of Georgia State 
Undergraduate Students with a mean age of 20 years.  On average, this group was much younger than 
the members of the focus groups held at the local church.  These latter groups consisted of members of 
the church’s senior group.  The average age of the second group of focus group participants was 
approximately 71 years.  Due to time and resource constraints, however, it was not possible to recruit 
additional focus group participants.   
3.2.2 Procedure 
Initially, focus group participants were recruited from Georgia State University Communication 
undergraduate students.  A total of four focus groups were scheduled at Georgia State. The intent was to 
conduct two focus groups of approximately 6-8 participants for each of the scripts. Only 2 participants 
reported for each of the hope message focus groups which did not meet the minimum number of 
participants for a focus group. Their responses were not included in the focus group analysis.  Likewise, 
one of the fear message focus groups had only a single participant, which also did not meet the 
minimum requirement. Their response was not included in the pilot test analysis.  The second fear 
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message focus group, however, included 8 participants which was sufficient for a focus group.  This 
group’s responses were counted in the analysis. This focus group was moderated by a single moderator 
(the student researcher) in a conference room at Georgia State University. 
  In summary, only one of the four focus groups scheduled at Georgia State had enough 
participants to be considered a focus group.  This one focus group with a sufficient number of 
respondents (n = 8), which read the fear PSA scripts, was included in the focus group analysis.  The 
responses from the other scheduled focus groups that had only one or two participants were not 
included.  
Because recruiting at Georgia State did not yield enough participants for the pilot test, additional 
focus group participants were recruited from a local church.  A total of 21 participants were recruited 
from a senior social group at a local church.  These participants were divided into two focus groups 
which were conducted simultaneously in a large fellowship hall separated by a divider.  There were two 
moderators present for this session, the student researcher and a female colleague.   One moderator was 
assigned to each focus group.  The focus groups read either the fear-framed script (n = 8) or the hope-
framed script (n=13).   More participants were assigned to the hope focus group in this setting due to the 
lack of respondents in the first focus groups at Georgia State. Likewise, because of time and resource 
constraints, is was not possible to divide the hope-framed focus group participants into two smaller 
groups, therefore one large focus group of 13 was conducted for the hope script. The use of a second 
moderator (i.e., not the student researcher) and the size of the hope focus group (13 rather than 6-8) 
deviated from the research protocol approved by the GSU IRB. Accordingly, a Protocol Deviation Form 
was submitted to the IRB [and was accepted]. 
Focus group participants first read the scripts and discussed them with the moderator who asked 
a series of questions about their impressions of the script.  The focus group at Georgia State was audio 
recorded.  The focus groups at the church were not recorded but extensive notes were taken.  At the 
conclusion of the focus group discussions, participants completed a short survey asking them to rate the 
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extent to which the scripts elicited certain emotions on a 5-point scale ranging from (0 = none of this 
feeling to 4 a lot of this feeling).   As noted above, the focus group questions and survey can be found in 
Appendix B. 
3.2.3 Results: pilot test focus groups 
The qualitative responses indicated that in general, respondents were able to distinguish the 
positive and negative aspects of the different messages.  Specifically, those reading the hope message 
were able to ascertain that the message contained a more positive tone.  For example, in response to the 
question asking: “What are your perceptions of the message? Anything positive or negative?”  
Responses from the hope group indicated that they perceived the positive tone of the message. Their 
comments included:  
Don’t be afraid to get tested (church focus group member, hope script) 
There is hope, [if you are at risk] there is something you can do about it (church focus group 
member, hope script) 
 
Similarly, those in the fear focus groups were able to perceive the negative tone of the messages, 
although they were also critical of some of the imagery used in the fear script (e.g. the initial script 
contained an image of a graveyard which was meant to imply that people who didn’t discuss genetic 
screening might end up there). 
 
[Message] stressed the severity of not being screened (Georgia State Focus group member, fear 
script) 
 
 The graveyard scene was too abrupt, seemed thrown in, it didn’t work (Georgia State focus 
group member, fear script) 
 
 
The qualitative responses of the focus groups indicated that most participants understood the 
importance of talking to a doctor about genetic cancer screening and that it targeted those with a family 
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history of cancer, which were the main messages the scripts were attempting to convey. Comments 
included: 
[Message] would prompt me to check into my family history   (church focus group member, hope 
group) 
 
[Message] would make me check to see if I have a high risk of cancer (GSU focus group member 
fear group)   
 
 Some respondents, however, thought the messages focused more on genetic cancer screening 
itself as opposed to talking to a doctor about genetic cancer screening. In other words, some people did 
not make the critical distinction between talking to a doctor about genetic cancer screening and genetic 
cancer screening itself.  
The message made me aware of genetic screening (Focus group participant from Georgia State, 
fear script)   
 
It did bring the idea of genetic screening into my head (Church focus group member, hope 
script) 
 
 Some participants felt the messages themselves were not strong in that they seemed to lack an 
“emotional punch”: 
It was too soft of a message (church focus group, hope script) 
The subject was interesting but the set up wasn’t all that interesting.  The narrative wasn’t 
compelling (GSU focus group, fear group) 
Additionally, a number of focus group participants also pointed out that the PSA scripts should 
provide more detail about how to access genetic screening.  Apparently they did not effectively convey 
the importance of talking to a doctor about genetic screening: 
Need to add information about how to access genetic screening (church focus group member, 
hope group) 
 
 These comments suggested that some revisions of both of the draft PSA scripts were necessary.   
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As previously indicated, participants completed a survey following the focus group where they 
answered questions about the extent to which the scripts conveyed various emotions.  These results are 
summarized in Table 1.  
Table 1 Emotional Responses to Pilot Test Scripts 
 
Fear framed 
script 
Hope framed 
script 
t-tests 
Emotions Mean SD Mean SD t value df p value 
Key Emotions Related to Manipulation 
Fear 1.60 1.5 1.62 1.66 .026 26 .980 
Worry 2.31 1.62 1.62 1.66 -1.14 27 .265 
Hope 2.19 1.33 2.15 1.63 -.061 27 .951 
Additional Emotions 
Sadness 1.75 1.34 1.54 1.76 -.367 27 .716 
Anger .56 1.09 .85 1.52 .584 27 .564 
Courage 1.31 1.54 1.62 1.5 .533 27 .598 
Happiness 1.25 1.34 1.38 1.33 .270 27 .789 
Confusion .81 .83 .77 1.36 -.105 27 .917 
N 16 13  
Note. Emotion ratings could range from 0 to 4. 
The primary emotions of interest in this study are hope and fear.   There was no significant 
difference in the focus groups’ perception of hope (p = .951) or fear (p = .980) which may suggest that 
the initial messages did not differentially elicit the desired emotional responses. This may also suggest 
that the initial PSA scripts should be revised so that the fear message would elicit more fear and the 
hope message would elicit more hope which is consistent with focus group responses indicating that the 
messages lacked a strong emotional appeal.  
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3.3 Phase II: Production and Pilot testing of Public Service Announcements (PSAs) 
At the completion of the pilot test focus groups, the scripts were revised based upon both the 
quantitative and qualitative data obtained.   Most notably, a prologue and an epilogue sequence was 
added to each script that clearly showed either the consequences of not adopting the behavior (fear 
framed message) or the benefits of adopting the behavior (hope framed message).  This element was 
missing from the initial scripts which may have contributed to the respondents not perceiving high levels 
/of fear or hope conveyed by the messages. Once the revisions to the scripts were incorporated, two 
separate public service announcements (PSAs), each approximately two minutes in length, was 
produced using a locally-recruited cast and production crew.  One PSA contained a fear-framed message 
and the other a hope-framed message.   
3.3.1 Participants 
After PSA production, a sample of 38 undergraduate students from Georgia State University 
communication courses were recruited to view one of the final videos online. See Appendix E and 
Appendix F for the recruitment message and Consent Form. Students were awarded extra credit for 
participation in the form of 0.5 percent of the total points available in the course. Twenty respondents 
(52.6%) were female, 13 (34.2%) were male, and there were 5 not reporting (13.2%).  The age of the 
participants ranged from 18 to 43 years of age (M = 20.8, SD = 4.4).  Eighteen respondents (47.4%) 
were African-American, 11 (28.9%) were White / Caucasian, 6 (15.8%) and were East Asian / Pacific 
Islander, 2 (5.3%) were Hispanic / Latino.   Two of these respondents selected more than one race:  One 
participant identified as both Black / African American and East Asian Pacific Islander, and one 
identified as both East Asian Pacific Islander and White Caucasian.   
3.3.2 Procedure 
The students were randomly assigned to watch either the fear-framed PSA (n = 22) or the hope 
framed PSA (n = 16) and answer a short survey which can be found in Appendix G.  The survey 
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consisted of questions about the perceived frames, emotional responses, and effectiveness of the 
messages.  After watching the video, participants rated four items that assessed the extent to which they 
believed the message addressed gains/losses and advantages/disadvantages. These items were rated on a 
7-point scale from 0 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly agree.  They also rated the emotions they felt 
were conveyed by the messages, including fear, worry, hope, sadness, anger, courage, happiness, and 
confusion.  The emotions were rated on a 7-point scale from 0 = none of this feeling to 6 = a lot of this 
feeling.  Finally, they rated the message on a series of characteristics (e.g., interest, attention, credibility) 
on which the messages should not differ, using a 7-point scale (0 = strongly disagree to 6 = strongly 
agree).  A summary of the findings is contained in Tables 2, 3, and 4 below. 
3.3.3 Results of Phase II pilot test 
A total of 33 respondents completed the survey: 20 of the fear group respondents completed the 
survey and 13 of the hope group participants completed the survey.   In the first set of items, participants 
rated the extent to which they believed the messages addressed gains/losses and 
advantages/disadvantages.  As expected, the findings indicate that the fear-framed PSA was significantly 
more effective than the hope-framed PSA at conveying the loss of important health benefits (p = .035) 
and stressing the disadvantages of not discussing genetic cancer screening with a doctor (p = .031).  
There was no significant difference between the PSAs in terms of how respondents perceived the gains 
and advantages of talking to a doctor about genetic cancer screening. Table 2 summarizes the perception 
of the extent to which the PSAs conveyed the gains and losses and advantages and disadvantages 
associated with either adopting of not adopting the behavior. 
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Table 2 Perceived Inclusion of Gain/Loss and Advantages/Disadvantages in the Messages 
 Fear PSA Hope PSA t-tests 
Items Mean SD Mean SD t value df p value 
According to this message, I will 
gain important health benefits 
if I talk to my doctor about genetic 
cancer screening. 
5.25 1.29 4.92 .954 .782 31 .440 
According to this message, I 
will lose important health 
benefits if I don’t talk to my 
doctor about genetic cancer 
screening. 
4.75 1.29 
 
3.62 
 
1.66 
 
2.20 
 
31 
 
.035 
This message emphasized the 
advantages of talking to my 
doctor about genetic cancer 
screening. 
 
5.05 
 
1.09 
 
5.23 
 
.927 
 
-.490 
 
31 
 
.628 
This message emphasized the 
disadvantages of not talking to 
my doctor about genetic cancer 
screening. 
4.45 1.43 
 
3.08 
 
2.06 
 
2.26 
 
31 
 
.031 
n 20 13  
Note. Ratings could range from 0 to 6. 
In the second set of items, respondents were asked to rate the extent to which the PSAs elicited 
eight different emotions. The primary emotions of interest were fear, worry, and hope.  It was expected 
that the fear PSA would lead to significantly higher levels of fear and worry and that the hope-framed 
PSA would lead to significantly higher levels of hope.  These expectations were partially confirmed. 
The results summarized in Table 3 indicate that the fear-framed PSA elicited a significantly 
higher level of worry than the hope-framed PSA, t(31) = 2.53, p = .017, but that the fear-framed PSA 
did not elicit a significantly higher amount of fear than the hope PSA, t(31)=1.28, (p = .209).  The 
difference in the level of hope elicited by the fear-framed vs. hope-framed PSA was substantial (fear 
PSA, M = 2.84; hope PSA, M = 3.92), although it did not quite approach significance t(30) = -1.58, (p = 
.130), possibly due to the small sample size. 
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Other emotions that were analyzed in the pilot test included, sadness, anger, courage, happiness, 
and confusion.  The only significant difference found among these emotions was for sadness with the 
fear PSA eliciting a significantly higher level of sadness than the hope PSA which is not surprising. 
Table 3 Perceived Emotions Conveyed by the Messages 
 Fear PSA Hope PSA t-tests 
Emotions Mean SD Mean SD t value df p value 
Key Emotions Related to Manipulation 
Fear 2.90 1.86 2.08 1.71 1.28 31 .209 
Worry 3.65 1.90 1.92 1.94 2.53 31 .017 
Hope 2.84 2.12 3.92 1.61 -1.58 30 .130 
Additional Emotions 
Sadness 3.50 1.79 2.08 1.98 2.14 31 .040 
Anger 1.89 2.13 .77 1.36 1.68 30 .104 
Courage 2.74 2.18 2.83 1.53 -.134 29 .895 
Happiness 2.05 2.21 2.31 1.55 -.365 31 .718 
Confusion 1.70 1.49 1.23 1.74 .828 31 .414 
n 20 13  
Note. Emotion ratings could range from 0 to 6. 
In the third and final set of items, respondents were asked about their evaluations of the PSAs.  
The results are summarized in Table 4. As expected, there were no significant differences found on any 
of the items suggesting that the PSAs were perceived similarly in these dimensions. 
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Table 4 Perceived Effectiveness of the Messages 
 Fear PSA Hope PSA t-tests 
Items Mean SD Mean SD t value df p value 
Overall, I liked this ad. 3.9 1.37 3.77 1.79 .237 31 .814 
The ad was interesting. 3.65 1.63 3.46 1.85 .307 31 .761 
This ad was easy to 
understand. 
4.95 .999 
4.69 1.80 .530 31 .600 
I would pay attention to 
this ad if I saw it again. 
3.65 1.95 
3.77 1.83 -.175 31 .862 
I am interested in this ad’s 
topic. 3.75 1.77 
4.31 1.65 -.906 31 .372 
I like the way the ad looks. 3.65 2.06 3.46 1.98 .261 31 .796 
I can do what the ad 
suggests. 4.30 1.42 
4.17 1.64 .243 30 .810 
The ad was convincing. 4.10 1.59 4.00 1.68 .173 31 .864 
The ad grabbed my attention. 3.75 1.77 3.38 1.66 .593 31 .558 
The ad was confusing. 1.58 1.92 1.85 2.58 -.336 30 .739 
The message was credible. 3.90 1.45 4.23 1.69 -.600 31 .553 
The message was persuasive. 4.05 1.50 3.54 1.71 .904 31 .373 
n 20 13  
Note. Ratings could range from 0 to 6. 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
The results of the second pilot test indicate that the perception of the disadvantages and losses 
associated with not discussing genetic cancer screening with a doctor were significantly higher among 
those who saw fear-framed PSA than those who saw the hope-framed PSA.   This would suggest that the 
fear PSA successfully manipulated the negative perceptions associated with the fear framing.  Likewise, 
it should also be noted that the fear PSA also resulted in significantly higher levels of worry and sadness 
than the hope PSA.  Although neither of these emotions is the focus of this study, these findings suggest 
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that the fear PSA elicited higher levels of these “negative” emotions. Overall, however, the second pilot 
test also determined that there was a lack of statistical difference in the levels of hope and fear elicited 
by the public service announcements (i.e. the hope message did not elicit a significantly higher level of 
hope than the fear message did; the fear message did not elicit a significantly higher level of fear than 
the hope message did). However, the mean differences were in the expected direction. It could be argued 
that the lack of significance can partly be attributed to the very small sample size. It was expected that 
the larger sample size in the main study would push these findings closer to significance.   It should also 
be noted, however, that considerable effort and resources were utilized in the production of the two 
public service announcements and it was therefore not feasible to attempt to revise them after the second 
pilot test. 
4 METHOD: MAIN STUDY 
4.1 Participants 
Individuals aged eighteen years and older were recruited from the general population through 
Mechanical Turk (MTurk). Participation in the actual study was limited to those with a family history of 
breast, cervical, ovarian, peritoneal, colon, or thyroid cancers who had not yet been genetically screened 
for cancer susceptibility or had not talked to their health care provider about genetic screening.   
Participants must also not have previously been diagnosed with any of the aforementioned types of 
cancer. See Appendix H and Appendix I for the recruitment message and Consent Form. 
A total of 1047 individuals responded to the recruitment notice in MTurk and began the survey. 
Of those, 766 were excluded from analysis for various reasons.  A total of 594 were excluded because 
they did not report having a relative with one of the aforementioned cancers. Eighteen more were 
excluded because they indicated that they had spoken to their doctor or health care provider about 
genetic cancer screening. One hundred thirty eight respondents did not answer any questions past the 
public service announcements, meaning they did not answer any of the questions related to the 
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experiment and were thus excluded. Finally, another 16 were excluded because they did not respond 
correctly to an item included in the survey to see if they had actually watched the video.   
The final sample used for analysis consisted of 281 participants: 137 males (48.8%), 142 females 
(50.5%), 1 transgender male (0.4%), 1 unreported (0.4%).  The age of the participants ranged from 18 to 
74 years (M = 34.09, SD =11.96).  One hundred seventy six respondents (62.6%) identified themselves 
as White / Caucasian, 66 respondents (23.5%) as Indian /Asian / Pacific Islander, 19 respondents (6.8%) 
as Hispanic / Latino (a), 8 respondents (2.8%) as Black / African American, 8 respondents (2.8%) as 
multi-racial, and 4 respondents (1.4%) not reported. 
Because the survey was offered through MTurk, respondents came from all over the world.  Just 
over half of the respondents (52.7%), or 148 currently resided in the United States, 41 respondents 
(14.6%) currently resided in India, 26 (9.3%) respondents lived in Canada, 9 (3.2%) in Venezuela,  6 
(2.1%) in the United Kingdom, 5 (1.8%) in Italy, 3 each (1.1%) from Brazil, Finland, Spain, and less 
than 1% currently living in Australia (1), Bulgaria (2) , Chile (1), Costa Rica (2), Croatia (1), Czech 
Republic (1), Denmark (1), Egypt (1), France (2), Germany (1), Greece (2), Hungary (1), Ireland (2), 
Israel (1), Japan (1), Lithuania (1), Malta (2), Mauritius (1), New Zealand (1), Philippines (2), Portugal 
(2), Romania (1), Russia (1), Singapore (2), The Netherlands (1), Turkey (1), and not reported (2). 
4.2 Procedure 
Primary data collection for this experiment took place entirely online using Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk).  Participants were paid $0.40 for their participation in this experiment. Once participants 
indicated their consent, they then were assessed on two variables that could be related to attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening.  Participants were first assessed for level of dispositional optimism using the 
Life Orientation Test Revised (LOT-R) (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) to determine where on the 
optimism / pessimism scale each participant resides.   Participants were also assessed on the extent to 
which they utilized monitoring or blunting coping styles when presented with a potentially fear-causing 
situation using the Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire (Muris, van Zuuren, de Jong, de Beurs & 
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Hanewald, 1994).  Neither of these measures will be used in this study but will be used for later 
exploration of this data.    
Participants were then randomly assigned to view one of the two experimental messages (PSAs) 
or assigned to a control group.  After viewing the videos, participants were asked to report their 
emotional responses to the videos they watched and to report their attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening.  
At that point, participants were screened for family history of cancer and history of genetic 
cancer screening. The screening questions consisted of three yes / no questions addressing family history 
of cancer, personal history of cancer, and whether or not they had been genetically screened for cancer 
susceptibility.   Only those with a family history of cancer, no personal history of cancer, and no prior 
genetic cancer screening proceeded to the survey questions that followed exposure to the PSA or control 
video. These measures will be discussed in detail in the following section. Those who did not have a 
family history of cancer, those with a personal history of cancer, or those who had previously received 
genetic cancer screening were routed to a different set of questions not related to the PSAs. Finally, 
participants were taken to a page that displayed a debriefing message that acknowledged the potential 
difficulty of answering questions about cancer screening and provided them with a link for more 
information about genetic testing. The message appears in Appendix J.  
4.3 Experimental stimuli 
The experimental stimuli utilized in this study consisted of two video public service 
announcements (PSAs) created for the purposes of this study and a third video which was shown to the 
control group.   The experimental videos were 2-minute public service announcements produced 
utilizing the scripts written during pilot testing phase. These videos promoted the importance of 
discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider.   Although the “message” part of the 
videos contained exactly the same content, the two PSAs were framed differently: one used a loss-frame 
and an emotional appeal designed to elicit fear; the other PSA used a gain-frame and an emotional 
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appeal designed to elicit hope.  The final scripts used for the production of the two PSAs can be found in 
Appendix K. The control group video was selected from pre-existing videos that had been posted to 
YouTube and therefore was not produced as a part of this study.  The subject of the control group video 
was unrelated to genetic cancer screening.  Each of the two experimental videos essentially contained 
three parts: a prologue, the main message (the “body” of the PSA), and an epilogue.  The two 
experimental PSAs each had a different prologue and epilogue but contained the exact same main 
messaging component. The control group video was a 2-minute video on energy conservation produced 
by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
4.3.1 Fear PSA 
The fear-framed PSA stressed the importance talking to one’s doctor about genetic cancer 
screening by demonstrating this behavior while also highlighting the consequences of not discussing 
screening with a doctor.  The video can be viewed at:  https://vimeo.com/153825310 .   
This PSA began with a prologue that consisted of a stark black and white shot of a young man 
sitting alone in a wheelchair as sad sounding music plays in the background.  At that point the narrator 
begins to explain that the character in the wheelchair, “Steve”, had been diagnosed with terminal cancer 
and had also learned that he carried a gene that made him more predisposed to getting cancer.  The 
narration strongly implies that Steve only learned of his genetic predisposition after he’d been diagnosed 
with terminal cancer when, according to the narrator, “it was too late”.   
The video then transitions into the “body” of the PSA by cutting to a shot of another character 
named “Jenny” sitting nervously in a doctor’s office.  This is the main message portion of the PSA 
where the desired behavior—talking to a doctor about genetic screening—is modeled.  As the music 
shifts to a more upbeat style, the narrator mentions that Jenny’s mom and grandmother both had cancer.  
As Jenny is called back to the doctor’s office, the narrator states that Jenny “is not going to let this 
happen to her.”   When she is called back to the doctor’s office, the audience learns the reason that Jenny 
is there is that she has decided to undergo genetic cancer screening.  Once in the doctor’s office, the 
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doctor offers reassurance that genetic screening will help them determine whether or not she carries 
genes that may predispose her to cancer and that knowing this information can help them put into place 
a plan that will help prevent her from getting cancer and reduce her risk of prematurely dying from 
cancer.  As the doctor and Jenny continue to talk, the narrator then can be heard describing how simple 
the process of genetic screening is and why it is important.   
The final shot or “epilogue” of the video cuts back to a black and white scene of Steve from a 
different angle.  In this shot, Steve is still sitting alone in his wheelchair, but this time the camera zooms 
out from overhead creating the illusion that Steve is getting smaller and smaller and more alone as the 
wheelchair begins to fade into the gray concrete of the balcony. This dramatic shot included the same 
sad sounding music that was used in the opening and included a somewhat ominous narration warning 
the audience: “don’t let this happen to you.”  The narrator goes on to say that if they have a family 
history of breast, colon, ovarian, or thyroid cancer that they should talk to their doctor about genetic 
screening “before it is too late.”  The PSA ends with a long overhead shot of Steve sitting alone on a 
barren concrete balcony, presumably of a hospital. He appears small and alone.   
4.3.2 Hope PSA 
 Like the fear PSA, the hope-framed PSA also models the behavior of discussing genetic cancer 
screening with a doctor but rather than showing the consequences of non-adoption, it shows the positive 
outcomes of adopting the behavior.  In characterizing the behavioral adoption in this way, the video 
specifically sought to elicit hope.  The video can be viewed at:  https://vimeo.com/153825720 .  
The hope-framed video began with an upbeat prologue that introduces the same character 
“Steve.”  But instead of seeing Steve in wheelchair and learning that he has terminal cancer, the hope-
framed video shows Steve running to an upbeat soundtrack.  Although the video points out that Steve 
does have a gene that puts him at risk for cancer, it also says that he is not afraid and has hope.  The 
video then cuts to the same “body” as the fear video.   
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The epilogue of the hope-framed video shows a jubilant Steve, enjoying his life, presumably 
comforted by the knowledge that he has learned about his genetic predisposition to cancer and is taking 
steps to prevent cancer.  The video ends with the same appeal to talk to a doctor about genetic screening.  
4.3.3  Control video 
Finally, the control video was an unrelated informational video about energy conservation which 
can be viewed at:  
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BH-6WopGb9g&list=PLBhfkkujnoRC-
KTrX2XsfhlxcN2_PQ4Wr&index=62 
The control group video was also approximately two minutes in length and made no mention 
whatsoever of genetic cancer screening.  The video discussed how people can participate in the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s “Energy Star Program.”  The video was selected largely because it 
did not appear to contain any particularly strong emotional appeals.     
4.4 Measures 
 All of the measures used in this study can be found in Appendix L.  In addition, some of the 
measures included in the survey, specifically the measures for self-efficacy, optimism and coping 
strategy, will not be used for this research but were included for future exploration of the data.  
4.4.1 Manipulation check 
Participants in the two experimental groups were asked to report on their perceptions of the PSA 
they saw, using measures adapted from Maheswaran and Meyers-Levy (1990).  These measures were 
included to determine the effectiveness of the frame manipulation (hope, fear) in the two experimental 
videos. Two items addressed the extent to which the messages emphasized the health benefits and 
advantages of talking to a doctor about genetic screening. These items were rated using a 5-point scale 
(0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree).  A scale was created by averaging the two items (M = 3.40, 
SD = .70). This scale was found to be reliable (α = .70). 
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Two additional items addressed the extent to which the messages emphasized the consequences 
and disadvantages of not talking to a doctor about genetic cancer screening. These items were rated on 
the same 5-point scale, and the two items were averaged (M = 2.16, SD = 1.18).  The scale was found to 
be reliable (α = .70). 
4.4.2 Emotional response 
After viewing one of the three videos, the respondents were asked about how they felt using 
measures adapted from Dillard, Plotnick, Godbold, Freimuth, and Edgar (1996).  Participants reported 
the extent to which they felt each of 21 different emotions. These 21 emotions were used to construct 
response scales for 7 primary emotions of interest:  fear, hope, anger, courage, sadness, happiness, and 
puzzlement (three items each).   For each item, the 5-point response scale was: 0 = none of this feeling 
to 4 = a lot of this feeling.  Fear was measured using three items: worried, afraid, and scared (M = 1.17; 
SD = 1.09) and the scale was reliable (α = .90).   Hope was measured using three items: hopeful, upbeat, 
and confident (M = 1.89; SD = 1.09) and the scale was found to be reliable (α = .80).  Anger was 
measured using three items: angry, irritated, and annoyed (M = .63; SD = .91), and the scale was reliable 
(α = .86).  Courage was measured using three items: courageous, fearless, and strong (M = 1.55; SD = 
1.11) and the scale was reliable (α = .81).   Sadness was measured using three items: dejected, sad, and 
sorrowful (M = .82; SD = .93) and the scale was found to be reliable (α = .82).  Happiness was measured 
using three items: happy, joyful, and pleased (M = 1.48; SD = 1.17) and the scale was found to be 
reliable (α = .88).  Lastly,  puzzlement was measured using the following three items: puzzled, 
confused, and bewildered (M = .77, SD = .91) and the scale was found reliable (α = .82). 
4.4.3 Attitude toward genetic testing    
Attitude toward genetic testing was measured using items from Henneman, Vermeulen, van El, 
Claasen, Timmermans & Cornel (2013).  Participants completed a ten-item scale including items such 
as: “Genetic cancer testing does more harm than good,” “Genetic cancer screening is tampering with 
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nature” and “Genetic cancer screening should be promoted to people at risk.”   Each item was measured 
using a five-point scale ranging from 0 to 4 (strongly disagree to strongly agree), (M = 3.04; SD = .66).  
After reverse-coding negatively-worded items, the 10 items were averaged so higher scores indicate 
more positive attitudes. The scale was found to be reliable (α = .81).  
4.4.4 Behavioral intent regarding discussing genetic testing with health care provider 
Intent to talk to a health care provider about genetic cancer screening was measured using a 4-item 
scale adapted from Rhodes and Matheson (2005).  Items included: “I intend to talk to my doctor about 
genetic cancer screening for myself” and “I plan on talking to my doctor and learning more about 
genetic screening.” Each item was scored on a five-point scale ranging from strongly disagree (0) to 
strongly agree (4), and the four items were averaged (M = 2.16, SD = 1.15). The scale was found to be 
reliable (α = .93).   
4.4.5 Perceived efficacy of genetic cancer screening (response efficacy)  
Perceived efficacy of genetic cancer screening was measured with 3 items adapted from 
Smerecnik, Quaak, van Schayk, van Schooten, and de Vries (2011). Items include: “Talking to my 
doctor about genetic cancer screening will increase the chances that I can protect myself from cancer” 
and “Talking to my doctor about genetic cancer screening is the first step toward getting screened.”  The 
items were rated using a 5-point scale ranging from (0) strongly disagree to (4) strongly agree, and the 
three items were averaged (M = 2.98, SD = .79). The scale was found to be reliable (α = .70) 
4.4.6 Access to health care  
Access to health care was measured using items from the household component of the 2010 
Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS).  The MEPS household component is sent to individual 
household members and collects data on many topics including access to health care (U.S. Agency for 
Healthcare Research and Quality, 2010). The MEPS also asks those who do not have a regular source of 
health care to specify why.  One of the items from the MEPS was: “Is there a particular doctor’s office, 
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clinic, health center, or other place that you go if you are sick or need advice about your health?” 
(yes/no). If no, respondents were asked: “What is the main reason you do not have a usual source of 
health care?” This question was followed by a list of choices including “recently moved into area,” 
“don’t know where to go for care, “no health insurance” and several others.   
The final question from the MEPS survey asked about the difficulty of accessing their health 
care provider, which was measured on a 4-point scale from 1 = very difficult to 4 = not at all difficult 
using the item “How difficult is it to get to your health care provider?” (M = 3.02, SD = .891).  
4.4.7 Type of health insurance  
Type of health insurance was measured using an item from the American Community Survey 
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015) which asked what type of insurance coverage they had using the 
following item: “Are you currently covered by any of the following types of health coverage plans?” 
followed by a list of insurance plans including employer-based insurance, direct purchase, Medicare, 
Medicaid, Tricare / Military, VA, Indian Health Service, or other.   
4.4.8 Video viewing verification  
Finally, an item was added to determine whether or not the respondents actually watched the 
video they were assigned.  This item contained a question that asked them to recall something about the 
video that would be easily recalled if they had in fact watched the video.  The hope frame video 
contained the following item: “The video you just watched contained which of the following (choose 
one): A man riding a bicycle, a woman driving a car, a man running / jogging, children playing 
baseball.”  The correct answer was “a man running / jogging.”   The fear survey contained the following 
item: “The video you just watched contained which of the following (choose one): A man hiking in the 
woods, a woman driving a car, a man sitting in a wheelchair, children playing basketball.”  The correct 
answer was “A man sitting in a wheelchair.” 
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5 RESULTS 
5.1 Overview of Analysis 
The hypotheses and research questions for this study were addressed using regression-based path 
analysis to examine the effect of multiple mediators such as discrete emotions and attitude toward 
genetic screening within a proposed health communication model.  The health communication model for 
this study used fear- and hope-framed health appeals in the form of experimental public service 
announcements (PSAs) to promote discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider for 
those genetically predisposed for higher cancer risk.  The hypotheses made predictions about the 
influence of these framed health appeals on attitudes toward genetic cancer screening and intent to 
discuss screening with a health care provider, as well as the extent to which discrete emotions and other 
factors mediate the relationship between message frame and these outcomes.  The results of all of the 
hypotheses proposed in Chapter 2 as well as the results of the manipulation check will be reported in this 
chapter.  
The first set of analyses compared the two experimental groups (fear-framed and hope-framed 
PSAs) to the control group on the four measured variables, using one way analyses of variance 
(ANOVAs). These ANOVAs addressed the first three hypotheses, H1 and H2, which tested levels of 
emotion elicited by the framed PSAs in comparison to the control PSA, and H3a and H3b which tested 
whether the framed messages seen by the experimental groups resulted in a more positive attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening (H3a) and greater intent to discuss genetic screening with a health care 
provider (H3b) than the control group.  
The next set of analyses examined a model that proposed relationships among the experimental 
frame (fear, hope), attitude toward genetic screening, and behavioral intent to discuss.  H4a examined the 
effect of frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening and H4b examined the effect of frame on 
intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider. H5 examined the association 
between attitude toward genetic cancer screening and intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a 
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health care provider.  H6 examined the extent to which attitude toward genetic cancer screening 
mediated the relationship between message frame and intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a 
health care provider.  H4a, H4b, and H5 were addressed with Pearson’s correlations, and then the full 
model (including the mediation hypothesis, H6) was tested using regression-based path analysis. 
The next section examined the extent to which the discrete emotions of fear and hope mediated 
the influence of message frame on attitude toward genetic screening.  The model proposed a partial 
mediation of framing effect on attitude by fear and hope. H7 examined the association between fear and 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening.  H8 examined the extent to which fear partially mediated the 
relationship between message frame and attitude toward genetic cancer screening.  H9 examined the 
association between hope and attitude toward genetic cancer screening.  Finally, H10 examined the extent 
to which hope partially mediated the relationship between frame and attitude. The bivariate relationships 
were initially addressed with Pearson’s correlations.  
The final section consists of a supplemental analysis that utilized regression-based path analysis 
to assess the indirect effect of message frame on intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health 
care provider through the discrete emotions of fear and hope.  
Prior to these analyses, however, is a summary of the background information from the 
respondents, including respondents’ health related characteristics and access to health care provider and 
insurance.  
5.2 Health-related characteristics 
5.2.1 Relatives reported with cancer 
Respondents were asked to identify which of their relatives had been diagnosed with one of the 
cancers of interest (breast, colon, thyroid, ovarian, cervical, tubal, or peritoneal). A total of 203 of 
respondents (72.2%) reported only one relative had been diagnosed with one of these cancers, and 78 
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respondents (27.8%) reported having more than one relative who had one of these types of cancers.   
The most common relative cited was grandmother (111 respondents; 39.5%), followed by aunt (85 
respondents; 30.2%), mother (55 respondents; 19.6%), grandfather (50 respondents; 17.8%), uncle (27 
respondents; 9.6%), father (22 respondents; 7.8%), cousin (14 respondents; 5.0%), sister (9 respondents; 
3.2%), and brother (4 respondents; 1.4%).  A Pearson chi-square test was run for each type of relative to 
determine if there were any significant differences between the three groups (fear frame, hope frame, 
control) and the only significant difference was found for grandmother, X2 (2, N = 281) = 6.65, (p < .05).  
Thirty respondents (30.6%) from the hope group, 45 respondents (48.9%) from the fear group, and 36 
respondents (39.6%) from the control group reported that their grandmother had at least one type of the 
cancers listed above. 
5.2.2 Types of cancer reported among relatives 
In addition to being asked which relatives had one of the cancers of interest, respondents were 
also asked to identify which types of cancer the relatives had.  Overall, 210 (74.7%) respondents 
identified only one type of cancer while 71 respondents (25.3%) identified multiple types of cancer.  The 
most identified cancer was breast cancer with 149 (53.0%) respondents reporting at least one relative 
having breast cancer.  The next most commonly reported type of cancer was colon cancer with 102 
respondents (36.3%) reporting at least one relative having it, followed by thyroid cancer (38 
respondents; 13.5%), ovarian cancer (37 respondents; 13.2%), cervical cancer (24 respondents; 8.5%), 
tubal cancer (8 respondents; 2.8%), and lastly, peritoneal cancer (7 respondents; 2.5%).  Pearson chi-
square tests were run for each type of cancer and no significant differences were found among the three 
groups for any of the types of cancer reported among relatives. 
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5.3 Access to and type of health care and health insurance 
5.3.1 Regular source of health care 
Respondents reported on whether they had a regular source for health care.  According to their 
responses, 200 participants (71.2%) reported that they did have a particular doctor’s office or clinic that 
they go to when they are sick or need advice about their health, whereas 80 (28.5%) responded no to this 
question with one respondent (0.4%) not reporting.  A Pearson chi-square test was run to determine if 
there were any significant differences between the three groups on access to health care (yes, no), and 
although there were none, it did approach significance, X2 (2, N = 280) = 5.82, p = .055.   Seventy-six 
respondents (77.6%) from the hope group, 68 respondents (73.9%) from the fear group, and 56 
respondents (62.2%) from the control group reported yes to this question.  
Respondents also reported on why they may not have a regular source of health care.  A total of 
80 participants indicated that they did not have a usual source of health care.  For those who reported 
that they did not have a regular source of health care health care, 39 respondents (49.0%) cited multiple 
reasons.  The most common reason cited was that they seldom or never get sick (41 respondents; 51.3%)  
followed by cost of health care (28 respondents; 35.0%), not knowing where to go for health care (19 
respondents; 23.8%), recently moving to the area (17 respondents; 21.3%) ,  do not have health 
insurance (17 respondents; 21.3%), don’t use doctors or treat themselves (14 respondents; 17.5%), like 
to go to different places for health care (13 respondents; 16.3%), recently changed insurance (4 
respondents; 5.0%), could not find a provider who spoke their language (2 respondents; 2.5%), usual 
source of health care is no longer available (2 respondents;  2.5%),  and finally other reasons not 
specified (11  respondents; 13.8%). A Pearson chi-square test was run for each of these reasons to 
determine if there were any significant differences between the three groups on reason for no regular 
source of health care and there were none found. 
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5.3.2 Access to health care provider 
Respondents reported on their difficulty of accessing health care providers.  According to the 
data, 21 respondents (7.6%) found it very difficult to access their provider, 44 (15.8%) found it 
somewhat difficult, 121 (43.5%) found it not too difficult, and 92 (33.1%) found it not at all difficult. A 
one-way ANOVA was run to determine if there were any differences among the three groups for access 
to health care provider and there were no statistically significant differences found F(2,277) = 0.661, p = 
.517. 
5.3.3 Type of health insurance 
Respondents were asked to report on the type of health insurance coverage they had.  The most 
common type of insurance reported was insurance through their current or former employer or union 
(129 respondents; 47.6%), followed by purchasing insurance directly from an insurance company (69 
respondents; 25.7 %), Medicaid recipients (57 respondents; 21.5%), Medicare recipients (19 
respondents; 7.1%), Indian Health Service (IHS) (15 respondents; 5.7%), TRICARE / Military (10 
respondents; 3.8%), and the Veteran’s Administration (VA), (9 respondents; 3.4%).  A total of 78 
respondents (27.8%) reported obtaining insurance from multiple sources, 55 respondents (20.5%) 
reported “other,” and 45 respondents (16%) did not report.  A Pearson chi-square test was run for each 
type of insurance reported to determine if there were any significant differences between the three 
groups. There was a significant difference among groups only for insurance through current or former 
employer or union, X2 (2, N = 271) = 10.36, p < .01.  Fifty-five respondents (57.9%) from the hope 
group, 45 respondents (49.5%) from the fear group, and 29 respondents (34.1%) from the control group 
reported than they obtained insurance form a current or former employer or union. 
5.4 Manipulation check 
To determine if the fear-framed and hope-framed messages differed as intended in the extent to 
which they were perceived as conveying advantages and disadvantages of discussing genetic cancer 
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screening, two independent sample t-tests were conducted. The analyses compared the two experimental 
groups on two measures that assessed the extent to which the messages emphasized: 1) the 
disadvantages and loss of health benefits that would occur if they did not talk to a doctor about genetic 
screening (perceived disadvantages); and 2) the advantages and gaining of health benefits by talking to a 
doctor about genetic screening (perceived advantages). The t-tests showed that the respondents who saw 
the fear framed message (M = 2.60) perceived greater disadvantages of not discussing genetic screening 
with a health care provider than those who saw the hope framed message (M = 1.75), t(188) = -5.33, p < 
.001. There was no significant difference in the extent to which the two groups perceived the 
advantages, t(188) = -.790, p = .430. These findings suggest that the framed messages successfully 
manipulated perceptions of disadvantages but did not similarly manipulate perceptions of the advantages 
of discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider. 
5.5 Comparison of the two experimental groups to the control group 
Measured variables used in this study included emotions felt after watching the messages, 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening, and intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with health care 
provider (behavioral intent).  A series of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs) examined the 
differences between the experimental groups (i.e., the groups that saw one of the two experimental 
PSAs) and the control group on these measured variables.  To test H1 the levels of fear elicited by the 
fear frame PSA was compared to the levels of fear elicited by the other two PSAs (hope and control).  
To test H2, the levels of hope elicited by the hope PSA were compared to the levels of hope elicited by 
the other two PSAs.   To test H3a and H3b, the groups were compared on attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening and intent to discuss screening with a health care provider.  The means and standard 
deviations for the main measured variables for all groups (both experimental and control), as well as the 
ANOVA results, can be found in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Means, Standard Deviations, and ANOVA Results for all groups (experimental and control) 
 Fear frame Hope frame Control  ANOVA 
Variables Mean Mean Mean SD Mean SD dfs F p-value 
Fear 1.60b 1.07 1.30b 1.06 .61a .90 2, 278 23.5 .001 
Hope 1.50a 1.00 2.00b 1.06 2.20b 1.12 2, 278 10.5 .001 
Attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening 
3.08 .70 3.08 .70 2.94 .64 2, 278 1.21 .300 
Behavioral intent to 
discuss genetic screening 
with health care provider  
2.30b 1.15 2.37b 1.10 1.83a 1.14 2, 278 5.81 .003 
n 92 98 91 281   
 Note. All scales could range from 0 to 4. Means in the same row with no subscripts in common differ at p < .05 using the Tukey method.  
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H1 predicted that the fear-framed PSA would result in higher levels of fear than the (a) 
the control message or (b) the hope-framed PSA.  This hypothesis was partially supported, 
F(2,278) = 23.5, p < 001.  Tukey post hoc tests revealed that fear was significantly higher among 
the fear group (M = 1.60) than the control group (M = .61), p < .001.  There was no significant 
difference between the fear and hope groups (M = 1.30), although it did approach significance (p 
= .089). 
H2 predicted that the hope-framed PSA would result in higher levels of hope than (a) the 
control message or (b) fear PSA.  This hypothesis was partially supported, F(2, 278) = 10.50, p < 
.001.  Tukey post hoc tests revealed that hope was significantly higher among the hope group (M 
= 2.00) than the fear group (M = 1.50), p < .01 but there was no significant difference between 
the hope group and the control group (M = 2.20), p = .372. 
H3a predicted that the fear framed and hope framed messages would result in more 
positive attitudes toward genetic screening than would the control message.  This hypothesis was 
not supported, F(2,278) = 1.21, p = .300.  The means for attitude toward genetic screening for 
each of the three groups were as follows:  Hope group, M = 3.08, fear group, M = 3.08, and 
control group M = 2.94.   
H3b predicted that the fear-framed and hope-framed messages would result in greater 
intent to discuss genetic screening with a health care provider than would the control message.  
This hypothesis was supported. There was a statistically significant difference among the groups, 
F(2, 278) = 5.813, p < .01. Tukey post hoc tests revealed that, compared to the control group (M 
= 1.83), behavioral intent to discuss genetic screening was significantly higher in the hope group 
(M = 2.37, p < .01) and the fear group (M = 2.30, p < .05).  There was no statistically significant 
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difference between the hope and the fear groups (p = .761). So clearly, the appeals by themselves 
appeared to have some effect on intent to discuss screening.  Those that watched one of the PSAs 
were significantly more likely to intend to discuss genetic cancer screening with their doctors 
than those who did not watch a PSA. 
5.6 Preliminary analysis of relationships among all key variables 
The rest of the analyses focus solely on the experimental groups (i.e. the fear-framed PSA 
and the hope-framed PSA). Zero-order correlations were computed among all key variables for 
participants in the two experimental groups. Variables included age, gender, message frame (0 = 
fear frame, 1 = hope frame), fear, hope, attitude toward genetic cancer screening, and intention to 
discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider. The correlations, along with means 
and standard deviations, are presented in Table 6. 
Table 6. Means, Standard Deviations, and Zero-Order Correlations between Variables for 
Experimental Groups 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Age 33.56 12 ---      
2 Gender --- --- .038 ---     
3. Frame .52 .50 .105 -.114 ---    
4. Fear 1.44 1.07 -.223** -.080 -.144* ---   
5. Hope 1.74 1.06 .112 -.264** .232*** -.029 ---  
6.  Attitude Toward Genetic 
Screening 
3.08 .67 .132 .078 -.002 -.103 .007 --- 
7.  Behavioral Intent to 
Discuss 
2.31 1.12 -.002 -.140 .052 .285*** .229*** .396*** 
Note. All scales could range from 0 to 4. Gender was coded 1 = male, 2 = female. Frame was coded 0 = fear 
frame, 1 = hope frame. 
* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001. 
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Table 6 shows that, when only the two experimental groups were included, the fear frame 
led to more fear than did the hope frame, and the hope frame led to more hope than did the fear 
frame. But the frame manipulation was not related to any of the measures that dealt with genetic 
cancer screening. The emotions of fear and hope were both associated with greater intention to 
discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider, but were unrelated to attitude. The 
measures that dealt with genetic cancer screening – attitude and intention to discuss – were 
positively correlated. 
5.7 Testing the influence of frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening and intent 
to discuss genetic cancer screening. 
This section examines the relationships included in the basic path model presented earlier 
in Figure 1.  This model predicted that, compared to the hope frame, the fear frame would lead to 
more positive attitudes toward genetic cancer screening (H4a) and greater intent to discuss 
genetic cancer screening with a health care provider (H4b), that respondents’ attitude toward 
genetic screening is positively associated with intent to discuss genetic screening (H5), and that 
attitude would mediate the influence of frame on intent to discuss (H6).    
H4a predicted that the fear framed message would result in a more positive attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening than the hope framed message.  As noted above, Table 6 shows that 
frame was not related to attitude toward genetic cancer screening. Therefore, H4a was not 
supported.  
H4b predicted that the fear-framed message would result in greater intention to discuss 
genetic screening with a health care provider than the hope-framed message. As reported above, 
Table 6 shows that frame was not related to intention to discuss genetic cancer screening. 
Therefore, H4b was not supported.  In neither of the two primary outcome variables, (attitude, 
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behavioral intent) was there any significant difference between the experimental conditions 
suggesting that neither framed PSA had a persuasive advantage.  
H5 predicted that respondents’ attitude toward genetic cancer screening would be 
positively associated with intent to discuss genetic screening with a health care provider.  Table 6 
shows that attitude toward genetic cancer screening was positively associated with behavioral 
intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider (r = .396). Therefore, H5 
was supported.   
H6 predicted that attitude toward genetic cancer screening would mediate the effect of 
framed message on intent to discuss genetic screening with a health care provider. The fact that 
the frame manipulation had no effect on either attitude or behavioral intent means that attitude 
could not function as a mediator. However, for completeness, a mediation analysis was 
conducted utilizing procedures specified by Darlington and Hayes (2017) using the PROCESS 
macro.  Age and gender were controlled in this analysis. The PROCESS macro for SPSS 
developed by Dr. Andrew F. Hayes and is an add-on for SPSS and SAS that allows for mediation 
analysis.  The PROCESS macro uses an ordinary least squares or logistic regression-based path 
analytic framework for estimating direct and indirect effects in single and multiple mediator 
models (Hayes, 2016).  The resulting model in presented in Figure 3.  
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Figure 3. Model of mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by attitude, controlling for 
age and gender. 
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While controlling for age and gender, it was determined the direct effect of message 
frame on behavioral intent was .088 which was not significant (p = .558).  The direct effect of 
frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening was -.010 which also was not significant (p = 
.915).  The direct effect of attitude on intent was .702 which was significant (p < .001). The 
indirect effect of frame on intent (with attitude as the mediating variable), was -.007.  In order to 
ascertain the significance of this effect, however, confidence intervals for this effect were 
analyzed.  Darlington and Hayes (2017) strongly suggest the use of confidence intervals in 
establishing the significance of effect sizes.  Because the confidence interval associated with this 
effect contained zero, CI [-.148, .131] this would suggest that attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening did not mediate the relationship between message frame and behavioral intent, 
therefore H6 is not supported.   
5.8 Mediation of the effect of frame on attitude by discrete emotions 
One of the main questions of this study is to determine the extent to which emotions, 
specifically fear and hope, mediate the relationship between the framed messages and attitude 
toward genetic screening. The proposed model was presented earlier in Figure 2. The proposed 
relationships within that model are first addressed separately, and then the full model is tested 
using the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016), controlling for age and gender.    
This model included two bivariate relationships with fear: the effect of frame on fear 
(H1b), which was addressed previously, and the relationship between fear and attitude (H7). 
Recall that H1b predicted that the fear message would elicit greater level of fear than the hope 
message. When the three groups (fear-framed, hope-framed, control) were compared in one 
ANOVA, a Tukey post hoc test showed that the fear-framed message produced a marginally 
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greater level of fear than did the hope-framed message. However, Table 6 shows that when only 
the two PSAs were compared, the difference reached significance (r = -.144, p < .05).  
H7 predicted that fear would be positively associated with attitude toward genetic scanner 
screening.  The zero-order correlation in Table 6 shows that there is no significant correlation 
between fear and attitude toward genetic cancer screening (r = -.103). Therefore, H7 was not 
supported. 
H8 predicted that fear would mediate the expected relationship between message frame 
and attitude toward genetic cancer screening (predicted in H4a). As previously discussed, a 
variable can be said to function as a mediator to the extent that it accounts for the relation 
between the predictor (independent variable) and the criterion variable (dependent variable) 
(Baron & Kenny, 1986).  In this model, the independent variable is the framed message (fear 
frame or loss framed PSA) and the dependent variable is attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening.  In order for mediation to occur, however, certain conditions must exist. The first step 
in establishing mediation is to show that the independent variable is correlated with the 
dependent variable which establishes that there is an effect that may be mediated (Kenny, 2014).  
As already reported, and as indicated in Table 6, message frame had no influence on attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening (r = -.002).  Darlington and Hayes (2017) argued that under 
certain conditions mediation can occur for a nonsignificant effect. However, in this case, the 
mediator must be associated with both the independent and dependent variables. That was not 
the case here. Although the frame affected fear, fear was not related to attitude (correlation near 
zero). Thus, there can be no mediation. Hence H8 was not supported.   
The model also proposed that hope would mediate the relationship between framed 
message and attitude toward genetic cancer screening. This model included two bivariate 
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relationships with hope: the effect of frame on hope (H2b), which was addressed previously, and 
the relationship between hope and attitude (H9).  Recall that in H2b it was predicted that the hope-
framed message would elicit higher levels of hope than the fear message and it was found that 
this was the case. As shown in Table 6, level of hope was significantly higher among the hope 
group than the fear group, r = .232, p < .001. 
H9 predicted that hope would be positively associated with attitude toward genetic 
screening.  As indicated in Table 6, there was no significant correlation between hope and 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening (r = .007). Thus, H9 was not supported 
Finally, H10 predicted that hope would partially mediate the relationship between frame 
and attitude but would be a weaker mediator than fear.  For H10 to be supported, the same 
conditions for mediation would again have to be present.  This was not the case.  As reported 
above, although message frame affected hope, the emotion of hope was not correlated with 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening; in fact, the correlation was near zero. Therefore, there 
can be no mediation. Hence, H10 was also not supported.   
For completeness, the proposed mediation model was tested using the PROCESS macro, 
controlling for both age and gender. This model is presented in Figure 4. In this analysis, no 
significant indirect effect of the emotion frame via either fear (.013), CI[-.009, .07] or hope 
(.004), CI[-.039, .06] was discovered. 
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                         -.284                                            -.047                                                    
                                                       -.028  
                                      
                                                         .409**  .010 
 
Figure 4. Model of mediation of framing effect on attitude by fear and hope, controlling for age 
and gender. 
5.9 Supplemental analysis: Mediation of the effect of frame on intent to discuss genetic 
cancer screening by discrete emotions 
The previous section made it clear that emotions did not mediate the relationship between 
message frame and attitude toward genetic cancer screening as had been predicted.  But since a 
large portion of this paper focuses on the effect of discrete emotions in a persuasive model, it is 
worth exploring the possibility that these emotions mediate the other outcome examined in this 
study.  Therefore, a supplemental analysis was conducted to examine whether fear or hope 
mediated the effect of frame on behavioral intent to discuss genetic cancer screening.  An 
analysis was run utilizing the PROCESS macro (Hayes, 2016), controlling for age and gender, to 
determine whether there was an indirect effect of message frame on intent to discuss genetic 
cancer screening through the emotions of fear and hope. The model in Figure 5 depicts the 
mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by fear and hope. 
 
 
 
 
 
Fear-framed message (0) 
Hope-framed message (1) Attitude toward 
genetic cancer 
screening 
  
 
 
Fear 
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                         -.284                                            .314***                                                    
                                                       .079  
                                            
                                                             
 
Figure 5.  Model of mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by fear and hope, 
controlling for age and gender.  
In the analysis, after controlling for age and gender, it was determined that the direct 
effect of frame on behavioral intent, .079, was not significant (p = .621), but the emotion frame 
did have indirect effects on behavioral intent via both fear and hope. The direct effect of frame 
on fear was -.284, which approached significance (p = .065), and the direct effect of fear on 
intent was .314, which was significant (p < .001). The direct effect of frame on hope was .409, 
which was significant (p < .001), and the direct effect of hope on intent was .223, which was also 
significant (p < .001).  Overall, it was determined that there was a significant indirect effect of 
message frame on intent through both fear (-.089), CI[-.210, -.002] and hope (.091), CI[.022, 
.213].  
6 DISCUSSION 
As previous research has found, message frames don’t act in a vacuum. Put another way, 
a framed-message by itself isn’t usually sufficient to motivate behavior.  For example, O’Keefe 
and Jensen (2007, 2009) appeared to find little evidence of the singular effect of frame on health 
behaviors.  This would suggest that for message frames to have any significant effect, other 
factors must be involved. To that point, the work of Yan et al. (2010), supports this notion, 
suggesting that message framing effects do exist but appear to be contingent on other factors.   
Fear-framed message (0) 
Hope-framed message (1) Behavioral intent 
  
 
 
Fear 
  
 
 
Hope 
  
 
 
.223** .409** 
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Factors that have already been examined within the context of framing research include 
demographics (age and race), perceptions and beliefs related to the health behavior, and 
perceived susceptibility to the adverse health outcome among others.  Similar to those studies, 
the focus of this research was to examine other factors that could potentially interact with 
message frame to influence outcomes related to genetic cancer screening. This study, however, 
sought to explore factors related to how people respond emotionally to framed health appeals.   
The factors examined by this study were attitude toward genetic cancer screening and discrete 
emotions, specifically hope and fear.  The outcomes of interest in this study were attitude toward 
genetic cancer screening and intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care 
provider.   
As the title suggests, the primary focus of this study was to examine the extent to which 
hope and fear mediated the relationship between message frame and attitude toward genetic 
screening.  Of the many possible discrete emotions to examine for this study, hope and fear were 
selected in part because of their relevance to health decisions and their distinctly different 
emotional tone.  As described above, fear is widely regarded as a strongly negative emotion and 
with the inherent negativity bias present in psychological research it should come as no surprise 
that there is an extensive literature on the effectiveness fear appeals.  Hope on the other hand is 
considered a positive emotion and its effect has been studied to a much lesser degree within the 
context of emotional health appeals.   
As the literature has shown, fear can certainly motivate people to adopt health behaviors 
under certain circumstances but the question remained, can the elicitation of a positive emotion 
such as hope influence attitude and behavioral adoption?  Recent work by Nabi and Prestin 
(2016) suggests that it can.  Although they found that hope did not independently influence risk 
106 
 
 
perceptions it did interact with another factor, specifically response efficacy to increase 
behavioral intention (Nabi & Prestin, 2016) related to health prevention behaviors (HPV 
prevention).    
Emotion, however, was only one of the factors this study explored.  The importance of 
attitude toward a behavior should was also considered as a possible mediator of message frame 
effectiveness because of its potential to influence behavior. Therefore, this study also examined 
how attitude toward genetic screening functioned as a mediator between message frame and 
behavioral intent.   
As previously discussed, five different models of mediation were developed for this 
study: a model for testing the mediation of framing effect on intent by attitude, models for testing 
the mediation of framing effect on attitude by both hope and fear, and models for testing the 
mediation of framing effect on behavioral intent by hope and fear. Analyses revealed that the 
framed PSAs used in this study (fear-framed, hope-framed) had no effect on either attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening or intent to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care 
provider. Additionally, this study found no evidence that attitude toward genetic screening 
mediated the effect of frame on behavioral intent nor did it find that fear or hope mediated the 
effect of frame on attitude toward genetic cancer screening.  However, despite the lack of a direct 
effect of frame on behavioral intent, the study did find evidence of mediation in the latter two of 
the five models, which addressed the emotions of fear and hope as mediators.  Specifically, the 
study found evidence that the message frame had an indirect effect on intent to discuss genetic 
cancer screening with a health care provider, which was the health behavior targeted by the 
messages, via the emotions of both fear and hope.  This is a notable finding because it suggests 
that both hope and fear played a role in the influence of the PSAs on behavioral intent rather than 
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on attitude as initially thought.  More importantly, it suggests that the emotions of both hope and 
fear contributed to the persuasive influence of the PSAs on behavioral intent to discuss genetic 
cancer screening. 
This study suggests that both hope and fear can play a role in the influence of health 
PSAs. At the broadest level, this is consistent with the notion that emotions can influence 
behavior. Especially the emotions examined in this study.   Izard (1977) for example discussed 
the potency of fear, positing that it can have a very profound effect on an individual’s perception, 
thought, and action.  Furthermore, there is large portion of literature suggesting that fear appeals 
are especially effective when used in the promotion of a health detection behaviors (Tannebaum, 
2013) 
Likewise, hope has also been found to play a potentially important role in influencing 
behavior.  Bar-Tal (2001) argued that hope was a fundamental psychological reaction for every 
person that also plays an important role in determining human behavior.  More recently, work by 
Prestin (2013) suggested that hopeful emotional responses to messages can lead to greater 
motivation and that such “approach oriented motivational responses are consistent with the 
action tendency of hope” (p. 336). 
Consistent with this, findings from this study suggest that the use of hope appeals may 
also be just as effective as fear appeals in promoting such health detection behaviors, such as 
discussing genetic cancer screening.  Indeed, the very premise of this study of course was to seek 
out potentially effective alternatives to fear appeals, to seek out ways to motivate people other 
than terrifying them in to adopting a behavior and evidence from this study seems to indicate that 
the use of hope appeals may be a viable alternative to the use of fear appeals.   
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6.1 Overall effectiveness of the PSAs compared to a control condition  
The first analyses examined the overall effectiveness of the two PSAs (fear-frame 
message, hope-framed message) compared to a control group.  The two framed messages that 
were used in this study were designed specifically to elicit certain emotional responses.  The 
fear-framed message should have led to more fear relative to the other messages whereas the 
hope-framed message should have led to more hope.  Likewise, it was also expected that both the 
fear- and hope-framed messages would result in a more positive attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening and greater intent to discuss genetic cancer screening than the control message, which 
made no mention of genetic screening.  
H1 predicted that the fear-framed PSA would result in higher levels of fear than both the 
control group and the hope group.  Fear was significantly higher in the fear group than the 
control group, but was only marginally higher than the hope group, when all three groups were 
compared. This would seem to suggest that there was some element in both PSAs that elicited 
fear.  In other words, it would appear that respondents in both the hope and the fear groups had a 
fear response to the message, regardless of the frame used. This is understandable when one 
considers the potentially dire outcomes associated with the diagnosis of cancer. This was still a 
somewhat unexpected finding, however. The fear-framed PSA produced for this study was 
intended to be a “classic” fear appeal designed to elicit high levels of fear. Recall that fear 
appeals are persuasive messages designed to scare people by describing the terrible things that 
will happen to them if they do not do what the message recommends (Witte, 1992a).  The fear-
framed PSA in this study was quite explicit (and rather dramatically so!) in its demonstration of 
the potential consequence of not discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider 
while the hope PSA focused on showing the positive “consequences” of adopting the behavior. 
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The fact that the hope message still led to fearful responses could be attributable to the high level 
of fear associated with cancer in general.  
Similarly, H2 predicted that the hope-framed PSA would result in higher levels of hope 
than both the fear and the control groups.  Levels of hope were significantly higher in the hope 
group than the fear group which was expected. However, there was no significant difference in 
the levels of hope between the hope group and the control group.  This outcome may be due to 
an increase in hope by the control message, a suppression of hope by the fear-framed PSA, or 
both.  Although the control group message was selected because it was thought to not contain 
any strong emotional appeals, it did discuss how easy it is for people to take simple steps to save 
energy and help protect the planet. It specifically told people that they could “make a difference” 
and help the planet.  These could have been perceived as somewhat hopeful messages. In 
retrospect, this should have been checked in the pilot tests. Alternatively, the fear message may 
actually have suppressed hope within that group.   
 The next set of hypotheses examined the effect of the two framed PSAs, compared to the 
control group, on both attitude toward genetic screening and intent to discuss genetic screening 
with a health care provider.  The findings from these analyses were mixed.  For example, H3a 
predicted that the fear framed message and the hope framed messages would result in more 
positive attitudes toward genetic screening than the control group message.  This was found not 
to be the case.  There was no significant difference in attitude toward genetic cancer screening 
between the experimental and control groups.  This was a somewhat surprising finding because 
although the experimental messages were framed differently, they both highlighted the benefits 
of genetic cancer screening whereas the control group saw a video completely unrelated to 
genetic cancer screening.  This shows that the experimental PSAs were largely ineffective at 
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changing attitudes toward genetic screening relative to the control group.  This finding could 
suggest that attitude toward genetic cancer screening may have already been somewhat solidified 
among all of the respondents before even seeing the videos.  This is somewhat consistent with 
other findings that suggest attitudes toward genetic screening are generally positive (Henneman 
et al., 2013; Morren, Rijken, Bannders, & Bensing, 2007). 
H3b predicted that the experimental groups (hope and fear) would be more likely than the 
control group to discuss genetic cancer screening with their doctor. In other words, it was 
predicted that behavioral intent would be higher amongst the experimental groups than the 
control group.  This was found to be the case.  Well over half of the experimental videos’ two-
minute run time was spent showing someone engaging in the behavior of visiting a doctor to 
discuss genetic cancer screening.  Those who did not view the experimental videos did not see 
this behavioral modeling nor did they receive the specific guidance about the importance of 
discussing genetic cancer screening.  This would suggest that seeing the behavior actually 
modeled in the experimental conditions increased the likelihood of adopting that behavior.  
Therefore, watching the videos did account for the differences in behavioral intent as expected.   
Overall, these findings suggest that the experimental PSAs did have some effect on 
emotions and behavioral intent but none on attitude toward genetic screening, compared to the 
control condition.  Perhaps the reason that behavioral intent was greater and not attitude was the 
fact that the PSAs modeled the behavior of discussing genetic screening with a doctor but did not 
model actual genetic screening.  
 Another reason may have been self-efficacy related to behavior. Although not 
specifically examined in the context of the models, self-efficacy, is the belief that one can 
perform an action intended to reduce the impact of a condition (Strecher & Rosenstock, 1997). In 
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this case, talking to a health care provider about genetic screening may have been perceived as a 
behavior that they could perform.  It is worthwhile to note that self-efficacy has previously been 
examined within the context of framing research which to some extent was the reason it was not 
the focus of this study. For example, in studying frames and self-efficacy, Van ‘T Riet and 
colleagues (2008) found that people with high self-efficacy beliefs about quitting smoking had 
higher levels of motivation to quit smoking after viewing a loss-framed message.   
It is probably important to point out that although the PSA’s were designed to positively 
portray genetic cancer screening, the PSAs didn’t actually focus on genetic screening as much as 
they did on discussing genetic cancer screening with a doctor.  This difference may be crucial to 
understanding why the emotional appeals failed to have any effect on attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening.  The PSA’s may have had an effect on attitudes toward discussing genetic 
cancer screening with a doctor (which was the modeled behavior) but the survey did not 
specifically ask about that.  Had attitudes toward discussing genetic screening with a doctor been 
measured in the survey, it may have been determined that emotions did mediate the relationship 
between message frame and attitude toward discussing genetic screening.  As it stands, another 
measure would have had to be created to make that determination 
6.2 Comparison of the framed PSAs 
The previous section compared the responses of the experimental PSAs to those of the 
control group message.  The discussion will now move on to compare the two experimental 
PSAs to each other.  This section will focus on the results of testing of the first model that was 
proposed in chapter 2.  This model examined the influence of the framed messages on attitude 
and behavioral intent to discuss genetic cancer screening, and whether attitude mediated the 
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framing effect on behavioral intent.  Prior to discussing this model, however, this section will 
discuss the relationships among all key variables for the experimental groups.   
The manipulation check showed that the fear-framed message did result a greater 
perception of the disadvantages of not adopting the behavior than did the hope-framed message, 
and the frame manipulation did result in the expected elicitation of discrete emotions: the fear 
frame was significantly associated with the level of fear elicited and (when the two frames were 
directly compared) the hope frame was significantly associated with the elicitation of hope. 
However, frame was not related to either of the measures related to genetic cancer screening 
(attitude or behavioral intent). Furthermore, the emotions of fear and hope were not related to 
attitude, but both emotions were associated with greater behavioral intent.  Additionally, it was 
determined that attitude toward genetic screening was also related to behavioral intent.  
The first model explored the influence of message frame on attitude toward genetic 
cancer screening and intent to discuss genetic screening with a health care provider, as well as 
whether attitude mediated the influence of frame on behavioral intent.  In H4, the study looked at 
whether individual frames differentially influenced attitude toward genetic screening and intent 
to discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider.  Specifically, H4 predicted that 
the fear-framed message would (a) result in a more positive attitude toward genetic cancer 
screening than the hope message and (b) that it would lead to greater intent to discuss genetic 
cancer screening with a health care provider.  These predictions were based largely on previous 
research suggesting that fear appeals tend to be more effective when those appeals contain 
information that people can use to reduce the threat (Bastien, 2011; Tannebaum 2013).  In this 
case, the fear appeal contained both a strong element of fear inducing imagery and narration but 
also provided a very clear action viewers could take to reduce the threat. Yet, there was no 
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evidence in support of either prediction.  Specifically, there was no statistically significant 
difference in attitude or behavioral intent between the two experimental groups—the fear appeal 
did not lead to a more positive attitude toward genetic screening nor did it lead to greater 
behavioral intent. Therefore, despite research indicating that this was the more likely outcome, 
this did not occur in this study.  There was no significant difference in the outcomes between the 
two experimental groups despite the fact that the different PSAs elicited the intended emotions.   
Thus far it has been established that message frame had no influence on either attitude 
toward genetic screening or behavioral intent. But the model also examined whether attitude 
influenced behavioral intent.  Shen and Dillard (2007) point out that attitudes can influence 
behavior.  Therefore, H5 predicted that attitude toward genetic cancer screening would be 
positively associated behavioral intent.  This was found to be the case. Attitude toward genetic 
screening was positively related to intent to discuss genetic screening. H6 predicted that attitude 
toward genetic cancer screening would mediate the expected effect of framed message on intent 
to discuss genetic cancer screening. But given that message frame had no influence on either 
attitude or behavioral intent, it would not be possible for attitude to mediate an effect of frame on 
behavioral intent.  Indeed, a mediation analysis of this model found precisely that: attitude 
toward genetic screening did not (and could not) mediate a relationship between message frame 
and behavioral intent.   
To summarize, frame in this model played no role in influencing attitude or behavioral 
intent.  The only significant effect in this model was the relationship between attitude and 
behavioral intent.  
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6.3  Mediation of the influence of frame on attitude: fear and hope 
The title of this study poses a question about whether fear or hope mediates the 
effectiveness of message frames used in genetic cancer screening appeals. Hypotheses addressed 
the role that emotions play in mediating the effect of message frame on attitude. Supplemental 
analyses (discussed in the next section) also addressed the role that emotions play in mediating 
the effect of message frame on behavioral intent.  Analyses so far have revealed that up to this 
point, message frame appears to have played no role in influencing attitude or behavioral intent.  
But further discussion of the potential role of the titular emotions—hope and fear—is warranted. 
A mediation model was presented in Chapter 2 that predicted mediation of the framing 
effect on attitude by fear and by hope (Figure 2).  The assumption underlying this model was that 
both fear and hope would mediate the influence of message frame on attitude but to different 
degrees.  It was expected that the fear-frame condition would lead to more fear, the emotion of 
fear would be positively related to attitude, and the frame would have an indirect effect on 
attitude via fear.  Similarly, the model contained a pathway through which hope would mediate 
the relationship between frame and attitude.  It was expected that the hope-frame would lead to 
greater hope, the emotion of hope would be positively related to attitude, and frame would have 
an indirect effect on attitude via hope.  This model presumed that both fear and hope would have 
a mediating effect but that fear would be the stronger mediator, given that loss-framed fear 
appeals are more effective than gain-framed appeals at inducing a positive attitude toward health 
detection behaviors.   
As noted, it was predicted that the fear framed message would elicit more fear than the 
hope message (addressed previously as H1b), while H7 predicted that fear would be positively 
associated with attitude toward genetic screening. The use of the fear frame did result in a 
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significantly higher level of fear being elicited, but there was no relationship between fear and 
attitude.  Attention then turned to whether or not fear mediated the relationship between message 
frame and attitude.  Put simply, the mediation suggested by this model could not occur due to the 
fact that there was no associative relationship between either message frame and attitude or 
between fear and attitude. Thus H8, which predicted that fear would mediate the relationship 
between message frame and attitude was not supported.   
With hope as the proposed mediator, the model made similar predictions as were made 
for fear as the proposed mediator. As expected (H2b), it was determined that the hope framed 
message elicited more hope than the fear framed message.  However, H9, which predicted an 
association between hope and attitude, was not supported.  Of greater importance to this study 
was H10 which proposed that hope would mediate the relationship between frame and attitude. 
Once again, because there was no relationship between frame and attitude and also no 
relationship between fear and attitude, mediation could not be possible, rendering H10 not 
supported.  
Ultimately, the analyses revealed that the associations of both fear and hope with attitude 
were not significant and that neither hope nor fear mediated the relationship between message 
frame and attitude toward genetic screening. The study asked whether discrete emotions (fear 
and hope) would mediate message frame effectiveness in genetic cancer screening appeals.  
Based on these findings for attitude, the short answer to that question would appear to be “no.”  
In this study, people’s attitudes toward genetic cancer screening were not significantly 
influenced by the framed PSAs they watched, and the emotions they reportedly experienced (fear 
and hope) were unrelated to their attitudes toward genetic cancer screen. Thus, no mediation was 
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possible. However, there was a second outcome measure in this study: behavioral intention to 
discuss genetic cancer screening with a health care provider. 
6.4 Supplemental analysis: The mediation of framing effect on intent by emotion 
The primary focus of this study was on the role of emotion in mediating the effectiveness 
of genetic cancer screening appeals. It was hypothesized that emotions would mediate the 
influence of message frame on attitude, but this not was the case. To some extent, attitude was 
the primary outcome of interest because of its expected role in influencing behavior. For 
example, it has been stated multiple times in this paper that attitudes can affect behavioral 
intention (Shen & Dillard, 2007).  The underlying assumption driving this study had been that if 
frame could directly affect attitude it could also therefore indirectly affect behavioral intent.  As 
this study has shown, however, this did not occur. But the findings had shown that the emotions 
of fear and hope were both related to behavioral intent.  The question was therefore asked, what 
if attitude were replaced in the mediation by emotion models by behavioral intent?  Would 
emotions play a mediating role in such a model? 
 To answer this, a supplemental analysis was conducted that essentially removed attitude 
as the dependent variable and replaced it with behavioral intention. The supplemental model then 
examined the extent to which fear and hope mediated the effect of message frame.  It was found 
that both fear and hope did mediate the relationship between message frame and behavioral 
intent. Although frame had no direct effect on behavioral intent, there was an indirect effect 
through both of the emotional responses. What this may suggest is that at least in the case of 
genetic cancer screening behaviors, the proposal that both hope and fear serve as mediators of 
the framing effect was not off the mark. Emotions did indeed have an effect on behavioral intent.  
It would also seem to suggest the focus on attitude as the primary outcome of interest may have 
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been somewhat misplaced, especially in light of the discovery that most respondents, regardless 
of experimental group, apparently already had a positive attitude toward genetic screening.   
It also bears repeating that the recommended behavioral response in this study was the 
discussion of genetic cancer screening with a health care provider, not actual genetic testing 
itself.  Part of the reason that the discussion of genetic cancer screening was chosen as the 
targeted behavior as opposed to actual genetic screening is that genetic cancer screening should 
almost always be undertaken under the guidance of a health care provider for a host of reasons 
previously discussed.  The public service announcements used in this study therefore modeled 
the initiation of dialog about genetic cancer screening with a doctor and only peripherally 
discussed actual genetic screening so perhaps the primary outcome of interest in these mediation 
analyses should have been on intent to discuss genetic screening rather than on attitude toward 
genetic screening.   
6.5 Theoretical implications   
Much of the framing literature suggests that message frames often act through mediating 
variables to exert their influence on outcome variables.  It has been well established that merely 
examining the effect of frame on a given outcome variable is not likely to advance framing 
theory.  The initial findings from this study showed that frames by themselves did not account 
for significant differences in attitude or intent.  In the first model, individuals who viewed the 
fear-framed video were not significantly more inclined to discuss genetic screening with their 
doctor than those who viewed the hope frame video nor were there significant differences in 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening among the different experimental groups.  In other 
words, neither frame proved to be more effective.   
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  Previous findings from framing literature support the idea that loss-framed messages are 
more effective than gain-framed messages at motivating people to adopt health detection 
behaviors.  For example, when the outcome of a health behavior is not known or uncertain, as is 
the case with genetic cancer screening, people are more responsive to a loss-framed message that 
highlights the consequences of not adopting the behavior (Kahneman & Tversky, 1981; O’Keefe 
& Jensen, 2006)   Based on this, it had been predicted that the fear-framed message would be 
more effective than the hope-framed message in influencing both attitude and behavioral intent. 
There are several possible explanations for why the emotion framing used in the study did not 
have the expected effect on attitude or behavioral intent. 
First, regarding the effect of frame on attitude, it has already been argued in this paper 
that attitudes toward genetic cancer screening among respondents was already somewhat positive 
and this may have been a factor in why frame did not influence attitude.  Recent findings suggest 
that people in general appear to have favorable attitudes toward genetic screening. For example, 
Henneman et al. (2013) reported that the benefits of genetic testing have increased among the 
public resulting in more popular opinions about genetic screening.  While Morren et al., (2007) 
found that attitudes among genetic screening are generally positive.  Since attitudes towards 
genetic screening among respondents was already high to begin with, it is possible that the fear 
PSA was no more effective than the hope PSA at raising attitudes toward genetic cancer 
screening. In addition, self-selection by participants may have played a role. Specifically, 
because the study dealt with genetic cancer screening, people who chose to participate may have 
been those who tended to have more positive attitudes towards that health behavior. Another 
possibility is that attitudes toward genetic screening were influenced by the relative novelty of 
the behavior. Unlike other health behaviors targeted by health appeals such as mammograms, 
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colonoscopies, or even skin cancer prevention, there appear to be relatively few communication 
campaigns addressing genetic cancer screening. It is possible that the relative newness of this 
topic in health appeals and the additional possibility that people simply do not know much about 
it led to people having a relatively positive attitude toward it.  The positive attitudes toward 
genetic cancer screening could also be attributable to social desirability bias.  In general, social 
desirability bias occurs when people either underreport undesirable activities and attitudes or 
overreport desirable activities and attitudes (Krumpal, 2013).  If this were the case, it would 
mean that respondents’ attitude toward genetic cancer screening was a function of their 
perceptions of it as a desirable attitude and therefore positive attitude would have been over 
reported.  
The lack of a difference in attitudes toward genetic screening between the two 
experimental groups may also have been carried over into the lack of a difference in behavioral 
intent as well.  It has already been argued that attitude can influence behavior.  Since attitudes 
toward genetic screening did not significantly differ between the two experimental groups and 
attitude and behavioral intent are related, it is possible that behavioral intent among the 
experimental groups would not differ significantly either.  
Another reason why there was no difference in attitude or behavioral intent between the 
two experimental groups may have been the way the behavior was modeled in both PSAs. Both 
appeals contained the same information on the importance of discussing genetic screening with 
doctor but it was presented in exactly the same way in each video—the same video footage of 
the behavior modeling was shown in each experimental PSA.  Some have pointed out that fear 
appeals are more effective when they contain information that people can use to reduce the threat 
(Bastien, 2011; Tannenbaum, 2013).  But these findings may not necessarily imply that fear 
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appeals containing such information are more effective than hope messages containing the same 
exact information. Because both groups were presented with identical content related to how to 
perform the targeted behavior, it is possible that this contributed to there being no difference in 
behavioral intent between the two experimental groups despite the fact that the messages were 
framed differently.  If this was actually the case, people were responding to the behavioral 
modeling rather than the frame.  
What these findings seem to suggest is two things.  First, if attitude toward a behavior is 
already relatively positive, neither frame is likely to change those attitudes.   Second, it would 
appear that in this case, the use of the exact same information and content on how to perform the 
behavior effectively in the fear message and the hope message may have neutralized the effect 
message frame may have had on behavioral intent.   Regardless of message frame, respondents 
could have simply responded to both messages by thinking they could actually perform the 
message (high self-efficacy).  Furthermore, because frame had no effect on attitude or intent, 
mediation by attitude was simply not possible in this model.   
In terms of implications for framing theory, recall that accentuating certain aspects of 
health behaviors at the expense of others is the essence of framing (Hoffner & Ye, 2009). 
Certainly each experimental PSA developed for this study accentuated different aspects of the 
health behaviors, notably the outcomes.  Yet, the aspect of the behavior itself was characterized 
identically in both messages.  This would seem to suggest that the inclusion of identical 
information about how to perform the behaviors in these messages may have neutralized the 
effect that the differential framing of the consequences could have had on attitude or intent.  
The second set of models in this study focused on determining whether hope and fear 
functioned as mediators of the framing effect on attitude.  Both of these models predicted that the 
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discrete emotions would mediate the relationship between message frame and attitude toward 
genetic screening.  Neither of these hypotheses were supported.  This is because frame had no 
effect on attitude, meaning that the mediation proposed by these models could not take place. 
Because mediation was not possible in these models, a supplemental analysis examined 
whether hope and fear could mediate the framing effect on behavioral intent.  Earlier in this 
study it was determined that message frame did not have a significant direct effect on behavioral 
intent.  However, the supplemental analysis found that that the indirect effect of frame on 
behavioral intent through both hope and fear was significant.  The question arises as to why hope 
and fear would mediate the relationship between message frame and intent but not the 
relationship between frame and attitude.   
One possible reason for this was alluded to earlier in this chapter.  Recall that the 
behavior of interest in this study was the discussion of genetic cancer screening with a health 
care provider.  This is distinct from attitude toward genetic screening.  Whereas attitudes toward 
genetic screening may have already been positive among respondents and thus not susceptible to 
influence by message frame, attitudes toward discussing genetic screening were not measured in 
this study and thus not known.  It is possible that people could have actually had less positive 
attitudes toward discussing genetic screening before seeing the PSAs and that the interaction 
message frame and emotion led to increases in attitude toward that specific behavior as well as 
behavioral intent.  This could have been verified had respondents been measured on their 
attitudes toward discussing genetic cancer screening.  The implications of these findings for 
framing theory should be somewhat clear: framing studies examining mediation should ensure 
that attitudes and behavioral intent align.  In other words, the attitude measured should 
correspond with the actual behavior to which the attitude applies.   As it relates to emotions, 
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these findings do suggest that both positive and negative emotions can have an effect on intent to 
adopt health detection behaviors. 
As a result of these findings, it can be said that this study did extend framing theory by 
identifying two variables, hope and fear, through which the framing effect was conveyed to a 
behavioral outcome.  These findings suggest that both positive and negative emotions (in this 
case hope and fear) can lead to intent to adopt health detection behaviors, which challenges 
previous notions that loss-framed messages were more effective in that regard.  Therefore this 
study’s primary contribution to framing theory is that framing effects on behavioral intent related 
to discussing genetic cancer screening do in fact appear to be contingent on discrete emotions, 
specifically fear and hope.     
6.6 Practical implications 
Overall, this study found that both hope and fear mediated the relationship between 
message frame and behavioral intent.  This immediately suggests that to some extent both hope 
and fear are beneficial and can influence behavioral intent.  To be sure, this study found that both 
the hope-framed and the fear-framed messages led to increased behavioral intent relative to the 
control group and more specifically that the both hope and fear were indirectly responsible for 
the relationship between message frame and behavioral intent.   
Evidence has already shown the value of hope in achieving healthy outcomes.  As an 
emotion, hope is action oriented and can motivate and inspire people to achieve health-related 
goals (Prestin, 2013).  Hope can also lead to the adoption of healthy behaviors.  Snyder (2002) 
for example, found that high levels of hope led to stronger intention to engage in cancer 
prevention behaviors.  What these findings as well as the findings of this study suggest is that the 
elicitation of hope can lead to desirable health behaviors.  Likewise, one could make the 
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argument that utilizing hope appeals should be considered along with fear appeals in the 
promotion of health detection behaviors. This is a potentially notable discovery especially when 
one considers the potential negative consequences sometimes associated with fear appeals.  For 
example, in some cases, fear appeals have been found to be counterproductive, leading to a 
boomerang effect where people actually adopt the maladaptive behaviors instead of the targeted 
behavior (Lennon, et al., 2010).  Furthermore, there is some evidence that while fear appeals may 
increase motivation to engage in adaptive behaviors, that may not necessarily translate into 
behavioral adoption (Halkjelsvik et al., 2013). Certainly it has been pointed out that fear appeals 
often result in stronger negative emotional reactions and in some cases greater perceived 
susceptibility which may not always be desirable (Jones & Owen, 2006).  These are all 
considerable negative consequences that perhaps some may be willing to accept because of the 
well-documented effectiveness of fear appeals.  But this study has helped to demonstrate that 
health communicators and health appeals designers have a viable alternative to fear appeals: 
hope appeals.  Certainly these findings contribute to work already conducted by Prestin (2013) 
and Nabi and Prestin (2016) that demonstrate the potential effectiveness of incorporating hope 
into health appeals.  
None of this is to suggest that people should stop using fear appeals and start using only 
hope appeals.  To be sure, this study provides only limited support of hope appeals that is 
specific to a single health detection behavior.  What these findings do suggest is that perhaps the 
inclusion of hopeful elements in health appeals, especially those that address frightening health 
consequences such as cancer detection, may be as effective as simply trying to scare people into 
acting.  Indeed, evidence in this study suggests that the fear-framed message may actually have 
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suppressed hope. If so, this could reduce some of the benefits that go along with the elicitation of 
hope. 
This study has some implications for health messaging.  In this case, the messages used 
in this study modeled a specific behavior but the study itself did not measure attitudes toward 
that specific behavior.  Much has already been discussed about the possibility that attitudes 
toward genetic screening were relatively positive but this study did not examine people’s 
attitudes about the topic of the PSA itself.  Future research along these lines needs to make sure 
that attitudes toward the actual modeled behavior are measured.  
Another potential implication of this study is that longer or more varied exposure to 
messages about genetic screening may be needed to impact attitudes or to have lasting effects on 
behavior. The PSAs in this study had running times of approximately two minutes.  That is a 
relatively short amount of time to be exposed to a health message.  While the results clearly 
indicate that the PSAs used in this study did lead to greater behavioral intent, it should not be 
assumed that these PSAs should be used by themselves. I would argue that repetition of the 
messaging through the use of supplementary materials promoting the discussion of genetic 
cancer screening with a physician should also be considered.  This could come in the form of 
additional public service announcements, printed and web based materials, and other 
communication strategies that reinforce and provide greater exposure to such messaging.    
Furthermore, while communication alone (such as the experimental PSAs  used in this study) can 
lead to increased knowledge about a health behavior, influence perceptions and beliefs, and 
demonstrate the benefits of behavioral change or adoption,  additional strategies such as 
engaging partners in promoting the behaviors, working with health care providers to promote 
them, and engaging  interpersonal communication about the behavior can lead to sustained 
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change (National Cancer Institute, 2002). This suggests that efforts to promote the discussion of 
genetic cancer screening should go far beyond a single PSA.  
Another way to achieve greater exposure to and impact of the messages would be the use 
of entertainment education strategies. The Entertainment-Education (E-E) approach seeks to 
capitalize on the persuasive power of television to influence audiences to adopt healthy 
behaviors by embedding messages in mass media productions, storylines, and characters 
(Whittier, Kennedy, St. Lawrence, Seely, & Beck, 2005).   In this case, narratives pertaining to 
the discussion of genetic cancer screening could be embedded into the storyline of a television 
show utilizing characters with whom the audience can identify. Entertainment education is an 
ideal way to use emotions such as hope or fear in relation to genetic cancer screening. 
One final implication to be considered derives from the likelihood that more genetic tests 
will become available to the public in the future. As more genetic tests become directly 
available, there will be an increased need for effective communication efforts stressing the need 
to discuss such tests with health care professionals, especially as consumers may lack the 
knowledge to properly interpret the results of such tests.  
 In summary, the findings of this study suggest that health communicators should 
consider incorporating elements of hope in their messages targeting health detection behaviors.  
Whether that is the inclusion of hopeful messages within a classic fear appeal or an appeal 
specially designed to elicit hope although it is clear more research is needed to ascertain the 
effectiveness of hope appeals for health detection behaviors other than discussing genetic cancer 
screening with a health care provider. 
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6.7 Limitations  
This study has several limitations.  The first potential limitation relates to the survey 
itself.  The survey asked about attitudes toward genetic screening, which was not actually the 
targeted behavior.  This brings into question whether the survey should have instead sought to 
measure attitudes toward discussing genetic screening with their doctors which was the targeted 
behavior.  Had attitude toward discussing genetic screening been measured, it could have been 
explored as a possible mediator of the framing effect.  Perhaps a more appropriate model may 
have examined people’s attitude toward the specific targeted behavior rather than attitudes 
toward genetic screening alone.   
Another limitation may be related to the method through which participants were 
recruited and data was collected. This study relied on the use of Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) to recruit participants for the study. MTurk has become a popular option for data 
collection among social scientists (Holden, Dennie, & Hicks, 2013).  In general, the participant 
pool of individuals (referred to in MTurk as “workers”) aged 18 and older sign up to complete 
what are referred to as human intelligence tasks (HITs) for reimbursement (Johnson & Borden, 
2012).  Through MTurk, the study questionnaire was made available to anyone worldwide who 
had joined MTurk as “worker.”  In one sense this could be seen as a strength of the study. For 
example, unlike a lot of research that relies upon a relatively homogenous sample of college 
students, this study recruited from a much broader population that ranged in age from 18-74 and 
had respondents from all over the world.  However, as Johnson and Borden (2012) point out, 
there is concern about the difficulty of controlling how much time MTurk participants spend on 
each section of the protocol.  According to Johnson and Borden (2012) “the primary concern is 
often that the worker simply answers questions randomly or rushes through the study” (p. 249).  
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This must be considered a potential weakness of this study.  Likewise, the length of time 
required of the participants to complete the survey (up to 25 minutes in some cases) may have 
led others to not complete the study or to lose interest in completing the questionnaire. 
Another concern related to the use of MTurk involves self-selection bias.  The 
opportunity to participate in this study was offered only to members of MTurk which could limit 
the generalizability of the findings despite the fact that they came from many countries and 
represented many ethnicities.   
Another potential limitation was the use of all actors as spokespersons.  As previously 
discussed, the messages may have been more effective if they had utilized spokespersons with 
actual experience related to the targeted behavior. For example, the hope PSA may have been 
more effective if in addition to having someone modeling the behavior, it also featured a 
spokesperson who had actually engaged in the behavior and had directly benefitted from 
adopting it.  This may have led to respondents being more able to identify with and trust the 
spokesperson.  
Additionally, this study did not assess the degree of risk perceived by the respondents. It 
asked only if they had relatives that had cancer, it did not examine the extent to which the 
respondents perceived their own risk of getting cancer.  The extent to which they felt risk—
which probably ranged from very little to a great deal—could very likely have influenced how 
they responded to these messages. 
6.8 Future research 
One line of future research should examine the mediating effect of attitude toward 
discussing genetic cancer screening with a health care provider rather than just simply the 
mediating effect of attitude toward genetic screening.  Perhaps attitude toward the actual 
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behavior may have mediated the framing effect on behavioral intent whereas attitude toward 
genetic screening in general did not.  After all, the targeted behavior in this study was initiating a 
conversation about genetic cancer screening with a doctor but the survey asked people not about 
their attitudes toward that behavior but rather for their attitudes toward genetic screening in 
general. Since the emotional appeals in this study specifically highlighted talking to a health care 
provider, future research should measure attitudes related to that specific behavior.  To be sure, 
attitude toward genetic cancer screening was actually correlated with behavioral intent but it 
would have been more accurate to have included attitude toward the actual targeted behavior 
somewhere in the causal pathway and mediation analysis.  
In addition, there were a number of other variables that were measured in this study for 
the purpose of future investigation, and which were therefore not included in the final analysis.  
For example, study participants were also assessed on the extent to which they utilized 
monitoring or blunting coping styles when presented with a potentially fear-causing situation 
using the Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire (Muris et al., 1994).  In general, people who 
“monitor” seek out information to combat a threat while those who use “blunting” typically 
engage in information avoidance when presented with threatening information (Muris et al., 
1994).  Considering that the behavioral action targeted in this study (asking a doctor about 
genetic cancer screening) is essentially an information seeking behavior, a future line of framing 
research should examine the extent to which coping style can act as a mediator of framing effects 
on behavioral adoption.  
Likewise, although not examined in the study reported here, respondents were asked 
about their levels of dispositional optimism using the Life Orientation Test Revised or LOT-R 
(Scheier, et al., 1994).  The LOT-R measured the level of respondents’ dispositional optimism. 
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Future analysis should examine levels of dispositional optimism as a potential moderator of the 
framing effect in genetic cancer screening appeals.  
There is also a possibility that other discrete emotions may mediate the effect of frame on 
attitude or behavioral intent.  Morales et al., (2012) found that utilizing disgust (another negative 
emotion) increased the effectiveness of fear appeals.  This certainly raises the question as to 
whether other positive emotions can increase the effectiveness of hope appeals.  In this study 
respondents reported on seven different emotions including hope and fear.  Future research 
should explore the possibility that other emotions, especially other positive emotions such as 
courage or even happiness, could influence the effectiveness of message frame 
6.9 Conclusion 
The present study was able to provide evidence that both hope and fear mediated the 
relationship between message frame and behavioral intent.  In other words, both hope and fear 
appeared to be effective at transferring the effect of message frame onto behavioral intent.  
Therefore, this study makes a positive contribution to the field of framing research by showing 
that both hope and fear mediate the relationship between frame and behavioral intent.  It also 
shows that both hope and fear can influence the adoption of health detection behaviors.  But, 
much opportunity remains to test how these and other discrete emotions potentially mediate 
other health detection behaviors.  Likewise, it remains to be seen if these emotions have the same 
mediating effect on other health detection behaviors, not to mention health prevention behaviors. 
Furthermore, there is still much to be learned about how these emotions interact with other 
potential mediators to influence behaviors.   
  In all likelihood, there are other mediating variables present in the supplemental models 
proposed in this study.  Examination of other potential mediating variables represent viable 
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avenues for future framing research and will be essential to further advancing framing theory. 
But perhaps more importantly is that to some degree the findings of this study support other 
work (Prestin, 2013; Nabi & Prestin, 2016) that shows the effectiveness of hope appeals.  This 
study also provides some evidence that begins challenge the notion that fear appeals are the most 
effective way to promote health detection behaviors.  This is not to suggest that the current 
literature has concluded that fear appeals are the only effective method to promote health 
detection behaviors.  Rather this is to say that another method to promote these types of 
behaviors has now been identified and that future research should also focus on the effectiveness 
of positive emotions and message frames to influence health behavior. 
  Much has been written about the negativity bias that has proliferated within the field of 
psychological research and earlier in this paper I made a similar argument about the presence of 
a negativity bias in communication research as evidenced by the extensive literature on fear 
appeals but the relative dearth of literature on positive emotional appeals.  Perhaps the most 
exciting conclusion from this study is that it appears to demonstrate an alternative approach to 
the use of fear appeals in promoting health detection behaviors.  The effectiveness and potential 
consequences of fear appeals is well documented but this study represents one of the first steps in 
examining the ability of “hope appeals” to influence health behaviors, especially health detection 
behaviors.  Perhaps in future years, communications scholars can build contribute toward a 
strong evidence base for these types of positive appeals to the point that the term “hope appeals” 
becomes as ubiquitous as “fear appeals.”   
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APPENDICES  
Appendix A 
Draft PSA scripts 
Genetic Screening Message # 1: Fear-framed PSA script 
A young woman is sitting in a doctor’s office looking very nervous.  Her husband is holding her 
hand. 
Narrator (OC).  Jenny’s mother had cancer.   
Close up of Jenny’s face nervously smiling. 
Narrator (OC).  So did her grandmother. 
Cut to nurse walking into waiting room. 
Nurse (smiling): Jenny Mimms? 
Jenny:  Yes, that’s me. 
Nurse: The doctor will see you now.  
Narrator (OC): But Jenny’s not going to let that happen to her. 
Doctor: So you’ve decided to go ahead with the genetic cancer screening we talked about last 
week. 
Jenny:  Yes. I have 
Doctor: I’m so glad.  
Jenny: But I’m a little nervous. 
Doctor:  Don’t be nervous.  Chances are we won’t find anything abnormal.  And if we do, we 
can put into place a plan that will help us better prevent you from getting cancer.  So this test 
reduces your risk of dying prematurely. 
Cut to:  Doctor and Jenny Narrator talking in background 
Narrator (OC): Today, Jenny is talking to her doctor to see if genetic cancer screening is right for 
her.    Genetic cancer screening can alert Jenny’s doctor to the possibility that she may be higher 
risk for mutations that cause cancer.  She and her doctor can then do something about it… [Jenny 
smiles at doctor…doctor smiles back.] 
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Narrator:  Today Jenny is taking steps to find out if she is at greater risk for cancer.  But a lot of 
people aren’t going to take those steps.   
[Cut to shot of people in crowd walking around] 
Narrator: As a result, they may learn too late that they were at increased risk for cancer and miss 
the chance to have done something about it.  
 [Cut to graveyard] 
Narrator (OC):  If you have a family history of breast, colon, ovarian, or thyroid cancer, talk to 
your doctor about genetic cancer screening…before it’s too late.  
 
Genetic Screening Message # 2: Hope-framed PSA script 
A young woman is sitting in a doctor’s office looking very nervous.  Her husband is holding her 
hand. 
Narrator (OC).  Jenny’s mother had cancer.   
Close up of Jenny’s face nervously smiling. 
Narrator (OC).  So did her grandmother. 
Cut to nurse walking into waiting room. 
Nurse (smiling): Jenny Mimms? 
Jenny:  Yes, that’s me. 
Nurse: The doctor will see you now.  
Narrator (OC): But Jenny’s not going to let that happen to her. 
Doctor: So you’ve decided to go ahead with the genetic cancer screening we talked about last 
week. 
Jenny:  Yes. I have 
Doctor: I’m so glad.  
Jenny: But I’m a little nervous. 
Doctor:  Don’t be nervous.  Chances are we won’t find anything abnormal.  And if we do, we 
can put into place a plan that will help us better prevent you from getting cancer.  So this test 
really gives you hope for a more healthy future.  
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 Cut to:  Doctor and Jenny Narrator talking in background 
Narrator (OC): Today, Jenny is talking to her doctor to see if genetic cancer screening is right for 
her.    Genetic cancer screening can alert Jenny’s doctor to the possibility that she may be higher 
risk for mutations that cause cancer.  She and her doctor can then do something to help prevent it 
or detect it sooner. [Jenny smiles at doctor…doctor smiles back.] 
Cut to…Jenny walking with her husband on wooded trail, smiling.   
[Narrator (OC): If you have a family history of breast, colon, ovarian, or thyroid cancer, you 
don’t need to be afraid…there is hope.  Talk to your doctor about genetic cancer screening. 
 
Appendix B 
First Pilot test focus group questions and survey 
Focus group moderator’s guide / survey 
 
Script pilot testing focus group moderator’s guide  
 
[Prior to beginning the focus group I will distribute an informed consent form to each participant 
and say the following]:  
 
Your participation in this discussion is voluntary.  You may leave the discussion at any time.  
Your names will not be used in any report.   I ask that all participants keep this discussion, in 
particular, what others say confidential.   I cannot, however, guarantee confidentiality.  
 
Please read the Consent Form. Do you have any questions about this consent form or how this 
discussion will work? 
 
If you agree to participate, please sign and date the informed consent form.   
 
Moderator:  Thank you for joining me today.   My name is Matt Sones and I am a PhD student at 
Georgia State University.  I am doing a study on the way different emotions effect how people 
respond to health messages.  As a part of this study, I will be producing two short public service 
announcements (aka PSAs) on the importance of genetic cancer screening for people with a 
family history of cancer.   
 
Today, I’m going to show you one of the scripts I have written for these PSAs.   After you have 
read through the script, I am going to ask you for your feedback and opinion on these script and 
the messages that are in the script.  It is important to hear people’s feedback before I produce 
these PSAs. 
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Before I get started, I’m going to take a few minutes to go over some things you need to know 
about this discussion.   
 
First, there are no right or wrong answers—I’m just looking for your opinions.  I will not be 
offended by any opinions you share with me. 
 
I will be taking notes so that I may refer back to it after the focus groups.  I will also be recording 
this discussion to help me better understand your answers.  Once this study is done, I will delete 
the audio recording of this group.    
 
To make sure that I hear and understand what everyone has to say, it’s important that you speak 
one at a time.   
 
Our discussion will take approximately one hour.  I don’t want to keep you here longer than that 
so I may interrupt to keep us on track. 
 
Please turn off your cellphones or put the ringer on silent.   
 
[Begin focus group questions] 
 
Focus group questions for pilot testing of script (Adapted from CDC’s Health Message Testing 
System, HMTS, U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2011).  [Note I will ask each 
question for both of the scripts.] 
I have given you a copy of a draft script for a short (60 second) public service announcement.  
Please take a few minutes now to read the script.  Afterward, I will be asking you some questions 
about the script.  
[When everyone has finished] 
First, I want to ask you about the emotional tone of the script you just read.  I’m going to hand 
out a very short questionnaire that asks you to rate what emotional tone the script conveyed. [I 
will hand out a separate survey form at this time which is in another attachment] 
Please rate the extent to which the messages in the script made you feel the following emotions. 
Rate each emotion listed below on a 5-point scale where 0 = none of this feeling and 4 = a lot of 
this feeling 
 
Worry   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
   
Sadness   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Hope   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
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Anger   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling  
 
Courage  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Happiness  0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Fear  0  1  2  3  4  
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Confusion 0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
 
I will now collect your responses.  
[Collect the surveys] 
Next I would like to ask you a few questions about the script.  
1. What is the main idea that this message is trying to get across, in your own words? 
2. How well do you think the main ideas come across? 
3. What action would the message prompt you to take? 
4. What words were unusual or unfamiliar in the script?  What words could be used in 
their place? 
5. Is there anything confusing, unclear, or hard to understand? 
6. What are your perceptions of this message?  Anything positive? Anything negative? 
7. Is this message believable or not? Why or why not? 
8. Is this message credible or not? Why or why not? 
9. I found this message interesting.  Why or why not?  
10. Do you think this message focuses more on the benefits of talking to your doctor 
about genetic cancer screening or the consequences of not talking to your doctor 
about it?  
11. How could this message be improved? 
 
Moderator:  That is all the questions I have for you.  Do you have any questions for me?  [If none 
then thank them for their participation] 
 
END OF FOCUS GROUP 
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Appendix C 
Recruitment messages for pilot test focus groups (Phase I) 
Recruitment message for GSU students 
Script to alert the class to the email invitation (All students will also receive the email 
invitation, which is the main recruitment message): 
 
I want to let you know that you will soon be receiving an email invitation to participate in a 
focus group research study that explores people’s emotional responses to a public service 
announcement on genetic cancer screening. The study, which is conducted by Dr. Cynthia 
Hoffner and Matt Sones in the Department of Communication, involves participating in a focus 
group to discuss the script for the public service announcement.  The focus group will take 
approximately one hour.  
 
Participating in the study is voluntary. For your participation, you will receive extra credit in one 
course: 2 percent of the total points available in the course. If you decide not to participate but 
would still like to earn the extra credit, the research invitation describes an alternative way to 
earn the extra credit. 
 
The invitation also contains more details about the study as well as the contact information for 
the researchers if you have any questions.  So, expect to receive this invitation, forwarded to 
your GSU student email address, in the next day or two.  
 
The researchers plan to conduct the focus groups on the GSU campus on [date and time TBD]  
 
Recruitment Message: Email Invitation for GSU Students: 
 
Subject Heading: Emotional responses to genetic cancer screening ad – Invitation to Participate 
in Research 
 
Dear Student, 
 
This email is an invitation to participate in a focus group research study that we are doing at 
GSU.  The study explores people’s emotional responses to a genetic cancer screening public 
service announcement. This study involves participating in a focus group with 6-8 other students 
to read and discuss the script for a proposed public service announcement on genetic cancer 
screening.  Participation in the focus group will take you approximately one hour.  
 
A total of 32 participants will be recruited for this focus group study. You are invited to 
participate because you are a college student.  Participating in this research is voluntary, and may 
not benefit you personally. 
 
For your participation in the research, you will receive extra credit in one course: 2 percent of the 
total points available in the course will be given to you. If you decide not to participate but 
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would still like to earn the extra credit, you can review a short article related to your course and 
write a 2-page response paper. To take advantage of this option, please notify the principal 
investigator by email before the survey closes. 
 
To participate in focus group, you will click the link below to [link to Sign up Genius form] sign 
up for a focus group session.  
   
 
Link to focus group sign up [Sign up genius] 
 
Please feel free to contact us with any questions. Thank you for considering your participation in 
this research. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
Matt Sones, Student Principal Investigator 
Cynthia Hoffner, Professor and Principal Investigator 
Department of Communication, Georgia State University 
Contact information: sones@bellsouth.net or 770-403-1342 
 
Recruitment message for recruiting from church (Phase I focus group)  
Good evening / Good morning. 
My name is Matt Sones.  I am a parishioner her at St. Stephens.  I am also a PhD candidate in 
communication at Georgia State University. I am here today to invite any adult aged 18 or over 
to participate in a focus group research study that I am doing at Georgia State to earn my PhD.   
This study explores people’s emotional responses to a genetic cancer screening public service 
announcement. This study involves participating in a focus group with 6-8 volunteers to read and 
discuss the script for a proposed public service announcement on genetic cancer screening.  
Participation in the focus group will take you approximately one hour and will take place 
following this announcement.  
 
A total of 32 participants will be recruited for this focus group study. Participating in this 
research is voluntary, and may not benefit you personally.  
 
If you would like to participate in this focus group today please see me at the table where I can 
sign you up for the focus group.  
 
Thank you for considering participation in this research.  
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Appendix D 
Pilot test consent forms (Phase I) 
Informed Consent form (GSU focus groups) 
Georgia State University 
Department of Communication 
Informed Consent (Focus Group) 
 
Title:    Responses to genetic cancer screening appeals 
 
Principal Investigator:  Cynthia Hoffner, Ph.D. 
Student Principal Investigator: Matthew Sones, MPH 
 
Purpose: You are invited to volunteer in a research study. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate how people respond emotionally to short public service announcements.  You are 
invited to participate because you are potentially a member of the target audience for this public 
service announcement (adult aged 18 or older).  A total of 32 people will be recruited for the 
study. Participation will require approximately one hour of your time.   
 
Procedures:  If you decide to participate you will be participating in an hour-long focus group 
with approximately 6-8 people to talk about a script for a public service announcement related to 
cancer.  During your participation you will first read the script for the public service 
announcement. You will then complete a very short survey asking you to describe how the script 
made you feel.  The student principal investigator will ask you questions about how the script 
made you feel.   He will also ask you if you thought the script was persuasive and easy to 
understand.  Your answers will help the study team improve the script. The focus group will be 
audio recorded in order to help the student researcher better understand what you say.    
 
Risks:   In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. 
However, it may be emotionally uncomfortable to reflect on the experience of having cancer. 
 
Benefits:  Participating in this study may not benefit you personally.  Overall, we hope to gain 
information about how to produce more effective public service announcements.  
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:  Participation in research is voluntary.  You do not have 
to be in this study.  If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to 
drop out at any time.  You may stop participating in the focus group at any time.  Whatever you 
decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
Confidentiality:   We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law.  Dr. Hoffner 
and the research team will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be 
shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, 
the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)).  No names will be used in study.  A number 
will be assigned to each participant by the focus group moderator (student investigator) only to 
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help to facilitate the focus group.  The short survey you will take during the focus group will not 
ask for any personal information.  Data will be stored on the Student PI’s firewall-protected 
computer in a locked office. He will delete the audio file of the focus group once the study is 
finished.  Please do not reveal what was discussed during the focus group. But please be aware 
that, because of the nature of focus groups, the researchers do not have complete control of the 
confidentiality of the data.  Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear 
when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported 
in group form. You will not be identified personally.  
 
Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Cynthia Hoffner, at choffner@gsu.edu  or 404-513-5650 if you 
have any questions, concerns, complaints about this study.  You can also call if you think you 
have been harmed by the study.  Call Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of 
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu  if you want to talk to someone who 
is not part of the study team.  You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain 
information, or suggestions about the study.  You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have 
questions or concerns about your rights in this study. 
 
Copy of Consent Form to Subject 
 
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio-recorded, please sign below. 
 
 
_____________________________________________   ___________ 
Participants         Date  
 
_____________________________________________  _________________ 
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent   Date  
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Informed Consent form (Church focus groups) 
Georgia State University 
Department of Communication 
Informed Consent (Focus Group) 
 
Title:    Responses to genetic cancer screening appeals 
 
Principal Investigator:  Cynthia Hoffner, Ph.D. 
Student Principal Investigator: Matthew Sones, MPH 
 
Purpose: You are invited to volunteer in a research study. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate how people respond emotionally to short public service announcements.  You are 
invited to participate because you are potentially a member of the target audience for this public 
service announcement (adult aged 18 or older).  A total of 32 people will be recruited for the 
study. Participation will require approximately one hour of your time.   
 
Procedures:  If you decide to participate you will be participating in an hour-long focus group 
with approximately 6-8 people to talk about a script for a public service announcement related to 
cancer.  During your participation you will first read the script for the public service 
announcement. You will then complete a very short survey asking you to describe how the script 
made you feel.  The student principal investigator will ask you questions about how the script 
made you feel.   He will also ask you if you thought the script was persuasive and easy to 
understand.  Your answers will help the study team improve the script. The focus group will be 
audio recorded in order to help the student researcher better understand what you say.    
 
Risks:   In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. 
However, it may be emotionally uncomfortable to reflect on the experience of having cancer. 
 
Benefits:  Participating in this study may not benefit you personally.  Overall, we hope to gain 
information about how to produce more effective public service announcements.  
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal:  Participation in research is voluntary.  You do not have 
to be in this study.  If you decide to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to 
drop out at any time.  You may stop participating in the focus group at any time.  Whatever you 
decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
Confidentiality:   We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law.  Dr. Hoffner 
and the research team will have access to the information you provide. Information may also be 
shared with those who make sure the study is done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, 
the Office for Human Research Protection (OHRP)).  No names will be used in study.  A number 
will be assigned to each participant by the focus group moderator (student investigator) only to 
help to facilitate the focus group.  The short survey you will take during the focus group will not 
ask for any personal information.  Data will be stored on the Student PI’s firewall-protected 
computer in a locked office. He will delete the audio file of the focus group once the study is 
finished.  Please do not reveal what was discussed during the focus group. But please be aware 
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that, because of the nature of focus groups, the researchers do not have complete control of the 
confidentiality of the data.  Your name and other facts that might point to you will not appear 
when we present this study or publish its results. The findings will be summarized and reported 
in group form. You will not be identified personally.  
 
Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Cynthia Hoffner, at choffner@gsu.edu  or 404-513-5650 if you 
have any questions, concerns, complaints about this study.  You can also call if you think you 
have been harmed by the study.  Call Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of 
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu  if you want to talk to someone who 
is not part of the study team.  You can talk about questions, concerns, offer input, obtain 
information, or suggestions about the study.  You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have 
questions or concerns about your rights in this study. 
 
Copy of Consent Form to Subject 
 
We will give you a copy of this consent form to keep. 
 
If you are willing to volunteer for this research and be audio-recorded, please sign below. 
 
 
_____________________________________________   ___________ 
Participants         Date  
 
_____________________________________________  _________________ 
Principal Investigator or Researcher Obtaining Consent   Date  
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Appendix E 
Survey questions for post PSA pilot test 
(This survey was used in the second pilot test (post-production), administered online to viewers 
of the produced PSA 
 
 
Instructions:    
Now think about the PSA you have just seen which discussed talking to your doctor about 
genetic cancer screening.  Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using 
the following rating scale: (0) strongly disagree to (6) strongly agree. 
 
1. According to this message, people with a family history of cancer will gain important 
health benefits if I talk to my doctor about genetic cancer screening.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree 
 
2. According to this message, I will lose important health benefits if I don’t talk to my 
doctor about genetic cancer screening. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree 
 
3. This message emphasized the advantages of talking to my doctor about genetic cancer 
screening. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree 
 
4. This message emphasized the disadvantages of not talking to my doctor about genetic 
cancer screening. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree        Strongly agree 
 
Next I want to ask you about the emotional tone of the PSA you just saw.  
Please rate video PSA on what emotions you think it conveyed.  Please rate each emotion listed 
below on a 7- point scale where 0 = none of this feeling to 6 = a lot of this feeling. 
 
To what extent did this PSA make you feel the following:   
 
Worry   0  1  2  3  4 5 6         
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
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Sadness  0  1  2  3  4 5 6          
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Hope   0  1  2  3  4           5 6        
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
 
Anger   0  1  2  3  4           5 6        
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling  
 
Courage  0  1  2  3  4           5       6 
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Happiness  0  1  2  3  4            5  6 
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
55 
Fear  0  1  2  3  4       5   6           
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Confusion 0  1  2  3  4            5 6 
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Lastly, please rate the overall effectiveness of the ads you saw using the following scale.  
On a scale from 0 to 6, where 0 indicates that you strongly disagree, and 6 indicates that you 
strongly agree, please indicate the number which indicates how much you agree or disagree with 
this advertisement. 
1. Overall, I liked this ad 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
2. The ad was interesting  
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
 
 
3. This ad was easy to understand  
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
4. I would pay attention to this ad if I saw it 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6 
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
5. I am interested in this ad’s topic 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
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Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
6. I like the way the ad looks 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
7. I can do what the ad suggests 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
 
8. The ad was convincing 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
9. The ad grabbed my attention 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6 
  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree  
 
10. The ad was confusing 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
11. The message was credible 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
12. The message was persuasive 
0   1  2  3  4  5  6  
Strongly disagree         Strongly agree 
 
 
Now we have some questions about you, to help us understand your responses: 
 
1. Has anyone in your family (parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, cousin, grandparent) had breast, 
cervical, ovarian, tubal, peritoneal, colon, or thyroid cancer?  Yes / No  
2. Have you had breast, cervical, ovarian, tubal, peritoneal, colon, or thyroid cancer?   Yes/ 
No  
3. Have you received any type of genetic testing our genetic counseling for cancer at any 
time in the past?  Yes / No  
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4. Have you talked to your doctor about genetic cancer screening for yourself? Yes/ No  
5. Are you female or male?   ______ Female  ______ Male 
6. How old are you ________ Age 
7. With what race / ethnicity do you most closely identify? (Choose any that apply) 
___East Asian/Pacific Islander  ___Hispanic/Latino(a)     ___White/Caucasian 
 ___Black/African American     ___Native American  ___ Other  
Thank you for your participation in this survey. 
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Appendix F 
Pilot test 2 recruitment message  
Script to alert the class to the email invitation (All students will also receive the email 
invitation, which is the main recruitment message): 
 
I want to let you know that you will soon be receiving an email invitation to participate in a 
research study that explores people’s emotional responses to a public service announcement on 
genetic cancer screening. The study, which is conducted by Dr. Cynthia Hoffner and Matt Sones 
in the Department of Communication, involves watching a 2-minute public service 
announcement (PSA) on genetic cancer screening online and taking an online survey about your 
responses to the PSA.  The survey should take approximately 10 minutes.  
 
Participating in the study is voluntary. For your participation, you will receive extra credit in one 
course: 0.5 percent of the total points available in the course. If you decide not to participate but 
would still like to earn the extra credit, the research invitation describes an alternative way to 
earn the extra credit. 
 
The invitation also contains more details about the study and a link to the survey which will open 
on March 22, 2016 as well as the contact information for the researchers if you have any 
questions.  So, expect to receive this invitation, forwarded to your GSU student email address, in 
the next day or two.  
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Appendix G 
                                           Pilot test 2 Consent Form 
Informed Consent form  
Georgia State University 
Department of Communication 
Informed Consent (Post-Production Pilot Test) 
 
Title:  Responses to genetic cancer screening appeals 
 
Principal Investigator:  Cynthia Hoffner, Ph.D. 
Student Principal Investigator: Matthew Sones, MPH 
 
Purpose: You are invited to volunteer in a research study. The purpose of this study is to 
investigate how people respond to short public service announcements about cancer.  You are 
invited to participate because you are a communication student at Georgia State University. A 
total of 20 people will be recruited for the study. Participation will require approximately ten 
minutes of your time.   
 
Procedures: If you decide to participate, you will watch a short 2-minute public service 
announcement (PSA) about cancer online and then will take a very short online survey asking 
about your responses to the PSA.  Participation in this study will require about 10 minutes.  
Participants will receive extra credit in one course equal to 0.5 percent of the total points 
available in the course. Those not participating or ineligible who would still like to earn the extra 
credit, may review a short article related to the course and write a half-page response paper.  
 
Risks: In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life. 
However, it may be emotionally uncomfortable to reflect on the experience of having cancer. 
 
Benefits:  Participating in this study may not benefit you personally.  Overall, we hope to gain 
information about how to produce more effective public service announcements.  
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in this research is voluntary.  If you 
decide not to be in the study and change your mind, you have the right to drop out at any 
time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any time.  Whatever you decide, you 
will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled. 
 
Confidentiality:  We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will not ask 
you for any identifying information. IP addresses will not be collected for this study.  Because 
this is an online study, however, data sent over the Internet may not be secure.  Therefore, we 
cannot guarantee anonymity.  Dr. Cynthia Hoffner and Matt Sones will have access to the 
information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is 
done correctly (GSU Institutional Review Board, the Office for Human Research Protection 
(OHRP)). Data will be stored on the Student PI’s firewall-protected computer in a locked office. 
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We will use a survey number rather than your name on study records. Your name and other facts 
that might point to you will not appear when we present this study or publish its results. The 
findings will be summarized and reported in group form. You will not be identified personally. 
 
Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Cynthia Hoffner, at choffner@gsu.edu or 404-513-5650 if you 
have any questions, concerns, or complaints about this study.  You can also call if you think you 
have been harmed by the study.  Call Susan Vogtner in the Georgia State University Office of 
Research Integrity at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu if you want to talk to someone who is 
not part of the study team. You can talk about questions, concerns, or suggestions about the 
study.  You can also call Susan Vogtner if you have questions or concerns about your rights in 
this study. 
 
Copy of Consent Form to Subject 
 
If you would like to keep a copy of the consent form, please print a copy. 
 
If you are 18 or older, and willing to volunteer for this research, please click the “I agree” button 
below.  
 
 
I agree                 I decline   
 
[If decline, the individual will see the following message] 
 
“Thank you for your interest in this study.” 
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Appendix H 
Main study recruitment message (MTurk recruitment message) 
Project Name (not displayed to workers): Public Service Announcement Study 
 
Title: Complete a Survey about a short public service announcement video 
 
Description: This study examines how people respond to a public service announcement.  The 
public service announcement may be about cancer or energy conservation.   
 
Keywords: Cancer, genetic screening, energy conservation, public service announcements,  
 
Reward per assignment: 40 cents 
 
Time:  25 Minutes  
 
HIT expires in: 7 days 
 
Auto-approve and pay workers in: 2 days 
 
Invitation: 
 
Researchers at Georgia State University are conducting academic research on how people 
respond differently to public service announcements (short television ads).  The study seeks to 
understand what responses have to these types of ads.  The survey will take 20 to 25 minutes to 
complete.  
 
Anyone can participate who is at least 18 years old. By participating in this study, you will not 
have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.  However, it may be emotionally 
uncomfortable to reflect on the possibility of dying of cancer.  IRB approval is on file for this 
study. Select the link below to complete the survey.  
 
When you have finished the survey, please enter your Mechanical Turk Worker ID in the box on 
the last survey page, to receive 40 cents payment. After it’s confirmed that you completed the 
survey, your payment will be transferred to your MTurk account.  
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Appendix I 
Main Study Informed Consent Form  
Informed Consent Form 
Georgia State University 
Department of Communication 
Informed Consent  (Main Study) 
 
Title:  Responses to genetic cancer screening appeals 
 
Principal Investigator:  Cynthia Hoffner, Ph.D. 
Student Principal Investigator: Matthew Sones, MPH 
 
Purpose: You are invited to volunteer in a research study. The purpose of this study is to learn 
more about how people respond to public service announcements.  You are invited to be in the 
study because you are registered with MTurk. You also must be an adult aged 18 or older. We 
will ask up to 1000 people to be in this study. The study will take about 20 to 25 minutes.   
 
Procedures:  If you decide to be in this study, you will watch a public service announcement 
(PSA). The video will be about 2-minutes long. The PSA may be about genetic cancer screening 
or energy conservation. Before watching the video you will be asked some questions about 
your personality.  After watching the video you will be asked about your responses to the 
video. You will also be asked for your thoughts and attitudes about cancer. These activities 
will take place online using Survey Monkey.  Your participation will require about 20 to 25 
minutes. Forty cents will be deposited to your MTurk account after completing the online 
surveys.   
 
Risks:  In this study, you will not have any more risks than you would in a normal day of life.  
However, it may be emotionally uncomfortable to reflect on the possibility of dying of cancer.  
 
Benefits:  Being in this study may not help you personally. But we hope to learn more how to 
design  public service announcements.  
 
Voluntary Participation and Withdrawal: Participation in this research is voluntary. You have 
the right to drop out of the study at any time. You may skip questions or stop participating at any 
time.  Whatever you decide, you will not lose any benefits to which you are otherwise entitled.  
 
Confidentiality: We will keep your records private to the extent allowed by law. We will not ask 
you for any identifying information. IP addresses will not be collected for this study. Because 
this is an online study, however, data sent over the Internet may not be secure.  Therefore, we 
cannot guarantee anonymity.  Dr. Cynthia Hoffner and Matt Sones will have access to the 
information you provide. Information may also be shared with those who make sure the study is 
done correctly. These include the GSU Institutional Review Board and the Office for Human 
Research Protection. Data will be stored on the Student PI’s firewall-protected computer. The 
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computer is in his locked office. The findings will be summarized and reported in group form. 
You will not be identified personally. 
 
Contact Persons: Contact Dr. Cynthia Hoffner, at choffner@gsu.edu or at 404-513-5650 if you 
have any questions, concerns, complaints about this study.  You can also call if you think you 
have been harmed by the study.  If you want to talk to someone who is not part of the study 
team, you can call Susan Vogtner. She is in the Georgia State University Office of Research 
Integrity. You can reach Susan Vogtner at 404-413-3513 or svogtner1@gsu.edu. You can talk 
about questions, concerns, or suggestions about the study.  You can also call Susan Vogtner if 
you have questions or concerns about your rights in this study. 
 
Copy of Consent Form to Subject 
 
If you would like to keep a copy of the consent form, please print a copy. 
 
If you are 18 or older, and willing to volunteer for this research, please click “I agree”.  
 
I agree                 I decline   
 
[If decline, the following message will appear] 
 
“Thank you for your interest in this study.” 
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Appendix J 
Debriefing message 
Debriefing Statement #1 
[To be shown to all main study participants who watched one of the two genetic cancer screening 
PSAs at the completion of their survey] 
Thank you for participating in this study.  During this study you watched a short video on the 
importance of genetic cancer screening for some people, and also answered questions related to 
genetic cancer screening.  We understand that talking about cancer and people’s risk for cancer 
can be hard.  We also understand that you may have more questions about genetic cancer 
screening.  If you would like to find out more about genetic cancer screening, the American 
Cancer Society has some excellent information on their website.  Please click on the following 
link if you would like to know more.   
Genetic testing:  What you need to know.  
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/geneticsandcancer/genetictesting/genetic-testing-
what-you-need-to-know-toc 
 
Debriefing Statement #2 
[To be shown to main study participants in the control group who didn’t see either cancer 
screening PSA] 
Thank you for participating in this study.  In this study, you answered questions related to 
genetic cancer screening. We understand that talking about cancer and people’s risk for cancer 
can be hard.  We also understand that you may have more questions about genetic cancer 
screening.  If you would like to find out more about genetic cancer screening, the American 
Cancer Society has some excellent information on their website.  Please click on the following 
link if you would like to know more.    
Genetic testing:  What you need to know.  
http://www.cancer.org/cancer/cancercauses/geneticsandcancer/genetictesting/genetic-testing-
what-you-need-to-know-toc  
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Appendix K 
Final PSA scripts  
Genetic Screening Message # 1: Fear-framed PSA script 
PROLOGUE  
A very sickly young man is sitting.  He has a nasal cannula attached to his face and a cap on his 
head.  He is laboring to breathe.  
Narrator (OC):  Steve was diagnosed with terminal cancer 6 months ago.  He also found out that 
he carries a gene that probably increased his cancer risk.  But he never knew that…until it was 
too late.  
CUT TO 
A young woman is sitting in a doctor’s office looking very nervous.   
Narrator (OC).  Jenny’s mother had cancer.   
Close up of Jenny’s face nervously smiling. 
Narrator (OC).  So did her grandmother. 
Cut to nurse walking into waiting room. 
Nurse (smiling): Jenny Mimms? 
Jenny:  Yes, that’s me. 
Nurse: The doctor will see you now.  
Narrator (OC): But Jenny’s not going to let that happen to her. 
Doctor: So you’ve decided to go ahead with the genetic cancer screening we talked about last 
week. 
Jenny:  Yes. I have 
Doctor: I’m so glad.  
Jenny: But I’m a little nervous. 
Doctor:  Don’t be nervous.  Chances are we won’t find anything abnormal.  And if we do, we 
can put into place a plan that will help us better prevent you from getting cancer.  So this test 
reduces your risk of dying prematurely. 
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Cut to:  Doctor and Jenny Narrator talking in background 
Narrator (OC): Today, Jenny is talking to her doctor to see if genetic cancer screening is right for 
her.    Genetic cancer screening is a simple blood or saliva test that can alert Jenny’s doctor to the 
possibility that she may be at higher risk for cancer.  She and her doctor can then do something 
about it… [Jenny smiles at doctor…doctor smiles back.] 
Narrator:  Today Jenny is taking steps to find out if she is at greater risk for cancer.  Steve never 
took that step. 
{EPILOGUE] 
[Cut back to Steve] Don’t let this happen to you.   
Narrator (OC):  If you have a family history of breast, colon, ovarian, or thyroid cancer, talk to 
your doctor about genetic cancer screening…before it’s too late.  
 
Genetic Screening Message # 2: Hope-framed PSA script 
PROLOGUE— 
A young man is jogging along the trail. 
Narrator (OC): Steve recently found out that he has a gene that makes it more likely that he will 
get cancer.  But he has hope.  He is not afraid.   
CUT TO: 
A young woman is sitting in a doctor’s office looking very nervous.   
Narrator (OC).  Jenny’s mother had cancer.   
Close up of Jenny’s face nervously smiling. 
Narrator (OC).  So did her grandmother. 
Cut to nurse walking into waiting room. 
Nurse (smiling): Jenny Mimms? 
Jenny:  Yes, that’s me. 
Nurse: The doctor will see you now.  
Narrator (OC): But Jenny’s not going to let that happen to her. 
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Doctor: So you’ve decided to go ahead with the genetic cancer screening we talked about last 
week. 
Jenny:  Yes. I have 
Doctor: I’m so glad.  
Jenny: But I’m a little nervous. 
Doctor:  Don’t be nervous.  Chances are we won’t find anything abnormal.  And if we do, we 
can put into place a plan that will help us better prevent you from getting cancer.  So this test 
really gives you hope for a more healthy future.  
 Cut to:  Doctor and Jenny Narrator talking in background 
Narrator (OC): Today, Jenny is talking to her doctor to see if genetic cancer screening is right for 
her.    Genetic cancer screening is a simple blood or saliva test that can alert Jenny’s doctor to the 
possibility that she may be at higher risk for cancer.  She and her doctor can then do something 
to help prevent it or detect it sooner. [Jenny smiles at doctor…doctor smiles back.]… 
EPILOGUE 
Cut to… Steve smiling jubilantly at the sunset.  
Narrator (OC): Just like Steve is doing now. 
 [Narrator (OC): If you have a family history of breast, colon, ovarian, or thyroid cancer, you 
don’t need to be afraid…there is hope.  Talk to your doctor about genetic cancer screening. 
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Appendix L 
Main Study Questionnaire 
**[All respondents completed Section A BEFORE watching the PSA] 
 
Section A 
 
Revised Life Orientation Test (LOT-R) (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994) 
Instructions: 
Please answer the following questions about yourself by indicating the extent of your agreement 
by using the following scale: 
 
[0] = strongly disagree 
[1] = disagree 
[2] = neutral 
[3] = agree 
[4] = strongly agree 
 
Be as honest as you can throughout, and try to not let your responses to one question influence 
your response to another question.  There are no right or wrong answers. 
 
___ 1.  In uncertain times, I usually expect the best. 
___ 2.  It’s easy for me to relax. 
___ 3.  If something can go wrong for me, it will. 
___ 4.  I’m always optimistic about my future. 
___ 5.  I enjoy my friends a lot. 
___ 6.  It’s important for me to keep busy.  
___ 7.  I hardly ever expect things to go my way. 
___ 8.  I don’t get upset too easily. 
___ 9.  I rarely count on good things happening to me. 
___10. Overall, I expect more good things to happen to me than bad 
 
 
Measure of information seeking / need for cognition  
Monitoring Blunting Questionnaire (Muris et al., 1994) 
 
Instructions: In a threatening situation people can make use of two sorts of coping strategies: the 
monitoring strategy and the blunting strategy. When being in a threatening situation, both 
strategies can be used alternately. 
 
The characteristics of the monitoring strategy are: 
(1) The person looks for information within the threatening situation by carefully paying 
attention to what is happening. 
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(2) The person seeks information by asking other people about it or by looking for 
information about it 
(3) The person seeks information within his own past experience by recalling a previous, 
similar occasion. 
 
The characteristics of the blunting strategy are: 
 
(1) The person avoids to think about the situation, directs his attention to other things, or 
tries to forget the situation. 
(2) The person thinks “The situation is probably less serious than it looks”. 
(3) The person engages in pleasant activities to distract himself. 
 
This survey describes 10 situations. Try to imagine that you are in each situation, and 
indicate to what extent you make use of the monitoring strategy and the blunting strategy in each 
situation (0 = not at all; 10 = very much). Refer back to these definitions, so that you can take a 
look at the definitions when you fill in each situation. 
 
1. You participate in a psychological experiment. During this experiment you will receive a 
series of harmless electric shocks. 
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
2. You visit the dentist to undergo a drilling treatment. 
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
3. For some time, you have complaints about headaches and dizziness. You visit your doctor. 
The doctor is suspicious about your complaints and sends you to the hospital to undergo an 
aversive examination. 
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
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Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
4. Due to a large drop in sales, it is rumored that several people in your department at work will 
be laid off. Your supervisor has turned in an evaluation of your work for the past year. The 
decision about lay-offs has been made and will be announced in several days. 
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
5. You have discovered a small lesion on your body. Your doctor sends you to the ER of the 
hospital where the lesion is removed. The tissue of the lesion is under investigation in the 
hospital’s laboratory in order to check out its malignancy. You are awaiting the result of this 
investigation. 
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
6. You visit your doctor with seemingly minor intestinal complaints. However, the doctor 
diagnoses acute appendicitis and says that you have to be operated on as soon as possible.  
Monitoring strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
 
Blunting strategy 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Not at all         Very much 
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[SHOW VIDEO HERE] 
  
**[All respondents completed Section B AFTER viewing the PSA, and were then directed 
to subsequent sections based on their personal and family history of cancer] 
 
Section B (All respondents) 
 
Measures of emotion (adapted from Dillard, et al., 1996) 
 
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you are feeling each of the following emotions. For 
each one, use a 5-point response scale where  0 = none of this feeling to 4 = a lot of this feeling.  
 
Worried   0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
   
Puzzled   0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling        A lot of this feeling 
 
Hopeful  0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Angry   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling  
 
Courageous  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Dejected 0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Happy   0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Afraid  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Confused 0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Irritated  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Joyful  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Sad  0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Fearless  0  1  2  3  4   
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
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Upbeat  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Scared  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Bewildered  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Strong  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Sorrowful 0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Confident 0  1  2  3  4  
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
Annoyed 0  1  2  3  4  
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling  
 
Pleased  0  1  2  3  4    
   None of this feeling         A lot of this feeling 
 
 
Attitude toward genetic screening (adapted from Henneman, et al, 2013) 
 
Instructions:  Please rate the extent to which you agree with the following statements using the 
following scale where 0 = strongly disagree and 4 = strongly agree 
 
 
 
1. To prevent cancer, I would want to know my risk of getting cancer. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
2. I am curious about my genetic makeup. 
 
0   1  2  3  4 
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
3. I do not want to know what kind of diseases I could get in the future. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
4. Genetic cancer tests deprive people of the freedom to live as they want. 
 
0   1  2  3  4   
180 
 
 
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
5. Knowing if you are at higher risk of cancer will help you live longer. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
 
6. Genetic cancer testing does more harm than good. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
 
7. Genetic cancer testing is tampering with nature.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
8. The use of genetic cancer screening should be promoted to people at higher risk for 
cancer. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
9. Genetic cancer screening should be available for those who want it  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
10. Genetic cancer screening should be offered to everyone with a family history of cancer 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
 
Personal and family history of cancer 
1. Have you ever been diagnosed with cancer? (If yes, skip to section F) 
2. Have you received any type of genetic testing or genetic counseling for cancer at any 
time in the past?  Yes / No (If yes, skip to section F) 
3. Has anyone in your family who is biologically-related to you (parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, 
cousin, grandparent) had breast, cervical, ovarian, tubal, peritoneal, colon, or thyroid 
cancer?  Yes / No (If no, skip to section D, if yes continue to section C) 
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Section C (Respondents with a family history of cancer only)  
 
Behavioral intent (Adapted from Rhodes & Matheson, 2005) 
 
Instructions:  Think about the PSA you just watched.  Please indicate your willingness to do the 
following things using the following scale where 0 = strongly disagree to 4 = strongly agree. 
 
1. I intend to talk to my doctor about genetic cancer screening for myself. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
2. I plan on looking into genetic cancer screening for myself. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
3. I plan on talking to my doctor and learning more about genetic screening.  
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
4. I intend to research more about genetic cancer screening. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
Measure of self-efficacy (adapted from Bandura, 2006) 
 
Instructions:   Please rate how certain you are than you can do each of the things described below 
in terms of percentage.  
 
 Rate your degree of confidence by recording a number from 0 to 100 using the scale 
given below: 
 
0% 10  20 30 40 50 60  70 80 90 100% 
Cannot               Moderately                                                  Completely certain 
do at all                                                       certain I can do                                                I can do 
 
         % Confidence 
         (0% – 100%) 
 
I can accurately describe my family history of cancer to my doctor             ______ 
I can bring up the topic of genetic cancer screening with my doctor             ______ 
I can ask my doctor if genetic cancer screening is right for me                     ______ 
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Perceived response efficacy (Adapted from Smerecnik et al., 2011)     
 
Instructions: Consider the following statements about genetic screening.  Please indicate your 
agreement with the following statement using the following scale where 0 = strongly disagree to 
4 = strongly agree.  
 
1. Talking to my doctor about genetic cancer screening will increase the chances that I can 
protect myself from cancer.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
2. Talking to my doctor about genetic cancer screening is the first step toward getting 
screened.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
3.  Discussing genetic cancer screening increases the likelihood that I will get screened. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
Family History of Cancer 
 
1. Above you indicated that you had a family member (biologically related) who had one of 
several types of cancer. Please indicate which type(s) of cancer the relative(s) had (checklist 
containing breast, cervical, ovarian, tubal, peritoneal, colon, and thyroid cancer) 
 
2. Please indicate which biologically-related family members have had one or more of the 
cancers listed above (checklist containing: parent, sibling, aunt, uncle, cousin, grandparent, 
other) 
 
3. Do you have a family history of any other kind of cancer? Yes/No 
 
If yes, please describe. [Text box] 
 
4. Have you ever talked to your doctor about genetic cancer screening for yourself? Yes/ No  
 
(Skip to section E) 
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Section D (Respondents with no personal or family history of cancer only) 
 
Behavioral intent (Adapted from Rhodes & Matheson, 2005) 
 
Instructions:  Think about the PSA you just watched.  Now suppose that you learned about a 
history of cancer in your own family. Keeping this scenario in mind, please indicate your 
willingness to do the following things using the following scale where 0 = strongly disagree to 4 
= strongly agree. 
 
1. I would intend to talk to my doctor about genetic cancer screening for myself. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
2. I would plan on looking into genetic cancer screening for myself. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
3. I would plan on talking to my doctor and learning more about genetic screening.  
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
4. I would intend to research more about genetic cancer screening. 
0   1  2  3  4   
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
Measure of self-efficacy (adapted from Bandura, 2006) 
 
Instructions:   Again suppose that you learned about a history of cancer in your own family. 
Please rate how certain you are than you would be able to each of the things described below in 
terms of percentage.  
 
 Rate your degree of confidence by recording a number from 0 to 100 using the scale 
given below: 
 
0% 10  20 30 40 50 60  70 80 90 100% 
Cannot               Moderately                                                  Completely certain 
do at all                                                       certain I can do                                                I can do 
 
         % Confidence 
         (0% – 100%) 
 
I could accurately describe my family history of cancer to my doctor             ______ 
I could bring up the topic of genetic cancer screening with my doctor             ______ 
I could ask my doctor if genetic cancer screening is right for me                     ______ 
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Perceived response efficacy (Adapted from Smerecnik et al., 2011) 
 
Instructions: Consider the following statements about genetic screening.  Please indicate your 
agreement with the following statement using the following scale where 0 = strongly disagree to 
4 = strongly agree.  
 
1. Talking to one’s doctor about genetic cancer screening will increase the chances that a 
person could protect him/herself from cancer.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
2. Talking to one’s doctor about genetic cancer screening is the first step toward getting 
screened.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
3.  Discussing genetic cancer screening increases the likelihood that a person will get 
screened. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree  
 
Family History of Cancer 
 
Above you indicated that you have no biologically-related family members who have had several 
types of cancer, specifically breast, cervical, ovarian, tubal, peritoneal, colon, or thyroid cancer. 
 
1. Do you have a family history of any other kinds of cancer? Yes/No 
 
If yes, please describe. [Text box] 
 
2. Have you ever talked to your doctor about genetic cancer screening for yourself? Yes/ No  
 
(Continue to Section E) 
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Section E [Note: Asked only of people who saw a PSA about genetic cancer screening] 
 
Manipulation Check (adapted from Maheswaran & Meyers-Levy, 1990) 
 
Instructions: 
Now think about the message you just viewed, which discussed talking to your doctor about 
genetic cancer screening.  Please indicate your agreement with the following statements using 
the following rating scale:  (0) strongly disagree to (4) strongly agree. 
 
1. A person will gain important health benefits if they talk to their doctor about genetic 
cancer screening. 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
  
2. A person will lose important health benefits if they don’t talk to their doctor about 
genetic cancer screening. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
3. This message emphasized the advantages of talking to a doctor about genetic cancer 
screening. 
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
4. This message emphasized the disadvantages of not talking to a doctor about genetic 
cancer screening.  
 
0   1  2  3  4  
Strongly disagree      Strongly agree 
 
(Continue to Section F) 
 
Section F (Insurance information/Demographics: All respondents)  
 
Measure of access to health care (adapted from U.S. Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(MEPS) Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality, 2010) and health insurance coverage 
(adapted from The American Community Survey, U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015) 
 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about your access to health care and health 
insurance.     
 
186 
 
 
1. Is there a particular doctor’s office, clinic, health center, or other place that you go if you 
are sick or need advice about your health? 
Yes   No  
2. If no, what is the main reason you do not have a usual source of health care? 
a. Seldom or never gets sick 
b. Recently moved into area 
c. Don’t know where to go for care 
d. Usual source of medical are in my area is no longer available 
e. Can’t find provider who speaks my language 
f. I like to go to different places for different health needs 
g. Just changed insurance plans 
h. Don’t use doctors / treat myself 
i. Cost of medical care 
j. No health insurance 
k. Other 
 
3. How difficult is it for you to get to your health care provider? 
a. Very difficult 
b. Somewhat difficult 
c. Not too difficult 
d. Not at all difficult  
 
 
Measure of access to health insurance 
 
Access to health insurance will be measured using items adapted from the 2015 
American Community Survey (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2015) 
Instructions: Please answer the following questions about your access to health insurance.  
Are you currently covered by any of the following types of health insurance or health coverage 
plans?  Mark yes or no for each type of coverage in items a – h. 
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         Yes    No 
a. Insurance through a current or former employer or union    ___    ___ 
b. Insurance purchase directly from insurance company          ___    ___ 
c. Medicare, for people 65 and older or people with certain 
Disabilities                                             ___    ___ 
d. Medicaid, medical assistance, or any kind of government 
Assistance plan for those with low incomes or a disability   ___   ___ 
e. TRICARE or other military health care                                 ___   ___ 
f. VA (including those who have never enrolled for VA care) ___   ___ 
g. Indian Health Service                                                             ___   ___ 
h. Any other type of health insurance or coverage plan             ___  ___ 
 
Demographic Questions 
1. Are you female or male?   ______ Female  ______ Male 
2. How old are you ________ Age 
3. With what race / ethnicity do you most closely identify? (Choose any that apply) 
___East Asian/Pacific Islander  ___Hispanic/Latino(a)     ___White/Caucasian 
 ___Black/African American     ___Native American  ___ Other  
4. In what country do you currently reside in?  [Drop down list of countries] 
5. In what country were you born? [Drop down list of countries] 
6. Is there anything else you would like to tell us about your experiences or thoughts regarding 
cancer or genetic cancer screening? [Text box] 
